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ABSTRACT 
The worsening income disparity in Singapore is threatening the 
legitimacy of the Developmental State. In the attempt to address the 
widening income gap, the government has prescribed "productivity 
enhancement and skills upgrading" as the primary means towards building 
an inclusive society. 
Against this backdrop, this case study examined the upward 
mobility of low-wage workers in the unarmed private security sector by 
interrogating the interactions among the state, employers, and workers. 
The study drew upon Bourdieu's Praxeological analysis to investigate the 
causal mechanism underlying their actions and rationale and the reasons 
embedded in their reciprocal relationships in their interpretation and 
facilitation of upward mobility of low-wage workers. 
The findings revealed the existence of institutional and 
circumstantial conditions that have impeded the upward mobility of low-
wage employees in the security sector. These conditions reflect a deep set 
of culturally- and historically-constructed dispositions of a developmental 
state such as economic primacy, pro-business mindset and self-reliance. 
The very same attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors that have 
contributed to Singapore's economic success have also led to the 
immobility of low-wage security workers. As shown in this study, the 
uncovering of the visible and the invisible forces that have impeded the 
upward mobility of low-wage workers highlights the need to explain the 
hidden predispositions embedded within the actors' interactions. 
Finally, the thesis argues that an multi-disciplinary macro-meso-
micro integrated approach of analysing the relational positioning of actors 
can enhance the Praxeological analysis by providing a balanced, yet 
critical, evaluation of a socio-economic phenomenon leading to a practical 
course of actions to improve current practices. 
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REFLECTIVE STATEMENT 
1. Introduction 
As I penned this reflective statement, I had spent five years and 
three months in the EdD programme — a relatively long journey. During 
this period, the world economy (2008-2009) suffered a blow caused by the 
financial meltdown in the West. To save jobs in Singapore, my agency (the 
Workforce Development Agency) was busy pushing out training 
programmes (WDA, 2012a). The watershed General Election of 2011 
illuminated the electorate's discontent with the rising economic inequality 
of "one island two Singapore" (Tan, 2011). Amidst these developments, I 
had a job posting to run an organisation (The Institute for Adult Learning). 
As I am nearing the end of my programme, I could comfortably say that I 
have developed new perspectives on my practice in the field of continuing 
education and training (CET). 
In this statement, I will reflect on my learning journey of traversing 
the academic world and the world of practice over the past five years, 
which could be tormenting at times. Beyond the struggles to balance 
family, work, and learning, my greatest difficulty stemmed from my 
newfound sensitivity to things at work, which I had once assumed to be 
natural; the 'taken-for-grantedness' had disappeared. That sensitivity to 
underpinning assumptions (system of disposition) drove me to ask deeper 
questions and offer alternative perspectives — a process that could be 
draining for me. 
In the remainder of this statement, I will first discuss the gradual 
change in my thinking and learning through the taught modules and 
institutional-focused study that culminated into my thesis project. My 
reflection will end with my redefinition of my practice as a designer of 
change. 
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2. The Sequel of Learning 
The Four Taught Courses 
The first taught module ("Foundations of Professionalism in 
Education") required me to reflect on my practice within the contemporary 
social, political, and cultural contexts in which I work and live. As I 
hesitantly stepped into the overlapping spheres of practice and the 
perceived surreal world of academic learning, I was inducted into the new 
habits and behaviours of critical thinking. 
In re-reading my assignment 1, I could see that my framing of 
professionalism was done within the familiar mental model of economic 
instrumentality. Specifically, I made the remark that "everyone can be a 
professional and put forth that it is the role of the government to nurture 
workers as designers". In retrospect, assignment 1 represents my vague 
conception of professionalism. Herbert Simon (1996) defined a 
professional as "anyone who designs with the intent to devise course of 
action aiming at improving existing situations" (p. 111). This seemingly 
simple definition embodies multiple concepts of structure-agency, logic of 
practice, constraints/enablements, and competing legitimacy among 
actors, all of which I had learnt through the course. 
In Module 2 ("Methods of Inquiry I — Theoretical and Conceptual 
Issues"), I was exposed to the rigour and disciplined way of enquiry 
through research, in particular, how the concepts of ontology and 
epistemology (O&E) formed the foundation of critical enquiry (Crotty, 
1998). My encounters with the diversity of ontologies and epistemologies 
led me on a quest for the O&E that would resonate with me. 
At work, I am regularly inundated with objectivist statistical analyses 
that are used in the design of policies and programmes for a large 
population of beneficiaries. Hence, my desire to hear the voices of people 
propelled me to explore studies under cognitive constructivist (e.g. Piaget 
and many early learning theorists) and social constructionist (e.g. Lave 
and Wenger, 1991; Billett, 2004) models. Exploring how people learn 
marked phase one of my EdD programme. For my module 2 assignment, I 
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designed my first piece of enquiry based on my work — the learning 
journey of mid-career switchers. 
Module 3 ("International Education") was refreshing in its 
exploration of key educational issues from a macro and global 
perspective. In learning about the inter- and intra- interconnectivity of 
issues (political, social, cultural, and economic) and actors (at global, local, 
and sectional levels) with regards to education policies, I am convinced 
that no comprehensive enquiry can ignore the dynamic and complex 
interactions between actors, their actions, and the underlying rationale. In 
particular, the critical perspectives presented by Barnett's lifeworld 
competence (1994), Grubb and Lazerson's vocationalisation of education 
(2006), along with Wolf's challenge to state's skills strategies (2002), 
offered fresh insights on workforce development. For assignment 3, I 
made the concluding remarks that "education is supposed to liberate 
people so that they are unconstrained by sectional interest, and people 
should contain a sense of knowing not derived from mere instrumentality'. 
My subsequent readings of the human capitalist theory (Becker, 1964) and 
the developmental state paradigm (Ashton et al., 2002) challenged me to 
further reflect upon the position of my practice — "for-whom-for-what" does 
CET serve? Now, my thinking has changed from when I completed 
module 3: in my view, economic development need not be in tension with 
human development. As the UNDP (1996) put it, "Human development is 
the end, economic development a means" (p. 3). 
With Module 4 ("Method of Inquiry II: Research Process & Skills"), I 
had the opportunity to try out diverse approaches to data collection, and 
analysis. Through this invaluable experience, I was able to crystalise my 
epistemological stance and explore linkages between theory and 
methodology. Assignment 4 revealed the slant of cognitive constructivist 
and social constructionism: these approaches seemed to sidestep the 
influence of structures in their narrow focus on the analysis at micro-
objective and micro-subjective analyses of social phenomena, thus 
ignoring macro-objective and macro-subjective interactions (Ritzer, 2008). 
As a result, I embarked on an exploration of sociological theories related 
to the concepts of Structure and Agency such as Bourdieu (1977) and 
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Giddens (1984). Delving into the notion of a relational network of actors 
and interplays between agents and structures introduced me to a whole 
new paradigm of understanding social phenomena. That is, the actor, 
actions and rationale are the duality — the making and remaking of social 
structures. 
The Institutional-Focused Study 
For the institutional-focused study (IFS), I conducted a small-scale 
independent analysis of the narratives of two mid-career switchers, using 
Giddens' (1984) Structuration Theory within Ritzer's (2008) macro-micro-
objective-subjective frame. 
My first attempt to present a deep deliberation of the duality of 
structures and agency did not achieve the desired outcome. I realised that 
my analysis failed to adequately identify the causal mechanism of actors' 
actions and their rationale. Essentially, I had only managed to obtain 
phenomenological knowledge (Bourdieu, 1973) as reported by the 
informants. I did not delve deeper into their logic of practice, as advocated 
by Bourdieu (1977) and determined how their socio-culturally constructed 
dispositions are remade through the interplays during their career 
transition journey. 
Inspired by Bourdieu's (2005) work on the Paris housing market, as 
well as Iverson and Armstrong's (2006) study on the working poor in the 
USA, I decided to examine the interactions among the three actors in 
Singapore — the state, the firms, and the low-wage workers in my thesis, 
which will capture the duality of structure and agency. 
The thesis 
The thesis is still a small-scale enquiry, but a far more complex one 
than the IFS. It is also a piece of "real world research" (Robson, 2011, p. 
3) that I hope to translate into a specific course of action, which would 
improve the current CET policy and practice in Singapore. 
After studying many interrelated concepts from diverse disciplines 
(political economy, education, and sociology) within the social sciences, I 
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chose to employ Bourdieu's Praxeological analysis (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992) for my thesis. It offered a strong fit for my thesis because 
it not only places a strong emphasis on the primacy of relational analysis, 
but also facilitates a macro-meso-micro integrated analysis that could 
uncover the system of dispositions underpinning the practice of CET in 
Singapore. 
My work on the thesis has convinced me that an inter-disciplinary 
perspective is far more superior to the "pre-matured specialisation" 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 27) approach of adopting a siloed 
discipline and theoretical lens. Most importantly, the process of the enquiry 
has helped me to appreciate the concept of "bounded rationality" (Simon, 
1996, p. 38). That is, the claim of achieving total social fact in social 
science research is at best satisfying and temporary. 
While my engagement with Western literature has highlighted its 
value in putting forth alternative perspectives, I am constantly questioning 
its relevance to the Asia context. The social, cultural and historical setting 
of the East and West are quite different. Hence, in the thesis, I have made 
a conscious effort to combine relevant arguments from critical research 
work in the West with a case study in the Singapore context. 
3. Practice of a Designer 
My learning from the EdD programme may be summarised as 
follows: to fulfil the role of 'professional as designer', one must engage in 
an ongoing practice of critical reflection. Specifically, such professionals 
view themselves as change agents who are not only concerned with 
improving the means, but also simultaneously evaluating goals, 
assumptions, and dispositions upon which these means are based. At the 
same time, they also take into account moral and ethical considerations in 
making judgments on issues of equity, while demonstrating respect for 
others. 
To engage in such a practice effectively, the designer must cultivate 
the ability to break away from pre-constructed facts (the taken-for-granted 
truths), think relationally (mindful of competing legitimacy among the 
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stakeholders), and acknowledge personal biases (one's social origin, 
dominant domain of understanding, and the tendency to critique without 
also offering constructive implementable actions). 
However, it is impossible to effect change as a single agent. Hence, 
the designer has to rally the support of other stakeholders by putting forth 
a new collective belief as the new social compact (e.g. re-prioritising 
economic development and human development). Such a process will 
involve examining goals, evaluating assumptions, and unveiling the hidden 
system of dispositions. Relational thinking will be useful in understanding 
the stakeholders' (the state, the enterprise, and the worker) natural 
tendencies to compete for legitimacy in fulfilling their respective roles so 
as to build an inclusive society. Achieving a shared understanding could 
help to mitigate the potential tension that could arise among stakeholders, 
which can be triggered by policy changes. 
In striving to remake the structure, designers must acknowledge the 
reality that they are themselves carriers of cultural-historically constructed 
values and disposition; thus, they should be mindful of their social origin 
bias. In order to minimise such a bias in the course of designing change, 
they must first uncover the system of dispositions by going beyond a 
superficial understanding of issues, or pre-constructed facts. 
In addition, designers should also be aware of the second type of 
bias that I call the 'dominant domain of understanding' — the lens in which 
the agent acquired through this silo discipline of understanding (e.g. 
economic lens). Domain bias can negate change because of the siloed 
understanding of issues. A case in point is the CET policy that is based on 
the simplistic economic assumption that high course fee funding will 
incentivise employers and employees to take part in training, as the firms 
and workers are supposed to maximize their utility. Designers need to 
have the humility to learn and the willingness to engage in cross-
disciplinary enquiries to mitigate such a risk. 
The third bias is manifested in the tendency to critique the situation 
without offering implementable actions. Such a bias may stem from the 
aforementioned biases of dominant domain bias and/or the lack of 
relational thinking. For example, the insistence of productivity 
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enhancement efforts onto enterprises without a proper understanding of 
the sectoral business-market differences and its challenges. In order to 
overcome the third bias, a change agent should practise critical reflection 
and strive to embody the attributes of a true professional, as described in 
the first paragraph of this section. 
4. Conclusions 
The EdD journey has been a humbling experience: I have become 
acutely aware of the limits of my knowledge and the need for me to 
engage in continuous learning. In truth, there can be no end to learning in 
life. 
To a great extent, my enquiry through research has been 
transformative in the sense of: developing my learning disposition; 
knowing the tools available for enquiry-based learning; appreciating the 
learning affordances around me; and realising that learning comes with 
the responsibilities to make improvements to the status quo. To me, my 
transformation encompasses the attributes of the four pillars of education: 
learning to know; learning to do; learning to live together; learning to be 
(Delor, 1996). 
I will continue the learning that had begun with EdD in my practice. 
As I am in the midst of preparing the Singapore Continuing Education and 
Training Masterplan 11 (2013-2022), the newfound identity of as designer is 
most timely. I will strive to hone and fine-tune the reflexive practice that I 
have acquired through this course. 
Moreover, as a beneficiary of enquiry-based learning, I vow to 
advocate for research-informed policy and practice in Singapore. As I 
move between the worlds of practice and research, I agree with Lingard 
and Gale (2010) that there is a need to develop the research dispositions 
of policymakers and practitioners, and in parallel, the development of 
pedagogical dispositions among researchers. Only then would we be able 
to maximise the synergies from the two worlds. 	 (2190 words) 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 	 Introduction 
That dreadful year for most parents in Singapore had arrived. My 
son, Ansel, was due to sit for his primary school leaving examination 
(PSLE). At the tender age of 12, the children in Singapore are required to 
take a high-stakes national examination that can determine their future. I 
was anxious that he had been spending considerably more time on soccer 
and music than preparing for the PSLE. 
As a desperate intervention strategy, I decided to expose him to the 
socio-economic impact of educational attainment on one's future potential 
in life. I brought home two publications — the Singapore Labour Force 
Report (MRSD, 2009a) and the Singapore Wage Report (MRSD, 2009b). 
In each document, I carefully selected the graphs and tables that I would 
use as resources to support my after-dinner conversation with Ansel. 
Our discussion covered issues related to occupational categories, 
median wages, and the corresponding educational levels. Ansel posed 
questions regarding where his grandfather, parents, and uncles were 
located in the workforce. Then suddenly, Ansel pointed at one of the 
graphs and asked: "Mum, what will happen to JJ? Will he become one of 
them?" 
JJ was his elder brother's primary school classmate whose PSLE 
score positioned him in the normal technical stream' — the bottom 25th  
percentile of the cohort. Ansel wondered about the chances of JJ 
becoming a low-skilled/low-wage worker. 
I struggled to respond to this difficult question. As a Singaporean, I 
have been brought up to believe in equality of opportunity. Cases of my 
own family, people around me, and the continuous media coverage of 
those who fought against all odds to rise up the social ladder followed the 
'The PSLE result is based on norm-based sorting, with 50% of the annual cohort going 
into the four-year 'Express' stream in secondary education. The next tier of 25% is placed 
in the five-year 'Normal' academic stream and the last 25% is allocated to the five-year 
normal 'Technical' stream. The last group would usually end up at the Institute for 
Technical Education that caters to students who are expected to fill the bottom three 
occupational groupings, e.g. Services, Technicians, and Labourers. 
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script of the Singapore Dream. Nonetheless, I could not give an affirmative 
answer to Ansel. 
Since its inception in 2003, the Singapore Workforce Development 
Agency (WDA) has been providing skills upgrading pathways to low-
skilled/low-wage workers (LSLW), with the aim of facilitating their upward 
mobility. I had joined the WDA in 2003 as Deputy Director of Skills and 
Curriculum, and subsequently as Director of Quality Assurance, to 
oversee the establishment and implementation of the national skills 
framework — the Workforce Skills Qualifications System (WSQ). The 
WSQ is intended to be the main skills upgrading pathway for the LSLW. 
We have launched numerous programmes and schemes aimed at 
helping the LSLW. Our statistics show that hundreds of thousands have 
gone through our programmes, which implies that we must have helped 
them to upgrade their skills and enabled them to move out of low-wage 
jobs. 
Yet, the research I undertook prior to this thesis challenged this 
assumption. In reviewing the outcome of one of the WDA's programmes 
— the Diploma in Culinary Craft, I learnt that one of the trainees had 
moved down to a low-wage job, despite undergoing 15 months of full-time 
culinary training at a hefty cost of S$45,000. I also found that trainees 
were being recycled within the low-wage employment sector. I was 
puzzled by the broken promise of the 'better skills for better life' policy 
rhetoric. 
During the same period, the 2010 Economic Strategies Committee 
(ESC) released its report on building an inclusive society through 
productivity-driven growth, with the aim of raising the wages of low-wage 
workers (LWWs) by 30% over a 10-year period (MTI, 2010). Since then, 
policymakers in Singapore have been reiterating the policy rhetoric of 
improving productivity and skills strategies as the way towards creating an 
inclusive society (Lee, 2010; NPCEC, 2012; Shanmugaratnam, 2012a). 
This thesis is thus my professional endeavour to reconcile the gap 
between the reality of LWWs and the policy rhetoric. Specifically, through 
my research study, I sought to identify and examine the factors affecting 
the upward mobility of LWWs. 
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1.2 	 Growing Concern of Income Inequality 
In-country income inequality has become a pervasive and worrying 
trend all around the world. Some attribute the cause of widening income 
gaps to globalisation: not everyone has been able to benefit from a high-
growth and knowledge-based economic model (Sweet & Melsins, 2008). 
Others highlight the problem of concentration of wealth by the richest 1% 
of the population (Leigh, 2009). 
Regardless of the reasons, studies have linked widening income 
gaps to all manner of ills from mental and physical illnesses to social 
unrest (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). At the macro level, rising inequality 
has fuelled protectionist sentiments, with people unwilling to support open 
markets and free trade, if they perceive that they are losing out (OECD, 
2011a). 
To counter the negative effects of globalisation, governments have 
been busy dishing out suites of public policies in an attempt to narrow 
income gaps (Tobin et al., 2008). The International Monetary Fund (Wade, 
2001), the World Bank (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000), and the 
International Labour Organization (2011a, 2011b) have also published 
many policy recommendations including: the re-distribution of wealth 
through social policies; reviews of wage policies; investments in education 
and training; and the co-creation of quality jobs. 
While the policymakers of some countries such as Singapore and 
the US are more concerned about equality of opportunity, others such as 
the Nordic countries are more concerned about equality of income. 
Despite their differences in emphases, all the governments in the 
aforementioned countries believe that a skills strategy is a sustainable 
solution (e.g. OECD, 2011a). In general, they subscribe to the belief that 
capability development is the most sustainable way of equipping 
individuals with the ability to survive in the highly competitive, globalised 
economy. Thus, investing in education and training is the way to ensure 
equal opportunity (see Wolf, 2002 for a critique). 
In the same vein, the Singapore government has invested heavily in 
formal education and continuing education and training (CET). The 
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government has also attempted to coordinate skills matching at multiple 
levels. At the macro level, coordination is done through aligning skills with 
economic growth strategies. At the meso level, the WSQ system seeks to 
meet the sector's skills needs in terms of the competency-based training 
provision. At the micro level, skills coordination is done by guiding the 
workforce towards jobs that are in demand (Low, 2000). 
The developmental state's 'skills coordinator model', as described 
above, is the envy of many because of its efficiency in enabling full 
employment and steady GDP growth (Ashton et al., 2002a). The 
`developmental state' — an archetype of the East Asian political economy 
coined by Johnson (1982) — describes the East Asian model of 
government in which the state secures its legitimacy through economic 
development. The state places economic growth at the core of its policy 
determination and centrally coordinates economic and other related 
policies. Ashton et al. (2002) who studied Singapore extensively among 
the high-growth East Asian economies found that skills strategies were 
highly coordinated to ensure that skills supply (i.e. education and CET) 
supported the country's economic and trade strategies. 
Singapore's per capita GDP has risen steadily over the last 40 years 
from a low of US$925 in 1970 to US$43,867 in 2010 (See Table 1.1). 
Correspondingly, the average household income among resident 
employed households increased by 48% from S$5,456 (US$4,454) in 
2000 to S$8,085 (US$6,600) in 2010. 
Table 1.1: Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices, 1960-2010 
Year GDP S$ GDP US$ 
1960 1,310 428 
1970 2,832 925 
1980 10,685 4,990 
1990 23,101 12,745 
2000 40,364 23,414 
2010 59,813 43,867 
(Source: Department of Statistics) 
Not only has Singapore done well in its economy, its healthcare and 
education systems have also been identified as exemplary models. The 
World Health Organization ranks Singapore's healthcare system as 6th  
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overall in the world (WHO, 2010). According to the international body, 
Singapore has a well-developed healthcare system with sustainable levels 
of healthcare financing. Singapore is ranked 26th (0.866) out of 187 
countries in United Nations Development Programmes' Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2010a). The report shows that Singaporeans 
have experienced exponential improvements in all aspects of well-being: 
life expectancy, education, and gross national income per capita. 
Neo-classical economists (e.g. World Bank, 1993) would lay claim 
to these indicators as clear evidence of the benefits of a country's 
participation in free trade and the effectiveness of the free market 
mechanism in creating wealth, as reflected in the country's economic 
growth. Statists (e.g. Sung, 2006) would attribute Singapore's success to 
the government's ability to reinvest its 'surplus' yield from the open 
economy in the building of its domestic capability — the strengthening of 
social and economic institutions for sustainable growth. 
Nevertheless, like many other countries with an open economy, 
Singapore is experiencing increasing income inequality. The 2010 
Department of Statistics report showed that, while the general income 
level had improved significantly, the Gini coefficient had also been rising 
from 0.436 in 1990 to 0.481 in 2010 (See Chart 1 below), with the lowest 
20th percentile of the income group experiencing decreases in income. 
The ratio between the highest 20 percent and the lowest 20 percent of 
average household income stood at a glaring 20.9 in 2010, compared to 
11.4 in 1990 (DOS, 2011). Chart 1 also revealed that, despite the 
government's efforts in ensuring equality of opportunity and the social re-
distribution of wealth (MOE, 2009), the income gap had been widening 
over the past ten years (see the green line). 
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Chart 1.1 Gini Coefficient among Employed Households, 2000-2010 
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Statistics suggest that the origins of the LWW problem can be 
found in the low level of formal education of LWWs (OECD, 2006; MRSD, 
2011a). In Singapore, the meritocratic education system means that the 
academically able benefit the most from the system; conversely, the less 
able are 'sorted out' early in life. The low-skilled workers have a minimal 
secondary, or lower, level of education by the time they leave the formal 
education system, with a large majority ending up in low-wage 
employment. 
Improving Productivity and Skills Upgrading — the Only Way to Build 
an Inclusive Society 
Determined to build an inclusive society, the Prime Minister 
commissioned the ESC to study the long-term economic transformation of 
Singapore in February 2010. The committee that comprised members of 
the public and private sectors recommended the skills upgrading of 
individuals and business process innovation at the firm level as the means 
to produce "productivity-driven growth" (MTI, 2010). The ESC believes that 
productivity-drive growth should ultimately translate into a 'better-pay-
better-life' for workers: 
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Singapore should aim to sustain productivity growth of 2 to 3 
percent per year, more than double the 1 percent we 
achieved over the last 10 years. This will raise productivity by 
one-third over a decade. It is a challenging goal, involving 
major changes in every sector and sustained over a full 
decade, and will require a comprehensive national effort. But 
raising skills and productivity is the only viable way to improve 
real wages of workers, and is the best way we can help 
citizens with lower incomes ... We have to boost skills in 
every job. We should develop an outstanding nation-wide 
system of continuing education and training to give everyone 
the opportunity to acquire greater proficiency, knowledge and 
expertise, from the most basic jobs to the most complex. 
Employers and industry associations, unions and government 
will also have to work together to redesign and create better 
jobs. (ESC, 2010: in the letter to Prime Minister) 
Chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, the National Productivity and 
Continuing Education Council (NPCEC) was subsequently set up in April 
2010 to drive the initiative of productivity-driven growth (NPCEC, 2010). 
Productivity-driven growth is premised on Becker's (1964) human capital 
theory that is based on the simplistic assumption that changing business 
processes and enhancing employee competencies will lead to cheaper-
better-faster operations that should translate into employers' ability to pay 
higher wages (see Livingston, 1997; Brown, Lauder, and Ashton, 2011 for 
critique). However, the productivity effect on wages remains inconclusive 
or elusive (e.g. Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004). With regards to productivity 
and skills strategies, Keep, Mayhew, and Payne (2006) pointed out the 
potential trade off between enhancing productive efficiency and the efforts 
of investing in skills and training. Essentially, an improvement in 
productivity does not always lead to an increase in skills investment, 
though the reverse may be true. 
Given these realities, we need to consider the following questions: 
• Does the attainment of higher skills guarantee improved services, 
better jobs, and secured higher wages for LWWs? 
• What would encourage employers in the low-wage sector to 
embark on innovation and subsequently raise the pay of their 
employees? 
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• Does the CET system that is an integral institution of economic 
growth truly facilitate the upward mobility of LWWs? 
1.3 	 Purpose of the Study 
Addressing the education, income, and upward mobility of LWWs 
involves a closely entwined constellation of stakeholders that include: the 
government, employers, trade unions, education/training providers, 
employment facilitation intermediaries, and the LWWs themselves. Their 
respective "bounded rationalities" have a direct impact on the others in 
their interlocking fields of practice (Simon, 1996, p. 38); hence, their 
actions may result in unintended consequences for others. Moreover, their 
rationalities are constrained by their differential positions within the socio-
economic sphere and their unique roles. The "duality" of the nature of their 
actions thus makes them both agents and structures (Giddens, 1984, p. 
25). 
The interactions of these stakeholders have contributed to the 
continuous evolution of Singapore's social, economic, and cultural 
structures. Against the backdrop of Singapore's policy of productivity-
driven growth, this study aims to examine the relationships between 
education, job, and income within the overlapping spheres of a political 
economy characterised by Singapore's concern to maintain its relevance 
in a globalised capitalist world. 
The context of the study is the security sector that has been 
categorised as a low-wage sector in Singapore. Three stakeholders are 
central to this study: a) the small-medium enterprises (SMEs) that 
dominate the low-wage security services sector; b) the voiceless LWWs 
themselves; and c) the developmental state institutions. The study delves 
deeply into the socio-economic setting of Singapore by highlighting the 
predispositions that shape the policy and practice of socio-economic 
institutions by examining: i) the behaviours of the developmental state's 
institutions at the macro level; ii) the coordination complexity of firms in the 
low-wage sector at the meso level; and iii) the experiences and views of 
the LWWs at the micro level. Thus, the study evaluates the extent to which 
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the upward mobility of LWWs is influenced by the interactions between the 
three stakeholders. The main research question is: 
How do the stakeholders interpret and facilitate the upward 
mobility of LWWs in Singapore? 
At the macro level, it is critical to examine the extent to which the 
predispositions underlying the developmental state model, as exhibited 
through its socio-economic institutions, have facilitated the upward mobility 
of LWWs. It is important to note that these predispositions have supported 
Singapore's economic growth over the past four decades. Addressing the 
research question may help to identify the levers of change that are 
necessary for the upward mobility of the low-wage workforce. Thus, the 
sub-question, at the macro level, is: 
To what extent has the developmental state mindset 
shaped institutional behaviours towards LWWs' upward 
mobility? 
With regards to issues at the meso level, resolving the following 
sub-research questions will enhance our understanding of the productive 
system (Wilkinson, 2002) of the low-wage sector, thus enabling us to 
design effective interventions: 
How do firms' response to exogenous forces shape their 
productive/market strategies, organisation of work, and 
skills strategies? 
To what extent has the one-size-fits-all 'productivity-driven 
growth' policy worked for the low-wage sector? 
To what extent has the sectoral environment encouraged 
the adoption of productivity and human capital strategies? 
To what extent have low-wage sector employers facilitated 
the upward mobility of their low-wage employees? 
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The upward mobility of LWWs is premised on the 
resources/constraints available to them and their engagement with them. 
The following sub-research questions at the micro level should shed light 
on job quality issues and societal effects, which may point to possible 
ways for them to improve their chances of a better life: 
How do LWWs' interactions with employers and 
institutions shape their individual skills strategies? 
What is the disposition of the LWWs towards upward 
mobility? 
What motivates them to take up low-paid jobs? 
To what extent are the low-wage jobs a stepping-stone to 
better-paid jobs? 
This study seeks to circumvent the temptation of placing the blame 
on 'victims' or pointing fingers at 'culprits'. Its aim is to present a 
comprehensive macro-meso-micro picture of the low-wage phenomenon 
in one low-wage sector and identify critical levers that could potentially 
enhance the upward mobility of LWWs. 
Most studies on the phenomenon of low-wage jobs are dominated 
by economic theorising. Hence, in this thesis, I chose to adopt a fresh 
approach of using the inquiry lens of economic sociology to analyse the 
actors, actions, rationale, and legitimacy. Specifically, I employed the 
Praxeological approach (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) within a macro-
meso-micro analytical framework to investigate the low-wage 
phenomenon in Singapore. In my view, this methodological approach is 
useful for achieving a comprehensive understanding of the causal 
mechanisms and uncovering the system of dispositions behind these 
mechanisms. Finally, I drew upon the conceptual lens of Bourdieu to 
identify feasible changes to existing policies and systems. 
1.4 	 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents a 
review of the literature in the related fields of political economy, economic 
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sociology, education, and sociology. I begin by examining debates within 
macro-level institutional analyses, evaluating policy interventions in low-
wage issues (e.g. Grimshaw, 2011), and assessing the impact of 
institutional factors on the incidence of low wages across countries (e.g. 
Salverda, 2010). Part Two of the review comprises previous research on 
firms' coordinating activities with stakeholders and their impact on job 
quality (e.g. Carre and Tilly, 2011). Part Three of the review covers the 
studies on LWWs, specifically their profiles, mobility, and intervention 
strategies. This section also focuses on the debates about the 
irreconcilability between the policy intent of lifelong learning and the rigid 
structural and societal barriers confronted by LWWs (e.g. Keep, 1997; 
Rainbird, 2000). This discussion of the literature review also demonstrates 
why an integrated micro-meso-macro approach is most appropriate for the 
thesis. 
In Chapter 3, I explain the implementation strategies of the 
integrated approach for the thesis. The guiding principles of Bourdieu's 
(1973, 1992) Praxeological analysis — thinking relationally, breaking away 
from pre-constructed facts, and the purposeful seeking of the system of 
dispositions — were used in the formulation of the research design of this 
research study, specifically with regards to data collection and data 
analysis. An in-depth discussion of the research questions and the frames 
of reference form part of the chapter. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present an analysis of the research findings at 
the micro, meso, and macro levels, respectively. Chapter 4 sets out my 
qualitative research findings on the experiences of a group of low-wage 
security employees, their socio-economic context, and their experiences 
with their employers. Evidence related to attitudinal, institutional, and 
circumstantial factors that shape the workers' skills strategies are 
presented. The LWWs' access to skills upgrading opportunities and their 
chances of upward mobility is evaluated. 
Chapter 5 focuses on firms in the low-wage private security 
services sector (the meso level), which are operating in a competitive 
cheap-sourcing environment. The chapter studies the complex 
coordination between the firms and the key stakeholders by examining 
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their product/market strategies, skills strategies, and organisation of work. 
Here, I critically review and predict the potential success of the productivity 
growth model designed for the sector. The findings thus shed light on the 
sector's lack of appetite for the high-skills route. 
Chapter 6 examines the behaviours of three developmental state 
institutions that have high stakes in the productivity and wage agenda in 
Singapore — the Workforce Development Agency (WDA), the Union of 
Security Employees (USE), and the Work Group for Security Sector 
Productivity (WGSSP). The findings reveal how the behaviours of the 
three institutions are shaped by their neo-liberal beliefs of economic 
primacy, market fundamentalism, flexible labour market, and pro-business 
mindset. The chapter ends by discussing the contradictions between the 
national agenda of building an inclusive society and the impediments 
posed by the developmental state mindset. 
In Chapter 7, the final chapter, I summarise the key findings from 
the thesis in two broad areas. First, I present a comprehensive picture of 
the low-wage private security sector in Singapore, which had never been 
done in previous research. Second, I argue that the micro-meso-macro 
integrated approach, coupled with Praxeological analysis, is needed to 
achieve a holistic understanding of the relationships between policy and 
practice with regards to improving the upward mobility of workers in the 
low-wage sector. Recommendations for improving CET policies and 
systems, enhancing the upward mobility of LWWs, and shifting the low-
wage sector towards the high-skills road are also discussed. Finally, the 
chapter also proposes suggestions for future low-wage research. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEWING THE LITERATURE — A MACRO-, MESO-, 
AND MICRO- EXPLORATION OF LOW-WAGE ISSUES 
2.1 	 Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical review of relevant studies from the 
fields of political economy, education, and sociology. It begins with an 
examination of literature on the macro-level institutional analysis related to 
low-wage issues. Next, a review of debates at the meso level, regarding 
the behaviours of firms in low-wage sectors, is presented. Then I shift the 
focus to the LWWs in my coverage of literature that relates to the skills 
and labour market from a micro-level perspective. In order to construct a 
sufficiently comprehensive framework, I have cited both international and 
Singapore-based studies. 
The problems of the low-wage economy have captured the 
attention of policymakers and researchers for many decades, as low-wage 
work is a common phenomenon in all regions of the world, be they 
developed, developing, and the less developed. The related issues are 
complex and diverse due to the involvement of multiple stakeholders 
including the state, employers, the workers, and the larger society in 
general. For many economies, the pressure to find ways of addressing 
income inequality has reached a tipping point. The legitimacy of states has 
been challenged, as the populace demands effective solutions to the 
growing income divide. 
Key research institutions such as the recently defunct European 
Low-Wage Employment Research Network (LoWER), the Russell Sage 
Foundation, and many others have been supporting extensive research 
that covers multiple dimensions of low-wage issues. The decades of 
research have, to a great extent, contributed to a body of systematic 
evidence base on low-wage issues, which have helped in the formulation 
of policies and further research. Similarly, the World Bank (e.g. through its 
social inclusion agenda), the International Labour Organisation (e.g. the 
Decent Work Agenda), and the United Nations Development Programmes 
(e.g. the Equity and Sustainability Agenda) have all advocated numerous 
initiatives to alleviate the low-wage situation. 
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It is evident from the literature that macro-level policy issues such 
as wage policy and social distribution have dominated the discussion 
(see, inter alia, ILO, 2008a; Grimshaw, 2009). These studies have 
primarily focused on policy efficacy and potential policy trade-offs. The 
debate on a minimum wage policy has also occupied centrestage (see, 
inter alia, ILO, 2008b; Hui, 2010). 
Institutionists have conducted several studies that examined the 
relationships between economic institutions and the low-wage situation 
(see, inter alia, Salverda, 2008; Gautie et al., 2010; Grimshaw, 2011). 
Specifically, these researchers investigated the roles of institutions such 
as wage setting, employment protection, and other institutional factors like 
collective bargaining in mitigating and/or aggravating the incidence of low 
wages. For instance, the role of trade unions in relation to collective 
bargaining for LWWs has invited much debate (see Baccaro, 2008; Bosch, 
Mayhew, and Gautie, 2010). More recently, other institutional factors that 
affect the labour market such as employment protection legislation have 
also attracted the attention of researchers (see, inter alia, Bosch et al., 
2010). 
Some institutionists have branched out to study the behaviours of 
firms in the low-wage sector in order to understand the causal factors 
between firms' strategies and the incidence of low wages (see Bernhardt, 
1999; Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murane, 2003; Mason, 2004). As job 
quality has been an important item on the agenda in Europe for decades, 
it is, therefore, not surprising to see this topic reflected in the research 
literature (see, inter alia, Leontaridi and Sloane, 2001; Carre and Tilly, 
2011). Studies on job quality have advanced the exploration of low-wage 
issues beyond wages to skills, work efforts, personal discretion, and job 
security. Researchers such as Solow (2008) and Green (2006) have 
argued that these latter factors are directly related to the skills strategies of 
firms; hence, they exert a direct impact on the productivity of the firms. 
In general, the mobility of LWWs has attracted two fields of 
scholars. Economists are essentially concerned with identifying trends and 
predicting the intra- and inter-generational mobility of LWWs (see 
Burkhauser and Couch, 2009; Bjorklund and Jantti, 2009). Human 
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capitalists are concerned with the issues skills matching and the skills 
acquisition of LWWs to enable them to get better-paid jobs (see Iversen 
and Armstrong, 2006; Rademacher, Bear, and Conway, 2001). 
Low-wage studies have been predominantly mono-disciplinary in 
approach. However, a group of scholars across the two continents of the 
Atlantic, under the sponsorship of the Russell Sage Foundation, attempted 
to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to study the low-wage situation. This 
research project produced monographs of six advanced economies (US, 
UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark) and comparative 
studies of these six economies in the final volume, which thrust low-wage 
research to a new height (Solow and & Wanner, 2010). 
From a research design perspective, the studies (both the 
monographs and the comparative volume) effectively integrated 
institutional (macro-level), sectoral (meso-level), and occupational job 
quality analyses (micro-level). By adopting this integrated approach, the 
researchers (economists from diverse specialties, sociologists, and 
scholars from business fields) constructed a relatively comprehensive 
picture of the many relational issues pertaining to the incidence of low 
wages. These studies also constituted a bold attempt to employ a multi-
disciplinary approach for cross-country comparative studies, hence 
overcoming the limitations of mere economic theorising. 
These studies examined how macro-level institutions and factors 
(e.g. policies) influenced the behaviours of firms and LWWs, albeit as 
unintended consequences. The findings have challenged many neo-
classical economic assumptions and provided new insights into the social-
relational dimension of activities that seem to be of a purely economic 
nature. The comparative studies have shed light on the critical role of 
historical, attitudinal, and institutional factors at play, which account for the 
differing levels of incidence of low wages across the six countries. Of 
course, it is inevitable that any research design would have its limitations. I 
will offer a more detailed evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of 
this series of studies in the remainder of this chapter. 
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2.2 Institutional Effects and Their Impact on the Low-Wage 
Phenomenon 
In this section, I will examine the debates surrounding the studies of 
economic institutional effects on the low-wage phenomenon and the 
challenges they pose before linking the review to my research questions. 
Economists, sociologists, and other social scientists have identified 
institutions and institutional factors as a foundational concept in social 
science. Their common claim is that institutions matter and that 
understanding institutions and institutional change are key to the agenda 
of social science (Nee, 2005). An 'institution' is a political socio-cultural 
construct. Therefore, institutions reflect not only the legitimacy of the state, 
but also the state's engagement with the stakeholders and its coordination 
efforts with its institutions. 
With regards to the low-wage phenomenon, economic institutions 
are the focus of many studies. The most frequently researched economic 
institutions are: minimum wage, collective bargaining, union density, 
employment protection legislation, active labour market policy, 
unemployment benefits, non-wage social benefits, and skill formation 
systems. 
Salverda (2008) argued that the selection and analysis of 
institutions in low-wage studies pose major challenges, simply because 
there is a lack of generally accepted frameworks for analysis. 
Fundamentally, the host of difficulties begins with the fuzzy concept of 
`institution' — for example, distinguishing between large-scale 
organisations, specific regulations, policies, informal rules, and 
programmes. The other difficulties relate to the treatment of the concept of 
`institution', such as isolating single institutions or grouping them together 
for analysis. Salverda, (2008) also cautioned against the risk of 
"overestimating the institutional effect to the disadvantage of the role of 
economy" (p. 63). In other words, one must not discount the reality that 
institutions exist as part of a larger structure. Therefore, the analysis of 
institutional effects must take into consideration their position within the 
economic construct. I would also argue that political and sociocultural 
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constructs should be considered in such discussions, as no one country is 
the same. 
Due to the foreseeable challenge, the Russell Sage team of 
researchers decided that, in order for their comparative studies to be 
possible, they had to be "modest in conception and selection and 
conceptually broad with respect to deliberative and regulatory applications, 
both formal (law) and material (policy), as well as to the field of action" 
(Salverda, 2008, pp. 65-66). Therefore, only six institutions were identified 
for the comparative studies: Employment Protection Law, Wage Policy, 
Collective Bargaining Arrangement, Active Labour Market Policy, 
Unemployment Benefits, and Non-Wage/Social Benefits (Gautie and 
Schmitt, 2010). These institutions were brought together under the broad 
label of 'Labour Market Institutions'. The first three were considered to 
influence firms' tendency to pursue low-wage works because of the "exit-
options" (Bosch et al., 2010, p. 92), which has been unintentionally 
created by the institutions. The researchers argued that the last three 
affect workers' willingness to take up low-wage jobs (Gautie et al., 2010b). 
The interactions between the firms, the LWWs, and the unique institutional 
settings in each of the six advanced economies, therefore, create varying 
rates of low-wage incidence. 
At first, it may appear that the comparative studies had 
successfully integrated all the major institutions in the discussion. 
However, a closer examination shows that each institution was treated 
independently in the discussion of the interactions between firms and the 
institutions without referencing the radically different sociocultural and 
economic settings of the respective economies. Such an approach runs 
the risk of treating the institution as the exclusive actor in shaping the low-
wage phenomenon, free of other relational ties. By neglecting to link 
institutions to the larger socio-cultural and economic settings of each 
country and their specific national philosophies and values, the research 
study could have "overestimated the institution to the disadvantage of the 
role of economy" — a common problem that Salverda (2008) had 
observed in earlier studies (p. 63). 
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Another weakness in the researchers' framing of institutional 
analysis is their treatment of skill formation systems. Although there were 
episodic discussions throughout the study (e.g. the German 
apprenticeship system and the lack of vocational education in the US), a 
comprehensive exploration of this aspect at multiple levels was glaringly 
absent. In fact, the research team had subsumed the issue of skill 
formation systems under the banner of 'job quality', thus placing the sole 
responsibility on firms. 
Such an approach overemphasises the employers' role in skills 
formation, thus blatantly ignoring the role of the state and individual 
workers in the skills equation, which Estevez et al. (2001) had clearly 
argued against in their work. Estevez et al. (2001), using OECD data, 
argued for an intricate relationship between workers' skills trajectory and 
firm- and industry- skills demand, which are closely linked to social 
protection and education policies. A more recent study by Tahlin (2007) 
demonstrated the importance of analysing skills formation systems at the 
firm, sectoral, and national levels, so as to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationships between skills, occupations, wages, 
and inequality. Hence, these studies point to the need to incorporate the 
exploration of skill formation systems into a broader institutional analysis in 
the investigation of the low-wage phenomenon. 
In the attempt to contrast the historical and attitudinal differences 
between the six countries, the Russell Sage research team initially 
adopted the typology of the Production Regimes of Liberal Market 
Economy (LME) and Coordinated Market Economy (CME). The central 
argument of Production Regimes is this: how firms try to resolve their 
coordination problems in areas such as industrial relations, vocational 
training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and employee 
cooperation can vary markedly in the two production regimes of LME and 
CME (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In LMEs, firms coordinate their activities 
primarily in terms of hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, 
while CMEs tend to rely more heavily on non-market arrangements. 
In the comparative volume, the research team eventually rejected 
the typology as "limited in understanding the result" (Appelbaum et al., 
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2010, p. 26). The researchers argued that the concept of Employment 
Regimes, specifically Inclusive, Dualist, and Market regimes (Gallie, 
2007), offered a better model for explaining the differences in the 
incidence of low wages among the six advanced economies than the 
Production Regimes. 
As described by Gallie (2007), the Employment Regimes concept 
attempts to bring out the mutual implications of welfare regimes and 
employment policies by linking the power resources, which reflect a 
political compromise by the major social actors through framing patterns of 
social interactions. In Inclusive Employment Regimes, employment 
policies extend protection to the workforce as widely as possible 
throughout the working age. Dualist Employment Regimes favour core 
workforces of the skilled long-term employees at the expense of a 
periphery workforce that experiences poor working conditions and low job 
security. Finally, the Market Employment Regimes emphasise minimum 
protection, based on the assumption that market adjustment will lead to a 
high level of employment in the long term. 
Ultimately, Appelbaum et al. (2010) were still unable to fit the six 
economies neatly into the Employment Regimes concept: 
LMEs such as UK and the US do display a higher share of low-
wage workers, but there is a wide divergence of experience 
among coordinated economies such as Denmark and Germany. 
And France, where state regulation plays a crucial role, does not 
fit the typology very well. Our view is closer to the "employment 
regimes". This framework appears to capture fairly well the low-
wage labor market regimes we observe in our six countries. 
Denmark is inclusive, Germany is dualist, and the US and UK is 
market regimes. France and Netherlands lie somewhere in 
between inclusive and dualist regimes. (p. 26) 
As an afterthought, the research team went further by arguing against the 
stereotyping and forced fitting of institutional differences into overly 
simplistic descriptions of existing political economy models. They also 
pointed to the fragility of national institutional models and the potential 
volatility of national economic and social performances due to externalities 
and circumstantial factors. On a similar note, Bosch, Lehrendorff, and 
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Rubery (2009) posited that the clear understanding of national outcomes 
requires moving beyond typologies, value judgments, and the tendency to 
ignore institutional tensions. 
Considering that both the Production Regimes and the Employment 
Regimes are archetypal concepts modelled on the characteristics of 
Western economies, neither may be suitable for the analysis of East Asian 
countries. Take Singapore as an example. While the Singapore 
government embraces free trade and the open market in its economic 
philosophy, it also coordinates major economic development strategies. In 
fact, this is why Singapore has earned the title of a 'nanny-state' or a 
'developmental state'. Nonetheless, while it is a highly coordinated 
economy, Singapore does not embrace welfarism, as the government 
guards against the risk of unsustainable overspending that could lead to a 
budget deficit and the possible erosion of the work ethic (Huff, 1999; Low, 
2001). Moreover, 'inclusiveness' is practised and expressed quite 
differently in Singapore. For example, the government tries to balance 
between fostering a flexible labour market and ensuring wealth sharing 
through non-wage benefits and the promotion of equal opportunity through 
the skills formation system (MOE, 2009). Low (2001) and Sung (2006) 
have noted that Singapore's political economy is unique in that it has been 
able to design its own terms and conditions, while playing the universal 
game of free trade and open market. 
Hence, those who study East Asian economies, namely Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, have deemed 'developmental 
ideology', a concept originated by Johnson (1982) and further developed 
by Wade (1990), to be most appropriate for evaluating the role of the state 
and its institutions in the development of these economies over the last 
decades (Amsden, 1989; Ashton et al., 1999; Sung, 2006). 
Among the aforementioned East Asian economies, Singapore, the 
setting of this thesis, is the most studied developmental state (e.g. Huff, 
1999; Pereira, 2007, Yeung, 2005; World Bank, 1993). At its core, the 
developmental state theory privileges structural-institutional state power in 
achieving economic development. In a development state, the state 
actively fosters economic development; in fact, it derives its legitimacy 
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from economic achievement. In the process, it establishes a powerful, 
competent, and insulated state bureaucracy (Institutions') that manages 
non-state economic interests effectively (Johnson, 1982; Evan, 1985; 
Leftwich, 1995). 
Ashton et al. (1999) have identified four unique features found in 
the East Asian development states: a) a political-economic strategy; b) 
mechanisms to link trade and industry policies to education and training 
policies; c) central control of the education and training system; and d) the 
ability to maintain the links through time: 
First and foremost was the commitment on the part of ruling 
elites to develop the economy in a specific direction. This 
commitment may have meant taking actions which conflict with 
the immediate interests of either capital or labour. A normal 
basic precondition for such actions is the establishment of a 
relatively strong insulated state. Second, the political 
leadership established mechanisms to ensure that the 
requirements of the economy played a central part in 
determining the output of the education and training systems. 
Third, so that governments could deliver the appropriate skills 
to the workplace, they had to establish strong controls over the 
institutions responsible for education and training. Fourth, 
governments had to constantly steer the system by adjusting 
the outputs from education and training system to meet the 
existing and future demands. (p. 141) 
The developmental state perspective thus provides an essential 
theoretical framework for examining the current state of affairs in relation 
to the low-wage phenomenon in Singapore. It offers a comprehensive 
picture of the unique attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors that 
shape the behaviours of social and economic institutions. For example, 
the industrial, education, along with the labour and wage, policies in the 
developmental state model are aligned with the national agenda of 
international competitiveness (Gopinathan, 2007; Yeung, 2005). 
One result of such an alignment is the adoption of a wage 
moderation policy and a centrally coordinated wage-setting mechanism 
through the tripartite National Wage Council, instead of the usual collective 
bargaining situation of the West (Lim, 1998). Another example is the highly 
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stratified education system that streams students based on academic 
ability and sorts them into vocational and academic tracks that are meant 
to prevent manpower wastage (Gopinathan, 1999; Tan, 2010). These 
examples illustrate the importance of viewing the role of institutions in 
relation to the role of the state and the historical socio-cultural setting. 
Critics have questioned the validity of the concept of the 
developmental state as being East Asian-centric; after all, the model had 
emerged initially from the study of Japan, followed by Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. However, since my thesis is an 
examination of a the low-wage issues in Singapore, such a criticism would 
not undermine the validity of my findings. 
There are also claims that the developmental state is a diminishing 
model — a phase that would pass as the economy matures, hence 
reducing the role of the state and its institutions, as in the case of Japan 
and South Korea (e.g. Low, 2001; Hsieh and Tseng, 2002). However, 
what we have seen in recent years is the ability of the developmental state 
to reinvent itself and its institutions in order to respond and adapt swiftly to 
environmental changes, as Singapore had done in the recent world 
financial crisis (ILO, 2010). The Singapore government put together a 
crisis rescue package (also known as the 2009 fiscal stimulus package) 
swiftly, which included: 1) short-term financing to businesses to ease the 
credit crunch; 2) job credit as a form of wage subsidy to enterprises to 
keep jobs; and 3) high training fee subsidy and absentee payroll to 
employers to encourage skills upgrading in preparation for the economic 
upturn (see MOF, Singapore 2009 Budget, 2009). Due to state 
interventions, unemployment stayed at a low 3.3%, even during the worst 
of the recession; moreover, the economy experienced a quick rebound 
with a growth rate of 14.7% in 2010. 
Thus far, the literature on the developmental state had focused on 
the secrets of success of a state's coordination within free-market 
economies (Ashton et al., 1999; Yeung, 2005). As such, the 
developmental state theory has not been applied to the study of the 
institutional impact on the low-wage phenomenon. Hence, this thesis could 
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set the stage for future comparative studies of the low-wage phenomenon 
among developmental states in East Asia. 
Ultimately, the study of the low-wage phenomenon must 
incorporate an institutional analysis. The challenge lies in the identification 
of appropriate institutions that are most suitable for the purposes of the 
research study. Moreover, it is important to include the skills formation 
system within the institutional analysis, along with an exploration of the 
cultural-historical underpinnings of the institutions within the countries. 
Based on the above discussion, a number of socio-economic institutions 
will be identified within the context of the developmental state in this study. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the key questions for the thesis is: "To 
what extent has the developmental state mindset shaped the institutional 
behaviours towards LWWs' upward mobility?" 
2.3 The Strategic Interactions between Firms and Exogenous 
Forces 
This section reviews the literature that examines firms' coordination 
behaviours with major stakeholders, which influence how they design their 
business strategies. The consequences predict their appetite for a low-
wage workforce. 
The concentration of low-wage jobs primarily in the service sectors 
and some manufacturing sectors has prompted analysts to study the 
strategies of firms in response to the exogenous factors and the firms' 
interactions with various national institutions. Researchers who conduct 
sectoral-focused studies tend to subscribe to the conception that a firm is 
"relational" (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 6); and thus, its success is 
dependent upon its successful coordination with a wide range of 
stakeholders. The underpinning assumption is that firms actively seek to 
exert control over their environment in order to maximise profit (see Bosch 
and Lehndorff, 2005). In the case of the studies done by political 
economists, the focus is on how the behaviours of firms are affected by 
the institutions of the political economy (see Baret, Lehndorff, and Sparks, 
2000; Gadrey, 2000). Research on the field of comparative business 
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systems also shows that national institutional regimes create an 
environment that can affect firms' strategies in response to changing 
market conditions (see Djelic et al., 2005). 
The analysis of low-wage issues at the level of a firm is not without 
its challenges. The differences between the sectors and the lack of 
common frameworks of analysis have been identified as two overriding 
issues (Salverda, 2010). Some analysts have suggested that the great 
variation in outcomes for LWWs across industries provides strong 
evidence that one size does not fit all when it comes to studying the low-
wage labour market. Hence, a qualitative approach that offers an in-depth, 
industry-by-industry analysis should facilitate a better understanding of the 
forces affecting the labour market (Salverda, 2010). 
Gadrey (2000) offered a promising "societal effect approach" for a 
single-sectoral-level analysis in comparative studies on food retailing (p. 
22). The schema is centred on the analysis of the work pattern (i.e., the 
organisation of work time) and two interrelated variables (i.e., job content 
and the segment of employee status within firms). More specifically, it 
examines how work patterns are affected by internal organisational 
structures and external factors (e.g., market structures, industrial relations, 
and domestic culture on the gender division of labour). 
Briefly, the schema adopts the Organization of Work as the unit of 
analysis, which includes job content, time of work, and core/peripheral 
workers, and examines its interactions with four socio-economic 
dimensions, namely: 
a) Market Structures: a firm's response to competition and regulation 
(i.e., market regulation, strategic positioning, and firm's strategy); 
b) Industrial Relations: a firm's response to legislation, incentives, and 
sectoral norms on employment arrangements (i.e., labour market 
characteristics, collective bargaining, pay and skills strategies, etc.); 
c) Organisational Structures: internal hierarchy and decision-making 
power (i.e., deployment of technology, size of firms, autonomy vs. 
centralised decision making, etc.); and 
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d) Domestic/Gender dimension: division of labour along gender lines 
(i.e., socio-cultural norms of male/female work and family 
responsibilities). 
Gadrey (2000) posited that a full explanation of the phenomenon of 
sectoral practices requires all dimensions to be treated as interdependent 
entities that combine to form a system that operates within a national 
system. One attractive feature of the model is that it allows for a 
comprehensive analysis of a firm's interactions with the main stakeholders 
and institutions (law/regulations, social/culture norms, employees, and 
market structures). However, due to its focus on a firm's responses, the 
model pays limited attention to worker responses whose discussion is 
subsumed under the collective bargaining of unions. The orientation of 
Gadrey's (2000) model is primarily towards the identification of a firm's 
adoption of high- or low-road strategies that are mitigated by institutions 
and the market. Essentially, this model is particularly useful for evaluating 
the impact of external factors on a firm's business and operational 
decisions. For the purposes of this thesis, it would need to be adapted to 
take into account the interactions between the state, firms, and their 
workers. 
In order to sharpen their analysis of low-wage jobs, the Russell 
Sage research team built upon Gadrey's (2000) model by limiting their 
research to entry-level jobs (Carre and Tilly, 2011). They argued that 
examining entry-level jobs, rather than entire employment systems, would 
offer insight into the low-wage issue, as workers in this job typically occupy 
socially disadvantageous positions, in terms of class, gender, and race. 
They posited that their sectoral entry-level job analysis allowed for an 
exploration of the interactions between multiple dimensions (such as 
market structures, industrial relations, organisational structures, and 
societal norms) and a firm's strategies. As various studies have also 
confirmed that entry-level jobs have the highest low-wage incidence in the 
service sectors (see, inter alia, Carre and Tilly, 2011; Bernhardt, 1999), a 
focus on entry-level jobs could thus shed light on a specific occupation 
within the sector where the policy intervention ought to take place. 
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In the literature that deals with sectoral studies, the retail sector has 
attracted the greatest interest (e.g. Bernhardt, 1999; Gadrey, Jany-Catrice, 
and Ribault, 2001; Carre, Tilly, van-Kiaveren, and Voss-Dahm, 2010). In 
the series of Russell Sage publications, sectors such as Hotel, Healthcare, 
Cleaning, Food Processing, and Call Centres were part of the cross-
country studies (Gautie and Schmitt, 2010). In the earlier sectoral studies 
in the US, sectors studied included Plastic Manufacturing, Kitchen, 
Hosiery, and Auto-suppliers (Appelbaum et al., 2003). 
What the findings of these diverse studies have in common is their 
conclusion that: firms have significant discretion in the adoption of high- or 
low-road strategies that influence job quality. However, the motivation of 
the firm to adopt high-road strategies is shaped by its strategic interactions 
with various institutions (Gautie and Schmitt, 2010; Gadrey, 2000). 
Arguing against such a claim, Keep (1997) cautioned against an 
overemphasis on the skills competitiveness model, because there are 
numerous alternatives to competitive success via skills and quality. Other 
competitive models may include investment in technology and cost/price 
competitiveness. The assumption that skills competitiveness is the best for 
all may not be true. 
The behaviours of firms across national borders have been a 
research interest to verify the impact of institutions on firms. For example, 
Tilly's (2007) research on Wal-Mart's business strategies in the US, 
Mexico, and other countries revealed that the corporation varies its 
strategies on price-setting, employee wages and benefits, and 
relationships with unions in accordance with the markets, institutions, and 
cultures of the host countries. Tilly (2007) identified the institutional setting 
as a potential leverage point for pressing multi-national corporations to 
adopt practices that are friendlier to local workers and suppliers. That is, 
state institutions should make the best bargain with these foreign direct 
investments to arrive at the best deals for the workers and the local 
suppliers through its socio-economic institutions such as unions, local 
employment protection legislations, and agriculture cooperatives. 
Similarly, results from far earlier studies of manufacturing sectors 
also suggest that the skills strategies of enterprises are closely related to 
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their product strategies (Mason, van Ark, and Wagner, 1994; Mason and 
Wagner, 2002; Steedman and Wagner, 1989). The comparisons of the 
clothing industry, the food processing industry, and the automotive 
industry in the UK and Germany illuminated glaring differences. In the UK, 
firms tend to opt for large-volume standardised manufacturing operations 
with less complex production processes; therefore, these firms are likely to 
be subjected to considerable price pressure. In contrast, German firms 
tend to go for high value-added products with high specifications and 
relatively low volumes; thus, they are better able to set premium prices. 
These contrasting strategies of the two countries have led to the low-skills 
equilibrium in the UK and the high-skills equilibrium in Germany (Mason, 
2004). Thus, the product/market strategy of the sector has a direct impact 
on its skills strategies. 
However, product strategies alone may not be sufficient in 
accounting for skills requirements. For instance, in a recent study 
conducted on the hotel sector in Singapore, Sung, Loke, and Ramos 
(2011) found that luxurious hotels that charge premium prices for their 
superior facilities and services do not all adopt high-skills strategies. The 
disparities in the research findings thus suggest there are sectoral and in-
country differences in terms of institutional settings and firms' responses to 
such exogenous forces. 
Research on East Asian firms has shown that the policies and 
institutional practices of the state do shape the business strategies of firms 
(e.g. Gomez, 2002; Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003). However, there is as yet no 
study on the low-wage sector's strategic interactions with national 
institutions in the literature on East Asia. Understanding such interactions 
is particularly important within the context of Singapore, as the 
government subscribes strongly to its belief that the only way to build an 
inclusive society and to improve the wages of LWWs is through 
productivity growth as the means of economic restructuring. According to 
the Deputy Prime Minister Shanmugaratnam (2012a), this responsibility 
rests squarely on the employers' shoulders. Therefore, it would seem 
logical to study employers' strategies as a consequence of their 
interactions with multiple stakeholders and forces. 
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This review thus shows that a sectoral analysis of firms at the meso 
level is critical to the understanding of the contextual aspects of a specific 
sector in a country. A comprehensive understanding of the sectoral 
operating environment and firms' coordination challenges with 
stakeholders lies at the heart of the meso-level analysis. Within the 
context of this thesis, this review provides a background context for 
addressing my next research question: "How do firms' responses to 
exogenous forces shape their product/market strategies, organisation of 
work, and skills strategies?" 
2.4 LWWs and Their Skills Strategies 
Defining the general profile of LWWs has been a common practice 
of all in-country and cross-country studies on the low-wage phenomenon. 
The data provide a broad understanding of the scope and nature of low-
wage issues. Understanding the profile of LWWs is also in line with the 
need for policymakers to administer policies that serve the target 
audience. The baseline data would include the measure of low-wage and 
the profile of LWWs. Some studies have advanced further by conducting 
comparative analyses on the inter-generational and intra-generational 
mobility of LWWs (see Bjorklund and Jantti, 2009; Yip, 2012). However, 
there are limited studies on the skills strategies of LWWs, with the 
exception of some that have examined the effectiveness of skills policies 
and training interventions (see, inter alia, Pocock, Skinner, McMahon, and 
Pritchard, 2011; Prince, 2008). 
Definition of low-Wage' 
It is worth noting that there is no universal agreement on the 
definition of a LWW (Grimshaw, 2011). The term 'low-wage' connotes the 
relative nature of its definition, i.e., low in comparison to others. Defining 
the term thus depends upon the intent of the studies. Labour economists 
who engage in the study of low-wage issues typically adopt one of the 
following definitions to measure the patterns and trends related to the low-
wage' issue (see Dex, Robson, and Wilkinson, 1999; OECD, 1996): 
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a) An absolute wage is based on an estimation of what an individual 
or a household requires to stay above the poverty threshold. 
b) Fixed proportion of the income distribution (e.g. the lowest 10th or 
20th percentile of the workforce); and 
c) A relative wage is based on a percentage of the median or the 
average wage for the economy. 
The absolute wage measures allow investigators to examine the 
relationship between low-wage work and household poverty (see Altman, 
1996; Cooke and Lawton, 2008). The concept of the fixed proportion of 
income distribution is most frequently used when comparing the income 
disparities between top and the lowest percentiles of a workforce (e.g. 
DOS, 2011). The relative wage measure is typically employed in 
comparative studies across countries (see Gautie and Schmitt, 2010). 
In practice, organisations and countries also vary in their definition 
of a LWW. Adopting the relative wage approach, the OECD defines low 
wage' as income below two-thirds of the median wage of the workforce; it 
is also the most frequently used measure. Singapore does not have an 
official definition for a LWW, though it seems to adopt the OECD's relative 
wage measure in its low-wage policies such as the Workfare Income 
Supplement Scheme. The absolute wage does not serve as a good 
measure in various societies, as LWWs may be staving off poverty 
because they are sharing households with other wage earners. Moreover, 
depending on their country of residence, LWWs may receive non-wage 
benefits through the social re-distribution of national wealth in the form of 
subsidised healthcare, education, and housing (as in the case of countries 
like Singapore, Denmark, and the Netherlands). 
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Profile of LWWs 
International studies show that LWWs tend to be: 
a) Females, rather than males; 
b) Youths up to 30 years of age, compared to older people; 
c) Least educated; and 
d) In elementary occupations that are concentrated in specific sectors 
such as hotel, restaurant, cleaning, and some manufacturing 
industries. 
LWWs in Singapore typically have an educational level of just ten 
years or less. They are generally aged 40 and above. Similar to their 
counterparts in Europe, LWWs in Singapore are employed in lower-end 
service jobs. They typically work as cleaners, food and drink stall 
assistants, retail assistants, private security officers, assemblers, and 
materials and freight handling workers (MRSD, 2011c). 
Gregory (2009) posited that women have a higher chance of being 
LWWs due to their expected social roles of childbearing and caring for the 
family. As a result, they are often penalised in pay either because they 
take a career break or reduce their working hours to part-time work, which 
could have a lasting effect, as they endeavour to return to full-time work. 
Research has shown that pro-creation policies have the unintended 
consequence of perpetuating a pay penalty on female workers, which is 
also observed in Singapore (MRSD, 2011c). Such societies often place 
the child-rearing responsibility onto women, without providing adequate 
institutional support for them to balance work and family (Salverda, 2010). 
Like many advanced economies, Singapore has been experiencing 
a continuous dip in its Total Fertility Rate. Seeking to reverse the 
downward trend, the government initiated pro-natalist policies since the 
late 1990s, which have included monetary incentives, publicity campaigns, 
tax policies, the latest extension of maternity leave, and pro-family work 
practices. In their critique of these pro-natalist policies, Wong and Yeoh 
(2003) pointed out that they have produced unintended consequences of 
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disadvantaging women in the workforce, due to their premature exits from 
the workforce and willingness to take up low-paying mini-jobs. 
Another significant population of LWWs comprises youths. In the 
EU, youths earning low wages are engaged in part-time jobs or 
apprenticeships in firms. Similarly, statistics indicate that there is a high 
incidence of low wages among youths (aged 15-24) in Singapore; 
however, this group includes students working in part-time and vacation 
jobs, along with younger workers in elementary-level jobs. Based on this 
description, youths in low-wage jobs are not a major policy concern in 
Singapore, which explains why the Workfare Income Supplement (tax 
credit) is only offered to workers aged 35 and above (MOM, 2012a). 
As with youths in low-wage jobs, there are differing trends for 
mature low-wage workers across various countries. Mason and Salverda 
(2010) reported that, in Europe, the incidence of low wages for workers 
aged 50 and above is lower than workers in the younger age group, 
except for the UK. This phenomenon may be explained by the generous 
pensions and other forms of financial support provided to older workers. In 
contrast, older workers in the US usually take up lowly-paid jobs as 
"bridge" jobs to retirement due to low pensions (Gautie et al., 2010b). 
Therefore, the availability and the expansiveness of retirement benefits 
can influence the willingness of older workers to take up low-wage jobs. 
In the case of Singapore, the highest incidence of low wages is in 
the 50 and above age group, with secondary education qualifications or 
below. They constitute approximately 40% of the LWWs in Singapore. 
These individuals are likely to have missed out on formal education during 
the earlier years of nation building because mass education only started in 
the early 1970s. Moreover, they lack adequate savings to retire 
(Bhaskaran et al., 2012). For a nation that prides itself on its belief in 
equality of opportunity, this statistic calls into question the effectiveness of 
Singapore's public policies in fostering the upward mobility of older low-
skilled workers. 
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Up-skilling the LWINs 
From the standpoint of some human capital theorists, the reality 
that LWWs are clustered primarily in low-skilled jobs seems perfectly 
logical. As Becker (1964) argued, employers are willing to pay a premium 
for higher-level skills. Moreover, the more 'able' individuals tend to have 
invested more in their education than others. Therefore, there is a high 
incidence of low wages among the lowly-skilled. 
Hence, many human capital theorists have contended that 
investment in education is the only way out for the lowly-skilled (UNDP, 
2010b; ILO, 2011a). Many governments have also pursued the up-skilling 
approach, even though the economic demand for up-skilling remains 
uncertain (see Keep et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2011 for critique). In 
Singapore, LWWs receive up to 95% of course fee funding; on top of that, 
they are rewarded with annual cash incentives for achieving modular 
training under the Training Completion Award Scheme (WDA, 2012b). The 
assumption behind this low-wage policy is that up-skilling would sustain 
their employability. 
Notwithstanding all the efforts in the upgrading of the skills of 
LWWs, many empirical studies have shown that barriers to accessing skill 
upgrading persist. Studying the lowly-skilled in Denmark and South Korea, 
Gvaramadzem (2010) concluded that time, costs, and access have direct 
implications on the skills acquisition of LWWs. Nixon (2006), in his study of 
lowly-educated men in the UK, noted that due to their social and cultural 
capital, their awareness of 'good' jobs is limited. Hence, they fall back on 
manual physical jobs and never venture into service-oriented jobs. Similar 
findings have also emerged from other studies (e.g. Pocock et. al, 2011 on 
the low-skilled in Australia), which serve to remind policymakers of the 
barriers to participation in skills upgrading. 
From an educationist perspective, these barriers may be 
summarised as Situational, Dispositional, Institutional, and Informational 
(Cross, 1981; Darkenwald & Merriam, 1982): 
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• Situational barriers refer to working hours, family-care, time, and 
cost factors. 
• Dispositional barriers reflect personal values, attitudes, and 
perceptions. 
• Institutional barriers consist of practices and procedures that 
exclude or discourage the participation of low-wage employees. 
• Informational barriers reflect the lack of awareness of the 
availability of education/training opportunities. 
These barriers that have direct implications on LWWs' upward 
mobility also serve to remind us that skills upgrading is not the sole 
responsibility of LWWs; rather, it requires the coordination of many 
stakeholders such as the state, employers, and trade unions. While the 
government is pushing for greater individual responsibilities for up-skilling, 
Keep (1997) posited that the existing Vocational Education and Training 
infrastructure and system in the UK that is tailored to enterprises are not 
conducive for individual workers in their pursuit of better economic 
opportunities. Emphasising the importance of the role of the state, Estevez 
et a/. (2001) claimed that, in some liberal market economies, the lack of 
institutions to mitigate the risks for enterprises (for example, losing trained 
workers) and the workers (for example, employment and income risks) 
has resulted in the reluctance of firms and workers to invest in skills 
upgrading. In their chapter, they proposed risk mitigation in three specific 
areas: employment protection, unemployment protection, and wage 
protection — all of which require the close coordination of the three major 
stakeholders — the government, enterprises, and workers. 
The debates on firms' competitive strategies via low- and high-skills 
routes reveal a divide between two camps. One camp contends that high-
performance firms adopting high-skill strategies will lead to zero, or low, 
incidence of low wages. Moreover, workers in these firms have the chance 
to embark on skills-upgrading that enables firms to gain a competitive 
advantage (see inter alia, Ashton and Sung, 2002; Gautie and Schmitt, 
2010). The other camp is sceptical about the simplistic assumption of the 
skills competitiveness model because firms have a variety of options to 
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remain competitive. In its view, skills competitiveness remains low on the 
business agenda (Keep, 1997; Brown et al., 2011). This debate points to 
the need for understanding the effects of workplace practices and 
institutional factors on the skills upgrading opportunities of LWWs. As 
Rainbird (2000) argued: 
In order to understand issues relating to low-skilled workers' 
access to training, it is first necessary to investigate the 
context in which they and their workplace make decisions 
about formal learning. This requires a dual focus: on the 
nature of work which is considered to have a low skill 
content and on the workers who occupy these positions in 
the structure of the organization, on the other hand, and/or 
because of their status as subordinate members of society, 
due to ascriptive characteristics such as class, gender, race 
and others. The extent to which access to learning is seen 
as linked to problems faced by the individual or to the 
structural characteristics has consequences for the ways in 
which patterns of inequality in access are reproduced or 
can be challenged. (p.184) 
It is, therefore, necessary to acquire an in-depth understanding of the 
LWWs' responses (as in their skills strategies) to their workplace 
affordances and socio-economic conditions. 
Mobility of LWWs 
The focus of this thesis is on the upward mobility opportunities of 
LWWs. Upward mobility refers to the moving upward financially (wage-
income) through engagement in paid work. The assumption behind this 
definition is the hope that, given the opportunity, LWWs would upgrade 
their skills and eventually transition to jobs that do not belong to a low-
wage category. Differentiating 'wage-income' from non-wage social 
redistribution benefits will sharpen the analysis of the rhetoric of 'skills 
upgrading to better life', as we will see later how the policies of Singapore 
place a large emphasis on non-wage social redistribution that is aimed at 
motivating LWWs to work. The differentiation would allow us to evaluate 
the promise of 'better skills for a better life' policy rhetoric. 
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In this study, it is not my intent to adopt the economic tradition of 
studying the intra-generational, or inter-generational, mobility of LWWs. 
Bearing in mind that Singapore pursues inclusiveness through equality of 
opportunity, the aim of the thesis is thus to examine the constraints and 
enablements present in the sociocultural and economic construct of 
Singapore. Basically, I seek to address this fundamental question: To what 
extent is the pursuit of upward mobility at all possible for LWWs in 
Singapore? 
For the purpose of this study, social mobility and economic mobility 
will be treated as a single factor because one enables the other in a two-
way direction, as shown in the OECD's (2011b) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Status Index. Social mobility relates to social capital (e.g. social 
network) and cultural capital (e.g. educational credentials), or simply put, 
the social position of LWWs (Bourdieu, 1977). Studies have shown that 
social and cultural capitals reinforce each other, especially in this post-
modern society. The impact of one's capital resources has a large impact 
on their future generation (Ng, 2007; Yip, 2012). 
In summary, previous studies on LWWs have not paid adequate 
attention to the skills strategies of LWWs in relation to their upward 
mobility. I argue that the proof of an inclusive society that places an 
emphasis on equal opportunity is through the upward mobility opportunity 
given to LWWs by the employers and the state institutions. Against the 
backdrop of 'productivity and skills strategies', the study of the mobility of 
the LWWs must, therefore, tackle this question: "How do the LWWs' 
interactions with employers and institutions shape their individual skills 
strategies?" 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The literature review has shown that, in order to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of low-wage issues, an integrated approach 
that brings together macro-meso-micro level analyses is necessary. The 
low-wage studies conducted by the Russell Sage researchers have 
illuminated the advantages of linking the macro-level institutional analysis 
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to a meso-level sectoral-firm analysis and a micro-level job quality 
analysis. Their findings have provided a systematic knowledge base of the 
causes of high low-wage incidence and identified possible levers to 
alleviate low-wage issues in the six advanced economies. This approach 
has unveiled the attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors that 
would otherwise have been neglected, which could lead to the possible 
misinterpretation of the findings. In fact, the acknowledgement of the 
importance of the interrelationships of the state, the employers, and the 
workers has begun to gain traction among researchers of the low-wage 
phenomenon. 
The success of the integrated approach requires the careful 
identification of actors, institutions, and dimensions in accordance with 
each unique context, as well as the purpose and design of the studies. For 
instance, in the case of Singapore in which skill formation has been a 
major national strategy for many years, a discussion at all three levels —
macro, meso, and micro — would be necessary. In this research study, 
the macro-meso-micro integrated approach was adopted to examine the 
responses from the firms and the LWWs within the larger context of the 
developmental state's policy rhetoric of productivity-driven growth. Due to 
the potential complexity of such an endeavour, a sectoral case study 
approach was deemed to be the most appropriate. In the next chapter, I 
shall discuss the research design and methodology in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS ACHIEVING PRAXEOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
	
3.1 	 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the 
unique attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors in Singapore, 
which concern the upward mobility of LWWs. It is situated within the 
context of Singapore's national agenda of building an inclusive society 
through the economic strategies of 'productivity-driven growth' and 
'continual skills upgrading'. 
The policy rhetoric of 'productivity-driven growth' is premised upon 
the belief that productivity is the only way to improve the lives of 
Singaporeans (Lee, 2012). While employers are expected to take the lead 
in productivity, workers are constantly reminded of their responsibility "to 
be adaptable, flexible, re-skill, and ... cross over to new, growing 
industries" (Lee, 2012, p. 1). Within the unique setting of a developmental 
state, as in the case of Singapore, the government plays a significant role 
as a 'coordinator', while firms drive productivity initiatives and LWWs 
upgrade their skills for a better life. Essentially, all three actors are 
strategically intertwined in a complex relationship. Hence, I have made the 
deliberate decision to incorporate the three groups of stakeholders and 
their dynamic interactions within the research design of my study. 
In this chapter, I will provide the details of my research design and 
the justification for my methodological approach. The chapter will begin by 
explaining my theoretical framework that is informed by Bourdieu's 
Praxeological analysis (1973, 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). It will 
be followed by a discussion of the methods used for data collection and 
data analysis. Ethical considerations will also be addressed in the chapter. 
	
3.2 	 Praxeological Analysis 
Wages, employment, skills upgrading, productivity, profitability, and 
economic competitiveness are all closely interwoven factors in low-wage 
studies. Estevez-Abe et al. (2000) argued that these related issues mean 
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different things to stakeholders — the state, the firms, and the workers. 
They engage in activities in overlapping spaces; and depending on their 
positions in the socioeconomic hierarchy, some may be more or less 
influential than the other (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). While they may 
share a common cultural historical background, their different positions 
within the socioeconomic spheres mean that they are responsive to 
different sets of pre-existing conditions within their respective operating 
environments. Due to the complexity of such relationships and their 
resultant behaviours, Bourdieu (1977) insisted that the study of social 
phenomenon must move "beyond the antinomy of social physics and 
social phenomenon": 
The task of social research is to uncover the most profoundly 
buried structures of the various social worlds which constitute 
the social universe, as well as the mechanisms which tend to 
ensure their reproduction on their transformation. This 
universe is peculiar in that its structures lead, as it were, a 
"double life". They exist twice: in the "objectivity of the first 
order" constituted by the distribution of material resources 
and means of appropriation of socially scarce goods and 
values; and in the "objectivity of the second order", in the 
form of systems of classification, the mental and bodily 
schemata that function as symbolic templates for practical 
activities — conduct, thoughts, feelings and judgments of the 
social agents (p. 7). 
According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), potential tension 
could arise due to the actors' competing for the legitimate form of specific 
autonomy in the fulfilment of their respective roles. In other words, these 
actors perceive multiple realities because of the position they hold within 
their specific socioeconomic spheres. Smelser and Swedberg (2005) also 
posited that the environment in which the actors operate, along with the 
resources and responsibilities endowed upon them socially and 
economically, also shape their actions. 
Within the context of this thesis, the stakeholders — the state, the 
firms, and the workers — are considered to operate at three levels. First, 
the state that participates in the field of the globalised economy functions 
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at the macro level. Its primary political economic consideration is to ensure 
sustainable economic growth and wealth sharing among its citizens. 
Second, firms at the meso level are situated within a competitive market 
environment. Their objective is to maximise their market share and 
profitability. The LWWs, at the micro level, are primarily concerned with 
income and employment security for themselves and their families. It is, 
therefore, logical to claim that the actors' rationale, their actions, and 
legitimacy of autonomy are fundamental to the investigation of the upward 
mobility of LWWs. And hence, only by studying their interactions could we 
arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the attitudinal, institutional, 
and circumstantial factors that affect the upward mobility of LWWs. 
The impact of the aforementioned macro-meso-micro interactions 
between the stakeholders with regards to the upward mobility of LWWs 
will be examined through Bourdieu's (1973) Praxeological analysis. 
Derived from Bourdieu's desire to elicit a more accurate understanding of 
the social world, this analytical approach seeks to take into account the 
effects of objective social structures on human conduct, while factoring in 
the reality that human beings can and do act subjectively (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). 
Specifically, Bourdieu (1973) called for the necessary rigour of 
studying the dialectical relationship between objective structures and the 
system of dispositions. His epistemic stand is based on the assumption 
that each agent is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. In 
other words, human action is an expression of the "dialectic of internality 
and externality, that is, of the internalization of externality and of the 
externalization of internality" (Bourdieu, 1973, p. 63). 
Bourdieu recommended three principles of social science research 
that builds upon his reflexive sociology (in Grenfell, 2008a, p. 220): 
1) The construction of the research object; 
2) A three-level approach to studying the object of research; and 
3) Participant objectivation. 
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The first principle calls for breaking from common sense by 
"thinking relationally" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 224), or being 
mindful of social spaces, positions, and relationships of social agents. The 
second principle seeks to reveal the generative principles of a society (a 
system of dispositions), which involves studying the relationships between 
agents who are competing for legitimacy in fulfilling their respective roles. 
The linking of the social agents, their dispositions, and the rules that 
govern their location will form the conceptual framework for this thesis. 
Based on the principle of reflexivity, participant objectivation 
requires researchers to recognise that they are part of the social construct 
(biographical influence); thus their knowledge about the world also 
influences their research claims. Bourdieu (1973) recommended that 
researchers attempt to address their potential bias (social bias, field bias, 
and intellectual bias) throughout the research process. The first — social 
bias — may arise from one's biographical background, while the second 
bias — field bias — may stem from one's preferred theoretical field. 
Finally, intellectual bias occurs when researchers impose their gaze onto 
the lived experiences of their research subjects. Bourdieu (1973) 
recognised that there is no simple method to overcome these biases; thus, 
he simply reminded all social researchers to be self-critical and be mindful 
throughout the research process. 
In sum, Praxeological analysis seeks to move social research 
beyond both Phenomenological knowledge in which researchers describe 
the subjective experiences of social agents without questioning their 
predispositions and Objectivist knowledge in which researchers present an 
outsider's perspective that risks hypostasising itself. Hence, in order to 
attain Praxeological knowledge, it would be necessary to examine the 
relationships between related actors (their positions and competing 
legitimacy), as well as analyse power distribution (resource distribution) 
and the system of dispositions (Bourdieu, 1973). The following section will 
set forth the implementation of this strategy. 
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3.3 Research Design 
Case Study of a Low-Wage Sector in Singapore 
Using Praxeological analysis, this thesis attempted to address the 
following overarching question: How do stakeholders interpret and 
facilitate the upward mobility of LWWs? In this thesis, the stakeholders 
refer to: 1) the developmental state institutions, 2) firms in low-wage 
sector, and 3) the LWWs, all of whom operate in the economic field. 
Bourdieu (2005) offered his perspective of the economic field in the 
following passage: 
The economic field of forces is also a field of struggles, a 
socially constructed field of action in which agents equipped 
with different resources confront each other in order to gain 
access to exchange and to preserve or transform the currently 
prevailing relation of force. Far from being faced with a 
weightless, constraint-free world in which they develop their 
strategies at leisure, they are oriented by the constraints and 
possibilities built into their position (p. 199). 
Comprehending the struggles confronting the stakeholders is the 
critical first step towards understanding the complex social structure of a 
developmental state economy. This thesis intends to conduct an objective 
and non-biased investigation of the interactions between the three 
aforementioned stakeholders, which would avoid the labelling of anyone 
as 'culprits' and 'victims'. The existence of studies that project LWWs as 
unmotivated problematic adults (inter alia, Becker and Tomes, 1979; 
MRSD, 2011b), position employers as 'wicked bosses' (Bernhardt, 1999; 
Ehrenreich, 2001), or point finger at institutions as being the root cause of 
the low-wage phenomenon (Willis, 1977; MacLeod, 2009) are not 
particularly constructive, in my view. 
Hence, this research studies sought to examine how social agents 
rationalise their decisions and actions and comparing their discourses with 
their actions. Such an approach served two purposes: 
First, the process of interrogation is used to uncover the 
dispositions underpinning the agents' interpretation' and 'facilitation' of the 
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upward mobility of LWWs. As their dispositions are shaped by the 
prevailing societal values that have been internalised, a comparison could 
be made between the actors to analyse their positional differences. 
Second, the levels of consistency in the 'interpretation' and 
`facilitation' of the different actors enabled me to examine their interactions 
with one another and assess their corresponding impact, which might not 
have otherwise been revealed. Through this verification process, I sought 
to produce an analysis of the low-wage phenomenon that went beyond the 
first-order understanding of the actors (phenomenological knowledge). 
The research design was underpinned by the following assumptions: 
• The historical success of the developmental state in aligning its 
institutions strictly to serve the national agenda of economic growth 
has created a unique disposition that may be a double-edged sword 
with regards to the upward mobility of LWWs. 
• A firm's decisions about the organisation of work and skills 
strategies are closely related to its product market strategies, which 
stem from its response to exogenous forces. Therefore, its appetite 
for high-road strategies (i.e. productivity enhancement and skills 
competitiveness) is intricately interwoven with the market, 
institutions, and its employees. 
• LWWs are the social and economic construct of Singapore. Their 
agency, specifically their skills strategies that comprise their choices 
of employment and their decision to participate in skills upgrading, 
are largely shaped by their capital resources and the affordances of 
the society at large. 
• The decisions and actions of the actors, which shape the 
affordance to the others in a collective sense, reflect the entrenched 
societal values of Singapore. 
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Unlike other studies that considered the firm as the unit of analysis 
(Gautie and Schmitt, 2010; Bosch and Lehndorff, 2005), the unit of 
analysis in this thesis is the interactions between the three actors, as 
reflected in their discourses and actions. Focusing on their interactions 
offered the most effective means for revealing the causal mechanism and 
the system of dispositions, which could account for the low-wage 
phenomenon in Singapore. 
Due to the complexity of the interactions between the actors, I 
adopted a case study approach to focus my investigation on just one low-
wage sector, namely, the unarmed private security sector. This sector was 
chosen because it is a domestic services sector that offers abundant low-
wage employment. The sector has been targeted as one of the low-wage 
sectors for the achievement of an annual real wage growth rate of just 3% 
over 10 years. As with many low-end service sectors, the unarmed private 
security service sector faces many challenges including the outsourced 
nature of the business, diverse demands from service buyers, long 
working hours, and poor career prospects. An in-depth analysis of the low-
wage condition of the sector will offer insight into the complex 
phenomenon of low-wage mobility within an outsourced services sector in 
Singapore. 
Though the case study method has been criticised for its lack of 
generalisability due to context specificity and the potential biasness of the 
researcher (Creswell, 2008), Yin's (2003) defence of this approach 
highlights its value: "The case study approach allows the researcher to 
examine the causal mechanism and the reasons embedded through 
engaging multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to be converged 
in a triangulating fashion" (p. 14). Bourdieu who utilised the case study 
approach in various studies (on the Paris housing market in 2005; and the 
study of tensions and trends in French higher education, 1988) also 
refuted the critics. According to Bourdieu, the rigorous application of 
reflexive sociology through Praxeological analysis would help to overcome 
potential researcher bias. With regards to the issue of generalisability, 
Bourdieu contended that "the relational model of reasoning within a 
specific contextual sphere makes it possible to see the case as particular 
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case of possible" (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 67). Essentially, 
the unveiling of a society's system of dispositions could present a 
reasonable understanding of social facts to serve the need of illuminating 
the logic of practice of a community. 
Data Collection 
Praxeological analysis calls for the use of multiple data types and 
sources to achieve a comprehensive understanding of a causal 
mechanism and unveil a system of dispositions (Everett, 2002; Harts, 
2011). Hence, for this study, data were gathered from interviews and other 
textual documents (examples, speeches, newspaper reports, and 
brochures), as well as published statistics and related reports. 
A preliminary mapping of the relational network of stakeholders 
(which includes relevant policies and programmes) preceded the 
identification of relevant stakeholders for this study (see Appendix A). It 
involved a desktop analysis of available publications/documents (in Table 
3.1) and consultation sessions with sectoral industry bodies, regulators, 
and colleagues from the WDA. The published data were subsequently 
used as secondary data to support the analysis. 
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Table 3.1 Secondary Data — Publications and Documents 
Types of data Sources 
Official published statistics & reports: 
• Singapore Yearbook of Manpower 
Statistics 2011 
• Singapore 	 Labour 	 Force 	 Survey 
2011 
• Report on wages, 2010/2011 
• Household income, 2011/2012 
• WSQ Outcome Evaluation Survey, 
2011 
• Inter-Ministerial Committee for Low-
Wage Work 2009 report 
Ministry of Manpower 
Workforce Development 
Agency 
Ministry of Education 
Unpublished reports: 
• Security Sector Manpower 
Development Study 2010 
• Workforce Skills Qualifications 
quarterly report, March 2012 
• Security Sector Productivity 
Roadmap 
(Permission granted by WDA) 
Workforce Development 
Agency 
Newspapers reports and speeches by 
political leaders 
(Print and online sources) 
Singapore Press 
Holdings, Websites of 
various ministries, and 
Social media 
Printed marketing collaterals of the 
Security WSQ (Print and online 
sources) 
Workforce Development 
Agency 
To achieve an in-depth understanding of the interactions between 
the three stakeholders — low-wage security employees, firms in the 
security sector, and the developmental state institutions, I employed semi-
structured interviews as the primary data collection method. Fraenkel and 
Warren (2007) noted that the interview method offers the most appropriate 
means for eliciting descriptions of experiences, behaviours, or activities 
that researchers cannot observe. It is also ideally suited for researchers 
who seek to determine respondents' goals, values, beliefs, and attitudes. 
At the same time, the interview method is also undermined by the 
following potential weaknesses: susceptibility to interview bias; power 
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relations between interviewer and interviewee; and interviewees' ability to 
articulate the forces that suppress/oppress them (see, inter alia, Kvale, 
2006; Nunkoosing, 2005; Weis and Fine, 2000). 
However, Bourdieu (1999) argued that interviews constitute a 
relevant tool in data collection, though it is vital for researchers to impose 
the strictest demand on themselves during their interactions with 
respondents. They should be conscious of the level of language used and 
their use of verbal and non-verbal signs. Essentially, researchers need to 
be self-reflexive and attend to the disparities between the researcher and 
respondents on the socioeconomic hierarchy during the interview. 
The other reason for using the interview as a primary data 
collection tool, instead of a mass quantitative survey, is because one of 
the unpublished reports — the Security Sector Manpower Development 
Studies commissioned by WDA — provided the required data from a large 
sample size of more than 1,000 participants involving security employees, 
employers, and security services buyers. 
Identification of Interviewees 
All new entrants to the security sector must complete mandatory 
training at a designated training centre — the Security Industry Institute 
(SII). I sought Sirs assistance in identifying the graduates who could meet 
my criteria: a Singaporean career switcher who had worked for at least 12 
months in the security sector. I was also aiming for adequate gender 
representation. SII compiled a list of 24 individuals. After numerous 
telephone calls, with many calls unanswered and others declining, only 
five security officers granted me interviews. 
The details of the five security officers will be presented in Chapter 
4 as part of the micro-level analysis. Interviews with the low-wage security 
officers focused on their experiences of low-wage policies and their 
interactions with their employers in relation to their job quality. The aim 
was to identify the collective beliefs of LWWs in Singapore and the society 
at large. 
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The process of identifying security firms to participate in the study 
was equally tough. The desktop analysis of the information on the security 
sector showed that there were diverse groups of firms with varying sizes, 
years of operation, and types of services. Hence, it was challenging to 
select firms that would be representative of the general profile of the 
sector. 
At that point in time, a productivity enhancement scheme called the 
Inclusive Growth Programme (IGP) was introduced to the sector under the 
ambit of the national productivity drive. I approached the programme 
administrator (Employment and Employability Institute — e2i) for a list of 
participating security firms. As the IGP was new, there were only a handful 
of security firms that had participated in the programme; I therefore 
decided to include those who had decided not to participate in IGP. Thus, I 
could provide the perspectives of both the firms that chose to participate 
and those who opted not to participate in the IGP in this study. 
The shortlist was established after three separate consultations with 
a manager from e2i, an officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and a 
representative of the Security Association of Singapore. Of the original 10 
shortlisted, five agreed to participate in the study. The details of the five 
security firms will be presented in Chapter 5 as part of the meso-level 
analysis. The interviews with the security firms focused on their product 
market strategies and their organisation of work and skills strategies as 
outcomes of their interactions with market forces and institutional 
offerings. One key objective of the interview was to identify the firms' 
appetite for enhancing the productivity of and providing training to security 
officers. 
The decision on which state institutions to include in the study was 
less clear at the beginning of the study; hence, I interviewed all major 
stakeholders. Due to my role in the WDA, securing the interviews with 
various stakeholders from these state institutions was fairly 
straightforward. This also raised the issue of ethical considerations, which 
I will address in the later part of this chapter. 
At the data analysis stage, I decided to include only the WDA, the 
Union for Security Employees, and the Work Group for Security Sector 
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Productivity. They were chosen because of their close relationships with 
the productivity and skills upgrading agenda. The interviews with the three 
institutions primarily addressed their roles and rationale for their actions 
with regards to the upward mobility of LWWs in the security sector. The 
emphasis was on identifying the attitudes of the developmental state 
institutions. My aim was to pinpoint consistent displays of the particular 
rationale given by the institutional representatives, which could reveal the 
assumptions underlying the behaviours of developmental state institutions. 
A total of 20 semi-structured interviews, ranging from 35 to 90 
minutes, were conducted over a 10-month period, at various locations 
chosen by interviewees (homes, offices, workplaces, and fast-food 
restaurants/cafe). All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed (see 
Table 3.2 for the list of interviewees). The samples of the interview 
questions are provided in Appendices B1—B6. Field notes were made 
during the interview sessions. 
Table 3.2 List of Interviewees 
Interviewees Remarks 
2 female and 3 male security officers They are from different security 
firms. 
5 male managers from the security 
firms 
Each possesses more than five 
years of work experience in the 
sector. 
2 male officers from Workforce 
Development Agency (WDA) 
One is in charge of the security 
sector's manpower 
development. The other is 
responsible for the employment 
facilitation of low-skilled 
workers. 
1 male executive of Union for Security 
Employees (USE) 
He has been with the USE 
since 2004. 
1 officer from the Work Group of 
Security Sector Productivity 
He has been involved in the 
work group since its inception 
in 2011. 
Officers (2 males and 1 female) from 
the Police Licensing and Regulatory 
Department (PLRD) and the ex- 
Security Industry Regulatory 
Department (SIRD) 
Two are directly in charge of 
the day-to-day operations of 
PLRD. One served the SIRD 
from 2004 to 2011. 
1 female manager from the 
Employment and Employability 
Institute 
She is in charge of the 
Inclusive Growth Programme 
for the security sector. 
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1 male representative of the Security 
Association of Singapore 
He has more than 10 years of 
experience in the sector. 
1 officer from Ministry of Manpower He manages the overtime 
extension issues of the security 
sector. 
I also observed two sessions of the security industry's recruitment 
exercises. The sessions were part of the monthly recruitment drive 
organised by SII, which enables security firms to conduct speed-
recruitment. Field notes from the sessions form part of the data. My 
intention was to observe firsthand the process of security recruitment and 
the interactions between the employment facilitation service, employers, 
and LWWs. These field notes served as critical supplementary data in my 
analysis of the interactions between the stakeholders. Creswell (2008), 
among others, suggested that observation is a useful way to increase the 
validity of the study, as observations help researchers to acquire an 
increased understanding of the phenomenon being studied, especially 
when they complement other strategies such as interview and statistical 
analysis. 
Data Analysis 
The interview transcripts of the interviewees were first categorised 
under three groups — state institutions, firms, and LWWs. The transcripts 
were manually coded based on the broad criteria of: social position, 
disposition, actions, relational interactions with other actors, affordances 
from institutions, and constraints/enablements. The transcripts were 
individually analysed, and then cross-analysed by group and across 
groups, to identify consistencies or inconsistencies, as well as their 
relationships with one another. During the process, secondary data 
sources (as shown in Table 3.1) were drawn upon wherever applicable to 
validate the findings. 
It is worth noting that the Security Sector Manpower Development 
Study (conducted by The Research Pacific Group in 2010) was particularly 
useful in the analyses of the behaviours of the firms and security 
employees. The study involved a large-scale survey of 1,580 participants 
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that comprised security employees, security agencies, and security 
services buyers. The study was commissioned by WDA in 2010 to better 
understand the manpower and training issues of the security sector. For 
this thesis, I used the three sub-reports on security employees, agencies, 
and buyers as part of the analysis in this study. 
Secondary data ranging from statistics, reports, newspaper reports, 
speeches, and printed collaterals were used to complement the primary 
data. Published statistics — systematically collected data by the ministries 
and agencies — provided "objective knowledge" (Bourdieu, 1973, p. 53) 
that were applicable to the analysis of interview data. Speeches, 
newspapers reports, and print collaterals were supplementary sources that 
showcased "social language" (Gee, 1999, p. 3), thus bringing to the 
surface the value systems embedded in daily life. 
The extensive triangulation of primary and secondary data was 
necessary to account for the presuppositions that are inherent in the 
practices of the stakeholders. According to Bourdieu, such a technique, 
whereby "one may adopt any or all techniques that are relevant and 
practically usable" is entirely permissible (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992, p. 30). He argued that social researchers should shred narrow rigid 
compartmentalised theoretical and methodological approaches in order to 
achieve the goal of constructing "total social facts" (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 26). Aside from Bourdieu, many others have adopted 
such approaches in the various fields of research (e.g. Oakes & Cooper, 
1998; Everett & Jamal, 2004). 
Finally, the findings of the analysis will be presented as follows: 
• Chapter 4: Perceptions of the skills strategies of security employees 
at the micro level; 
• Chapter 5: Product market strategies, organisation of work, and 
skills strategies of firms in the security sector at the meso level; 
• Chapter 6: The mental model of developmental state institutions at 
the macro level. 
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• Chapter 7, Section 1: Discussion that synthesises findings from 
Chapters 4-6. 
Ethical considerations 
In this study, I occupy the role of an insider-researcher. As a 
practitioner, I am a member of the senior management team of the 
Singapore Workforce Development Agency (WDA), which has enabled me 
to gain privileged access to data sources and individuals within the field of 
my study. For the data sources, I either utilised publicly available data or 
sought permission for the usage of unpublished reports. 
To address the informants' potential concern over power 
relationships, I implemented the following steps to mitigate such a risk: 
1) Explained to the participants the purpose of the study; 
2) Furnished the study's factsheet to the participants prior to the 
interviews (see Appendix C-1); 
3) Informed the informants that their participation in the study was 
entirely voluntary; 
4) Sought written consent from all participants prior to interviews (see 
Appendix C-2); 
5) Used pseudonyms to protect their identities; 
6) Assured all participants that their views will be treated in the 
strictest confidence and that their names will not be identified in 
any of the documents resulting from the study; 
7) Obtained permission to use the real names of three institutions; 
8) Kept the audio interview recordings, interview transcripts, and any 
other documentation relating to the fieldwork in a secure place; and 
9) Planned to destroy the items listed in (8) once the thesis had been 
examined and all further writings for publication completed. 
All considerable measures were prepared in compliance with the British 
Educational Research Association's ethical guidelines (2011). 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In sum, the study utilises Bourdieu's Praxeological analysis in order 
to provide an adequate examination of the low-wage phenomenon in the 
Private Security Services Sector in Singapore. While the research design 
draws upon previous studies of LWWs in the West, it has been adapted to 
suit the unique setting of Singapore, an advanced economy in East Asia. 
Over the next three chapters, I will present my analyses of the data 
obtained from low-wage security employees, security firms, and three 
developmental state institutions. The decision to sequence the analysis 
and discussion in the order of micro, meso, and macro levels is to avoid 
the effect of treating structures in a dominant position (e.g. Ritzer's 
treatment of America' credit card society, 1995 and Bourdieu's treatment 
of Parisians' housing choices, 2005). Thus, each stakeholder is accorded 
a reasonable voice within his/her respective socio-economic sphere. Only 
when all three layers are pieced together would the total social fact of the 
low-wage phenomenon in the security services sector be fully revealed. 
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CHAPTER 4: SKILLS STRATEGIES OF LOW-WAGE SECURITY 
WORKERS 
4.1 	 Introduction 
This chapter will present research evidence for the first of the three-
part analysis of the interactions between the three stakeholders — the 
low-wage security employees, the firms in the security sector, and the 
state institutions. Specifically, it will focus on how LWWs interpret and 
facilitate their own mobility, as a consequence of their interactions with 
institutions and their employers. Through the narratives of five security 
employees, the chapter will shed light on their rationale for becoming 
security workers, along with their chances for accessing skills upgrading 
and their opportunities for upward mobility. Essentially, a previously muted 
group of workers in Singapore will be given a platform to present their 
perspectives. 
In the next section, I will first present an overview of the profile of 
the security workforce and the regulatory framework that governs the 
workforce. Singapore's low-wage worker policies and programmes will be 
discussed alongside the interviewees' responses. In order to evaluate 
whether the policy rhetoric of 'skills upgrading for a better life' translates 
into reality, the skills upgrading facilities and career progression 
opportunities within the security sector will be assessed. Finally, I also 
enclosed short write-ups on the five security employees in order to provide 
a better understanding of the lives of LWWs in Singapore: their individual 
narratives reflect the collective beliefs of those occupying the lowest rungs 
of the occupational hierarchy. 
4.2 Workforce Profile and Regulatory Framework 
There are about 45,000 individuals holding security vocational 
licences in Singapore. Among them, about 75% are in active employment 
(MHA, 2011); 85% of the active licence holders work as Security Officers 
(SO) — an entry-level position. Since 2007, under the revised Private 
Security Industry Act, all individuals employed in the sectors are required 
to obtain a vocational licence issued by the Police Licensing and 
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Regulatory Department (PLRD, 2012a)2. Based on the licensing criteria, 
applicants need to obtain a certificate that indicates that they have no 
criminal convictions. In addition, they are required to obtain certification in 
two work-related areas: 'Provide Guard and Patrol Services' and 'Handle 
Security Incidents and Services'. The certification of additional skills may 
be required for individuals who are expected to perform special duties 
such as operating X-ray machines and handling patrol dogs. 
Traditionally, the unarmed private security sector typically attracts 
mature low-skilled workers, many of whom had come from other low-wage 
sectors. About 32,000 (70%) security workforce employees are 45 years 
and older with a secondary or lower education level3. According to the 
Security Sector Manpower Development Study (SSMDS), the top five 
reasons cited for joining the security industry are: 1) no other career 
options; 2) manageable workload; 3) job security; 4) matched education 
level; and 5) an easier job than other manual labour (TRPG, 2010a). 
The SSMDS also showed that the average employment tenure in 
the security industry is about five years for a SO. However, the tenure with 
the current employer stands at two years or less: 63% of the respondents 
have worked for multiple security agencies throughout their security career 
(TRPG, 2010a). The five security employees interviewed for this thesis 
shared similar profiles to those reported in the SSMDS. Their details are 
shown in Table 4.1. 
2 Prior to April 2, 2012, PLRD was known as the Security Industry Regulatory 
Department. 
3 In Singapore, low-skilled workers are defined as those who have attained a formal 
education of a maximum of 10 years. Government policies aim to equip 60% of the 
workforce with at least post-secondary qualifications at the Institute of Education and 
Polytechnics, and 30% with tertiary qualifications. 
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Table 4.1 Profiles of the Five Security Employees 
Age Education level Marital 
status 
Year in 
current job 
Nos. of 
security 
employers 
Time in 
security 
sector 
Madam J 
(SOF1) 
50 Secondary 2 Married 7mths 3 1 yr 9 mths 
Madam H 
(SOF2) 
48 Secondary 4 
(did not sit for 
'N' Level exam) 
Married 1 yr 9 mths 2 2 yrs 3 
mths 
Mr. N 
(SOM1) 
42 Secondary 4 
('N' Level) 
Married 2 yrs 1 2 yrs 
Mr. L 
(SOM2) 
53 Secondary 4 
('O' Level) 
Divorced 5 mths 3 5 yrs 
Mr. G 
(SOM3) 
49 Secondary 4 
('O' Level) 
Married 1 mth 3 9 yrs 
4.3 Incentives to Take Up Low-Wage Jobs 
In their studies of six advanced Western economies, Gautie et al. 
(2010) suggested that social and economic institutions have a direct 
impact on the supply of LWWs, i.e., by influencing their willingness to take 
up low-wage jobs. They identified a number of institutions as having a 
direct impact on the willingness of workers to take up low-wage 
employment: 1) wage-setting institution; 2) employment protection laws; 3) 
active labour market policies; and 4) the availability (or lack) of social non-
wage benefits. 
Adopting a similar approach to examine the institutional offerings in 
Singapore, I drew upon MOE's (2009) report of the Ministerial Committee 
for LWWs (MCLWW) to analyse the experiences of the interviewees. The 
report encapsulates all the low-wage policies and programmes in 
Singapore, which cover housing, social support, employment, skills 
upgrading, education for children, and the share of economic wealth. 
The MCLWW was set up in 2005 to address the employability and 
income security of LWWs. Its members consisted of representatives of the 
ministries of Finance, Education, Health, Housing, Manpower, and Social 
Support. This commission adopted a six-spoke measure to address the 
well-being of LWWs in 2006. The summary of the six-spoke initiative is 
presented in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Inter-Ministerial Initiatives for the LWWs 
Initiatives Objectives Schemes 
Spoke 1 — Rewarding 
Work 
Encourage 
economically inactive, 
low-skilled 
Singaporeans to enter 
and stay in the 
workforce by making 
work financially 
worthwhile. 
• Workfare Income 
Supplement4 (WIS) 
provides cash and 
Central Provident 
Funds (CPF) 
incentives to 
encourage people to 
work and prepare for 
long-term retirement 
needs. 
• Additional Housing 
Development Board6 
(HDB) housing grant is 
given to help lower-
income families own 
HDB flats. 
Spoke 2 — Social 
Support to Enable 
Work 
Provide social support 
to help low-wage 
families gain self- 
sufficiency through 
work. 
• Work Support 
Programme provides 
temporary and urgent 
financial, medical, and 
educational assistance 
during a period of 
unemployment or skills 
upgrading. 
Spoke 3 — Higher 
Skills for Better Jobs 
Make skills upgrading 
opportunities more 
accessible to and 
relevant for LWWs. 
• 95% course fee 
subsidy is given to 
LWWs to participate in 
employment-related 
programmes. 
Spoke 4 — Expand 
Job Opportunities 
Help to enhance the 
productivity, 
employability, and job 
prospects of LWWs. 
• Job Re-creation 
Programme' (JRP) 
helps the unemployed 
and lowly-skilled to 
take up better-paying 
jobs. 
4 Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) is a job credit paid by the government to citizens 
whose monthly salary is S$1700 and below. 
5 The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a compulsory social security savings plan for 
citizens and permanent residents, for purposes of retirement, medical needs, and home-
ownership. Employers and employees jointly contribute to the fund. 
6 Housing Development Board (HDB) flats are high-quality public housing constructed 
and managed by HDB, a government agency. Eighty-two percent of Singapore's 
population lives in HDB flats under the home ownership scheme. 
JRP was integrated into the Inclusive Growth Programme as part of the productivity 
initiative in 2010. 
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Spoke 5 — Hope for Provide support to low- • Ministry of Education's 
the Future wage families so that financial assistance 
they are not trapped in scheme for needy 
the vicious cycle of students covers school 
lower income. fees, textbooks, school 
attire, and a bursary. 
• Kindergarten financial 
assistance scheme 
and financial 
assistance are 
extended for childcare. 
• School social workers 
empower pupils to 
realise their potential 
and target at-risk 
students to help them 
to manage their 
emotions. 
• Northlight School and 
Assumption Primary 
School run vocational 
training programmes 
to help students from 
at-risk families stay in 
education and prepare 
for employment. 
• Home Ownership Plus 
Education provides 
assistance to enable 
young, low-income 
families to own HDB 
flats, on the condition 
that they upgrade their 
skills and keep their 
family small. 
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Spoke 6 — Sharing in Benefit all • Progress Package and 
the Nation's Progress Singaporeans through Growth Dividends are 
surplus sharing distributed during 
exercises, with more years of good 
given to the lower- economic 
income people. performance, based 
on a progressive rate 
to citizens, with more 
going towards low-
income families. 
Sources: Extracted from the Progress Report of Ministerial Committee on LWWs. 
According to the MCLWW report, the six-spoke model is based on the 
following principles (extracted from pages 9-10 of the report): 
1) Continued economic growth and job creation is the 
best assurance that LWWs have for a better future. At 
the same time, we should not erode our workforce's 
competitiveness and flexibility to respond to unexpected 
challenges. 
2) Preservation of our work ethic. Singapore has 
achieved prosperity over the years through our 
emphasis on self-reliance and a strong work ethic. 
These values should be adhered to even in our efforts to 
help the LWWs. 
3) Equity and assistance for low-wage workers. 
Singapore has an open economy that is heavily reliant 
on external trade. Artificially raising wages without 
improvements in productivity will cause companies in 
Singapore to lose their competitiveness, which will lead 
to their relocation to other countries and result in more 
job losses. To help LWWs to improve their income, we 
must provide adequate opportunities and rewards for 
them to move up. 
4) Focus on Children. Children from low-income 
households sometimes face multiple challenges, in 
addition to financial difficulties. To ensure that these 
children can maximise their potential, adequate support 
must be provided to help them complete their education 
and acquire skills to be employable. 
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The MCLWW report offers a powerful representation of the 
developmental state's notion of an 'inclusive' society. Essentially, 
inclusiveness is developed and sustained through active participation in 
the workforce. A careful scrutiny of the six spokes shows that having a job, 
albeit low-paid, delivers a slew of benefits including housing, children's 
education, the accumulation of CPF for future medical and retirement 
funds, and a small portion of cash for immediate gratification during years 
of strong economic growth. Thus, a significant emphasis is placed on self-
reliance, as no other alternatives are available. Unlike the West whereby 
most governments are responsible for a large part of social welfare (see 
Esping-Anderson's (1990) Three Welfare Regimes), in Singapore, the 
market is expected to generate welfare by getting individuals to work hard 
to earn their keep. The philosophy of self-reliance (as we have seen in the 
four principles spelled out in the policies on LWWs) is an entrenched belief 
because the government deems it as the only sustainable way of ensuring 
economic growth for the country and to motivate individuals to care for 
themselves. The low tax rates and financial austerity makes the 
Singapore's 'inclusive' model unique; in fact, the October 24 issue of The 
Economist magazine highlighted it as a model for the West to consider. 
Another feature of the 'inclusive society' is the family-centric 
approach that stems from the Asian values of filial piety towards the 
elderly and the nurturing of future generations, which also includes the call 
to provide for one's family. Based on the model, the responsibilities of 
welfare should be shared between the state, the market, and the family. 
Essentially, the state re-distributes the economic wealth by putting in place 
a world-class infrastructure, as well as programmes in education, health, 
and security. For the bottom 20th percentile that need extra help, the 
state's offerings are conditioned upon their gainful employment. 
This model that I call 'developmental state welfare capitalism' offers 
a conception of 'inclusiveness' that differs from the three Western Welfare 
Regimes highlighted by Esping-Anderson and Myles (2009): Nordic 
(Social-democratic), Anglo-Saxon (Liberal), and Continental Europe 
(heterogeneous, but primarily familialistic), which are described below: 
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• The Social-democratic regime (Denmark and Sweden) is 
characterised by universal inclusion, comprehensive social 
entitlements, and de-familialistic. Through a high tax rate, the State 
ensures the equal distribution of shares of welfare to all, be they 
young or old, male or female. 
• Though the Continental European Regime (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) is more heterogeneous, they 
share a common trait of welfare that is built upon mandatory social 
insurance based on lifelong employment. The regime also assumes 
that primary welfare responsibilities lie with family members (except 
for Belgium and France). 
• The Liberal Regime (U.K., US, and Australia) favours minimal state 
intervention under the assumption that the majority of the citizens 
can obtain adequate welfare from the market. The role of the 
government is to nurture the market and provide targeted 
assistance to the neediest. 
While the developmental state welfare capitalism may seem similar 
to the Liberal Regime, there are differences in the following areas: 
• Economic primacy: centrally coordinated economic strategies to 
ensure sustainable growth, competitiveness and job creation; 
• Job as the best social safety net: social and labour market 
policies aim to enable and reward works; 
• Skills upgrading is the only way up: infrastructure and systems 
available to support the general workforce on the pursuit of 
education and training; 
• Family: imposition of primary responsibilities of caring for the old 
and young on family members; and, 
• Child-Centric investment: education is expected to provide a level 
playing field for all to pursue social mobility, regardless of family 
background. 
76 
The combination of the aforementioned conditions has produced 
"developmental workers" — a term coined by Sung (2006, p. 76). For the 
developmental state, the 'pro-economic growth, pro-business' mantra is 
sacrosanct (Sung, 2006). As can be seen in the six-spoke initiatives, the 
focus is on the development of active labour market policies and 
programmes that support the job-first (priority of securing employment) 
approach. In addition, the non-wage social benefits of subsidised housing 
and generous provisions for the next generation's education, coupled with 
the self-provision for retirement savings, are designed to instil within the 
LWWs a desire to be 'self-reliant'. 
Chua (1995), along with Mathi and Mohamed (2011), claimed that 
the reproduction of labour in Singapore is fuelled by the individual's 
perceived need to provide for self and family. The "stake-holding" 
approach of engaging the workers is designed to cultivate the collective 
belief of a 'self-reliance' mindset in low-wage developmental state workers 
(Sung, 2006, p. 93). This can be seen in the following extracts from the 
narratives of the interviewees: 
At first, I worked in a factory as an operator for many years; 
then I was retrenched. Then, I worked as cleaner and 
cleaning supervisor; the contract also ended. I tried to sell 
kuey (local tidbits)... because I needed to support my family 
and have a job... They (career centre officers) asked me to 
take up security job. (Madam J) 
I was in manufacturing, doing metal stamping. The company 
shifted overseas; so I was retrenched. I went for lots of 
interviews, but nobody wanted me. My wife is not working 
and my son is in primary school. I have to worry about my 
home mortgage. So I decided to take up security job. The 
pay is low, but it is more secure. (Mr. N) 
In Singapore, you can't just sit there. You need a job even if 
it is low pay. It is also about the future, you know! I have to 
save for my medical and my retirement. (Mr. L) 
Unlike the popular unemployment benefits in the West, the active 
labour market policies provide temporary assistance to motivate the 
unemployed to get jobs quickly, as highlighted in 'Social Support to Enable 
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Work' (Table 4.2: Spoke 2). As this report explained, the average support 
period is three to six months, with the exception of some who are given 
support for up to 12 months. In fact, the scheme caters to "those who can 
work8" (MCLWW report, p. 13, para. 18). One of the interviewees shared 
her experience at one of the Community Development Centres (CDC): 
My husband and I both got retrenched from the same 
factory. We went to CDC for help; they gave us a one-week 
food voucher and transport voucher. I have no qualification 
and because of my age, I can only choose between Cleaner 
and Security Officer. I look at the pay and decide to be 
security officer. Then, they sent me for an English course 
and security training. (Madam H) 
The stakes are high for them to get a job because of their housing 
mortgage payments and their desire to save for future medical fees and 
retirement. Sung (2006) aptly described how the stake-holding approach 
has successfully encouraged workers to participate in economic activities, 
even when the latter yields low wages: 
The essence of the developmental state strategy is that all 
workers have to maximise their contribution in terms of their 
ability, and in the end they all create their own stake-holding 
vis-à-vis their respective input into economic development 
process. From this perspective, stake-holding through 
welfare provision under the developmental state is not 
about equality. It is all about establishing one's own stake 
within society under the leadership of the developmental 
state (p. 93). 
The active labour market policies (e.g. WIS and Skills upgrading) and the 
social non-wage benefits (e.g. housing and progress packages) have 
induced the willingness of the five interviewees to accept low-wage jobs in 
the security sector. Madam J, Madam H, and Mr. G, who have been 
circulating in low-wage jobs because of their low level of formal education, 
8 Those who are temporarily unable to work due to illness, temporary disability, or care-
giving responsibilities are referred to the ComCare Transition scheme. (Ministry of 
Community Development, Youth and Sports. ComCare. Retrieved from 
http://appl .mcys.qov.sq/ComCare/FindTheAssistanceYouNeed/TemporarilyUnabletoWor 
k.aspx) 
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have come to accept their placements into the 'Cleaner, Labourer and 
Related Workers' category'. They were unable to succeed within the 
meritocratic education system that is designed to prevent the wastage of 
human resources (Tan, 2010): 
I struggled till Secondary four, so stressed-out! I decided 
not to sit for the 'N' ('Normal') level examination. So I 
started my first job in a factory assembly line. (Madam H) 
I always envy people who can study. If I can study, I won't 
be here today. I hope my children will be better than me. 
(Mr. G) 
According to Tan (2010), Singapore has an education system that 
favours the cognitively able from the onset, thus resulting in the following 
outcome: those who fall out early in the system enter the occupational 
groups of the lowest strata and move between low-wage jobs — low-wage 
jobs recycling. In defence of the developmental state policy, Lee Kuan 
Yew posited: 
You are born, the government has to provide conditions for 
good healthcare, good housing, good education. You must 
strive. What you make of yourself depends on you. We can't 
equalise everybody's result. (Han et al., 2011, p. 215) 
In response to the critique of the 'sorting' education system, Lee Kuan 
Yew retorted: 
You can only polish a stone if it's worth polishing. But not all 
stones are like that. That's life. (Han et al., 2011, p. 206) 
4.4 Quality of Work in the Security Sector 
The disproportionate increase in low-skilled service jobs in many 
economies has been identified as the root cause of income inequality (see 
9 Singapore Standard Occupation Code has eight levels of occupational categories. 
'Cleaner. Labourer and Other Workers' is the lowest occupational category. Security 
Officer is also classified under this grouping. 
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Green, 2006; OECD, 2000). In addition, there is the related debate about 
the issue of the deteriorating quality of work (e.g. OECD, 2000; Gallie, 
2007; Green, 2006; Appelbaum et al., 2010). 
In its simplest form, the concept of 'quality of work' comprises a 
number of dimensions: fairness of pay, job security, skills upgrading 
opportunities, work efforts, and personal discretion (Green, 2006; Gallie, 
2007; Appelbaum et al., 2010). In the following section, I adopt some of 
these dimensions to analyse the quality of work within the low-wage 
security sector. The issue of wage will only be addressed in the meso- and 
macro- level discussions, as low-wage security employees, in and of 
themselves, have no power in setting wages. 
Job Insecurity Amidst the Abundance of Employment Opportunities 
In the earlier section, we learnt that the security employees once 
settled into the sector have a relatively long tenure of service that 
averages at least five years. Yet, their tenures with respective employers 
tend to be short, averaging a maximum of just two years. Three of the 
interviewees recounted their experiences: 
I went for my first security job interview; they told me I 
would be deployed to a hospital. It was a nice working 
environment. But they did not tell me that the site contract 
would end in six months. Soon, I discovered that I was out 
of a job. They never bother to tell you. (Madam J) 
I worked a permanent night shift at XYZ building, did 
whatever the clients wanted me to do, including extra 
duties like changing light bulbs and repairing cabinets. I 
thought by pleasing the clients, my agency would recognise 
my effort. Then, one day, they told me they failed to renew 
the site contract. I was offered a job at another site. But it 
was far away from my home and there was a $200 pay cut 
because the other site's contract sum was low. I calculated 
that it was not worth my effort; so I had to look for another 
security job. (Mr. G) 
I want a permanent job like before (referring to his previous 
employment in restaurants) where I can work hard and get 
a promotion. But with this job, you don't have a permanent 
relationship with the agency. You always have to start all 
over again. (Mr. L) 
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As security service contracts are outsourced, the relationships 
between the interviewees and their respective employers are transient by 
nature. The security firm that will be discussed in Chapter 5 has no reason 
to hold on to excess manpower when contracts (that cover one particular 
site at a time) are completed. Despite the high growth in the sector and the 
concomitant high demand for workers, the work in the security sector 
offers limited job security, as it is dependent on the length of the individual 
contracts. Moreover, working hard offers no guarantee of any long-term 
career prospects with the security agencies. 
Work Arrangements 
No one could explain how the 12-hour shift and six-workday week 
has come to be instituted in the security sector. The common explanation 
that arose repeatedly is: "It has always been like that." The workers 
appear to be willing to do these hours; and the employment protection 
authority and the union have not objected to the practice. According to the 
Security Sector Manpower Development Study (2010a), close to 80% of 
the security employees worked 72 hours per week, exceeding the average 
44-hour work week by 28 hours, and even the permitted maximum of 60 
hours per week (inclusive of overtime), stated in the Employment Act, by 
12 hours. 
Long working hours essentially hamper workers' accessibility to 
skills upgrading opportunities: 
Although my shift officially starts at 8am, we are expected 
to come in early, change into uniform, and have a 
handover-duty briefing. I have to arrive half an hour before 
the shift starts. I do this everyday; so, by the end of the 
week, I would be so exhausted. Unless I go for training 
during working hours, I don't think I have time for training 
after working hours. (Madam J) 
Currently, all the training classes are on weekdays between 
9am to 9pm. It is totally impossible to attend outside 
training without the support from my agency. Someone 
should arrange for training at the workplace, like the type of 
e-learning I had at the plant, which I thought was good. 
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They gave us time to complete the learning during our 
nightshift. (Mr. N) 
As their basic pay is low and that overtime pay makes up a large 
proportion of their gross salary, leaving work for training has a punitive 
effect on their take-home pay: 
I was so happy that my agency finally sent me for training. 
Later, I was shocked that my pay was cut because they 
only paid me the basic pay. My family suffered when I 
went for training. (Mr. G) 
A part of the Workfare Skill-Up scheme (WDA, 2012b) seeks to 
encourage individual LWWs to take up training even when their employers 
do not support them. The scheme pays for 95% of the course fees; 
however, it does not take into account the income lost when the LWWs go 
for training. Yet, employers could claim for absentee payroll when they 
send staff for training, which compensates them for the loss of productivity 
during the employees' off-the-job training. The Continuing Education and 
Training System (CET) that includes the identification of skills desired by 
employers, the funding schemes that place skills upgrading decisions in 
the hand of employers, and employment facilitation that focuses on 
placing the unemployed seems to suggest that the model is employer-
centric. Hence, it is not surprising that the Workfare Skill-up programme is 
dominated by employer-initiated training, with a very low percentage 
initiated by LWWs10 . 
Skills Upgrading & Career Progression 
Whether 'skills upgrading for a better job' (as spelled out in the low-
wage worker policy) is a worthy pursuit, or a broken promise, is ultimately 
dependent upon the opportunities available within the internal labour 
market of the security sector. According to the Security WSQ brochure, 
10 The Workforce Skills Qualifications quarterly report (May 2012) that covers the 
Workfare Skill-Up scheme for low-wage sectors reported that 96% of the training 
programmes were initiated by employers. 
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the security profession is one 	 "with clear career pathways" and 
"advancement through Security Workforce Skills Qualifications" (see 
Diagram 4.1). In other words, career progression in the security sector 
could be achieved through the attainment of qualifications. 
Diagram 4.1 Security Workforce Skills Qualifications Brochure 
However, my interviews did not present such a rosy reality: 
I don't think I will have the chance to be supervisor here. 
There are two other senior colleagues ahead of me. Unless 
I quit and join another site, ... the chances are slim. My 
agency hardly knows me; I have not spoken to anyone 
from the agency since I joined this site. (Mr. N) 
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THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER 
LEGAL ISSUES
I am realistic: one site only has one supervisor. I don't see 
how I can get the promotion here. Maybe I need to work 
many years, know some people. I am new. I have not seen 
a female supervisor yet. (Madam H) 
The frustration of having to prove yourself all over again 
whenever you join a new agency also means your chances 
of getting the supervisory post is quite unlikely, unless you 
are so outstanding, or the opportunity is just right. (Mr. L) 
Their experiences of skills upgrading opportunities are quite 
diverse. Both Madam J and Madam H have not attended any training 
since their entry into the security sector: 
It is very shorthanded and there is no relief staff. When 
someone is sick or something, one of us has to work 
double shift. I don't see how they can send us for training. 
(Madam H) 
Mr. N, on the other hand, has had opportunities to attend periodic online 
learning pertaining to workplace safety as prescribed by the multi-national 
pharmaceutical plant where he was deployed. 
In the case of Mr. G, he had had to fight very hard to attend 
supervisory training: 
At first they said they needed someone to be acting 
supervisor at the night shift and asked me to double up. 
After more than 18 months, I asked for the training, they 
kept asking me to wait. When I asked for pay adjustment, 
they said I didn't have the qualification, hence not entitled. I 
felt so cheated that I threw in my resignation letter. They 
had no choice, but to send me for training. That was my 
second experience. The first time, I was with another 
agency. I walked away after they refused to send me for 
supervisory training. 
Among the five, Mr. L was the only one sent by his employer for the 
Advanced Certificate in Security Supervisory programme under the 
Security Supervisor Conversion Programme (SSCP). Under the SSCP, 
the government funds 90% of the course fee. Upon successful completion 
84 
of the training, the employer would receive a lump sum rebate of 65% of 
the monthly salary of the employee for the six-month training period. The 
skills upgrading episode took place after he had completed five years of 
service in the security sector and was with his third employer. Mr. L 
regarded the opportunity as 'lucky' because his superior values his 
management experience; hence, his superior was willing to stand in for 
him so that he could attend training. 
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that upward 
progression opportunities and access to skills upgrading are limited. The 
short employment tenures with employers and the long working hours are 
not conducive for the low-wage security employees to access skills 
upgrading at all. The limited progression opportunity (a limited number of 
supervisory positions) also means that there is no economic impetus for 
LWWs to initiate their own training. 
4.5 Five Cases of Security Employees 
The following profiles of the five interviewees have been compiled 
from the interview data. The data show that they are "developmental state 
workers" who take pride in their work. All of them were contented with 
what they have and place their hopes on their children to do well in 
Singapore. At the same time, these individuals illuminate the collective 
beliefs of the LWWs in Singapore. 
Case 1: Madam J (SOF1) 
Age: 50 
Educational level: Secondary 2 (eight years of formal education) 
Occupation: Security Officer at a primary school 
Family background: Madam J lives with her husband (aged 70) and 
youngest daughter (aged 22) in a three-room HDB flat. Her youngest 
daughter is a registered nurse. Her two older daughters (aged 25 and 28) 
who are married live with their own families; both daughters are full-time 
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housewives looking after their young children. Madam J has four 
grandchildren aged 2-8 from her two married daughters. 
My interview with Madam J was conducted over the telephone, as 
she insisted that it was more convenient for her since she worked shifts 
and had to rush home to tend to her aged husband. She instructed me to 
call her at 2pm sharp on the agreed date. Later, during the interview, I 
learnt that she was hiding in the toilet in order to take my call because she 
was not supposed to be making phone calls during working hours. 
Madam J has had a long career of low-wage jobs. She first worked 
as a factory operator at a semi-conductor plant where she spent many 
years on a permanent midnight shift so that she could tend to her children 
as they were growing up. When the factory moved its manufacturing 
operations offshore, she lost her job. Then she baked and sold kueh-kueh 
(Malay cookies) for a period of time. 
However, mindful that a full-time job comes with a CPF contribution, 
she took up the job of cleaning offices at commercial buildings. She was 
subsequently promoted to the position of a cleaning supervisor. As the 
cleaning jobs were outsourced on a temporary-contract basis, there was 
no job security. 
Hence she approached the Community Development Centre near 
her residence for assistance, she was sent for workplace literacy training 
and security licensing training, which landed her in the security sector. 
Madam J displayed her cheerful disposition in the following comment: "All 
jobs are the same, pay also sama sama (meaning "the same" in Malay). 
You must like it lah." 
She was aware of the advantages of attending training; in fact, she 
enjoyed her past training when she was unemployed. However, she 
related that there was no opportunity for training when she joined security 
services: "No one wants to send me for training." Her goal is not to pursue 
a better wage, but a living wage from a job that makes her feel useful and 
respected. She wishes to work as long as she could, as she does not want 
to "depend on people...you need a job to keep yourself going. My 
daughters all have their own family; they are taking care of their children, 
not working. I cannot expect them to look after me." 
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When I asked if she had joined the Union for Security Employees 
(USE), she replied that she was not aware of the existence of the union. 
Her response was notable: the USE is the entity that issues vocational 
licences to all security officers. 
Case 2: Madam H (SOF2)  
Age: 48 
Educational level: Completed Secondary 4 (10 years of education), but did 
not sit for the G.C.E. 'Normal' level examination 
Occupation: Security Officer at a commercial building 
Family background: She has four adult children from her first marriage. 
She lives with her third husband who is also a security officer in her 
husband's three-room HDB flat. Her youngest son is studying at a 
polytechnic. Her three daughters work as a sales assistant, a bank clerk, 
and a library information officer. All of them live with their biological father. 
I visited Madam H at her work site, a commercial building located in 
a suburban area. I had to negotiate with her supervisor, a male in his late 
40s, to relieve Madam H for the interview. He was not very pleased, and 
only granted her 30 minutes away from the reception counter. The 
interview took place at a corner of the canteen in the building. 
Madam H worked for 25 years at a plant producing electronic parts 
until 2009 when she was retrenched, as the plant was moved offshore. For 
the next three months, Madam H received assistance from the Northeast 
Community Development Centre (CDC) where she attended a series of 
training programmes. Madam H was proud to show off all her certificates 
that she had filed chronologically in a big clear folder because they 
represented her achievement since leaving school. 
Upon the completion of her training, Madam H was asked to 
consider jobs as a retail assistant, a taxi driver, or a security officer. While 
the job of a taxi driver promised better pay than the other options, Madam 
H deemed it to be a high-risk occupation, in terms of personal safety and 
the steadiness of income. She finally opted for the security sector even 
though the pay was low and the working hours were long. 
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On the whole, Madam H considers her current post at the 
commercial building to be relatively easy, compared to her previous 
employment as a production line operator. She is satisfied with the slightly 
higher take-home pay, although she works a 12-hour shift daily with only 
one day off every two weeks. She enjoys her work as a security officer; as 
with Madam J, she too would like to work in her current job for as long as 
she could, even though chances of a promotion were slim. She too hopes 
to be sent for training. 
As with Madam J, Madam H had not heard of the Union for Security 
Employees. 
Case 3: Mr. N (SOM1)  
Age: 42 
Education: Completed G.C.E. 'Normal' Level (10 years of education) 
Occupation: Security Officer at a pharmaceutical plant 
Family background: He lives with his wife (aged 40) who is not working 
and son (aged 11) in a 4-room HDB flat for which he is still paying 
a 30-year mortgage. 
Mr. N asked me to meet him at the shopping mall near his 
workplace. He was quite shy: he spoke in a whisper and gave very brief 
answers to my questions. Midway through the interview, he asked if he 
could speak in Mandarin. Subsequently, he became more expressive. 
Mr. N was unemployed for a period of time after the manufacturing 
plant, where he had worked as a metal stamping operator, was moved 
offshore. He finally settled for a job in the security industry because of the 
perceived high level of job security, though it entailed a 25% pay cut. Mr. 
N was well informed about all the entitlements of a low-wage worker. He 
told me "every cent count" and "you must know where to apply for the 
back-to-school fund", as he did for his son every school year. 
Though Mr. N perceived his work as a security officer to be a dead-
end job because of the limited upward mobility, he noted that he had no 
other choice: "I can only hope for some pay increment every year. That's 
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about it." As for skills upgrading, he periodically receives online training on 
safety and hazard prevention provided by the pharmaceutical plant. He 
considers himself to be an outsourced employee at the pharmaceutical 
plant. Based on his limited relationship with the security agency, he called 
it an "employment agency". 
What Mr. N would like is to regain his previous monthly salary of 
S$2000; however, he is not hopeful. When I suggested that he could visit 
the CDC for assistance, he replied in an annoyed tone that there were no 
good jobs at CDC. After a long pause, he added, "I cannot blame them 
because it depends on the qualifications..." 
Ultimately, Mr. N pins his hopes on his young son. He aims to give 
the best education to his son, "so that he won't be like me. I hope he will 
work in an office job." 
Mr. N was a member of USE for a year. However, he decided to 
discontinue his membership, because he deemed that it did not bring him 
any benefits. 
Case 4: Mr. L (SOM2)  
Age: 53 
Education level: GCE '0' level (10 years of education) 
Occupation: Acting Operation Executive 
Family background: Divorced; he refused to talk about his family 
Mr. L asked me to meet him at his workplace — an integrated 
lifestyle commercial building with retail, hotel, and hospital facilities on the 
premises. He donned a dark blue suit (a typical uniform) with a tie and 
wore a pair of gold-rim glasses. He voluntarily walked me around the 
premises under his charge before settling down for the interview at an 
open space near the rooftop garden. 
Based on the Security Industry Institute's student record, Mr. L was 
a security supervisor. At the time when I managed to secure an interview 
with him, he had been promoted to Assistant Operations Executive. 
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Mr. L had spent more than 20 years in the Food and Beverage 
(F&B) sector, 17 of which were in China, where he managed a number of 
restaurant chains. At that time, he was earning an average monthly 
income of close to S$8,000. 
Family reasons brought him back to Singapore after a long 
absence. Despite his wealth of experience, he experienced difficulties in 
re-entering the F&B sector. He finally decided to settle for a job as a 
security officer in order to pay his house rental and save up for old age. 
During the early part of his security career, he worked at nightspots such 
as discotheques and pubs, as well as numerous security firms and sites. 
Reasons cited for the changes of employers were: low pay, delays in 
paycheques, and issues with the management. 
Without relevant qualifications, Mr. L had to start as a security 
officer whenever he joined a security firm. It was not until the current job 
that his managerial ability was recognised: he assumed the role of 
supervisor and then Assistant Operations Executive within a short period 
of just five months. The opportunity arose because the agency had 
successfully secured a contract for a brand new development (his current 
work site). 
He recognises the need to acquire a vocational qualification: with 
the support from his employer, he is pursuing the Advanced Certificate in 
Security Supervision. Upon the completion of the advanced certificate, Mr. 
L plans to pursue a Diploma in Security Management. 
Mr. L's salary is S$2500, marginally lower than the workforce's 
median wage of S$2710, thus placing him at the lowest end of the 
managerial pay scale. When I asked him whether he was paid fairly as an 
Assistant Operation Executive, he replied, "Talk about pay, nobody is 
happy? What can I do?... At least I have a job." Nevertheless, Mr. L stated 
that his job satisfaction stems from serving his customer well and having a 
good team of staff. He had never heard of USE. 
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Case 5: Mr. G (SOM3)  
Age: 49 
Education level: GCE '0' level (10 years of education) 
Occupation: Security Supervisor 
Family background: Mr. G's wife (aged 45) works part-time as a cashier at 
a supermarket, while his son (aged 19) is serving conscription and his 
daughter (aged 17) is attending a Polytechnic. They live in a four-room 
HDB flat. He is still paying the mortgage of his family home. 
The interview was held at Mr. G's home in the northeastern part of 
Singapore. His home was adequately furnished and tidy. He was the most 
eloquent of the five security employees I interviewed; moreover, he 
exhibited the feistiest spirit. 
Mr. G began working right after his conscription service at the age 
of 20, joining his father at a manufacturing plant as the production 
inspector. However, long periods of standing and carrying heavy weights 
took a toll on his health. He then left the manufacturing sector to work as 
an in-house security guard at an upscale hospitality establishment. During 
his seven-year tenure there, he worked as a guard at various places 
including a hotel, a service apartment, and a condominium. In 2003 — the 
year of the economic downturn, to pre-empt potential retrenchment, Mr. G 
joined the private security industry to maintain his family's income. His 
hope was to set up a security agency one day. 
However, the outsourced mode of security operation was totally 
different from the in-house guard operation he had previously 
experienced. His dream of moving up the career ladder in the sector was 
squashed many times. He fought hard to secure an assistant supervisor 
position, only to learn that it would involve more duties without 
commensurate pay, because he lacked a vocational qualification. Though 
he waited for the chance to be sent for training, his agency failed to deliver 
on its promise. He managed to move to a bigger agency and attained his 
supervisory qualification. Unfortunately, he lost his job due to the 
cessation of the site contract and was then forced to look for a job with 
other agencies. Mr. G disliked the instability of frequent moves from 
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agency to agency: he could see that his lateral mobility was not propelling 
him upward in his career path. 
At the time of the interview, Mr. G had just started a new job for two 
weeks. He is frustrated to see that his job role as a supervisor is not much 
different from that of the officers, just more intense. Moreover, he has not 
been given the autonomy to improve work design: whenever he proposes 
enhancements, he is told: "Just do your job!" In his view, he should be 
assuming greater responsibilities; unfortunately, no one has noticed his 
talent as yet. 
He has no plans to pursue further education, pinning his hopes on 
his children instead: 
Practical training at work is useful. The academic education is too 
difficult for me. I envy those who can study and earn good money. 
Supervisor certificate is enough for me to open up a security 
agency... I cannot study, but I am proud of my two children: my girl 
is in Poly and my son will go to university after his national service. I 
know they won't end up like me. 
In the meantime, Mr. G is still harbouring the hope of finding 
someone who would be willing to invest S$50,000 to start a security 
agency with him: "I have enough security work experience. I have the 
Cert. I only lack the S$50,000. I can start the agency tomorrow if someone 
comes up with S$50,000. I plan to run the best agency." 
Mr. G confirmed that he is a member of USE, but lamented that 
USE could do more for members. Thus far, the only advantage of 
membership he enjoys is the discounts at the NTUC Fairprice 
supermarket chain. 
4.6 	 Conclusion 
These profiles of the five security officers offer evidence that 
addresses the research question: How do the LWWs' interactions with 
employers and institutions shape their individual skills strategies? 
On the whole, the evidence suggests that the limited resource 
capital of the LWWs propels them towards low-wage jobs. Their premature 
exits from formal education from the onset limit their choice of 
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employment. All of the interviewees have been recycling in low-wage 
employment since their first job. The only exception is Mr. L who had 
initially been downgraded to low-wage jobs upon his return to Singapore. 
For the interviewees, the in-employment skills upgrading 
opportunities were in the hands of their employers who had not granted 
them much of an opportunity for training and advancement. Mr. L is the 
only exception after working for more than five years in the security sector 
and with his third employer. Mr. G has had to fight for the opportunity for 
training. The others continue to wait for their chances to attend training 
that may never come. 
The only time when they were sent for CET training by the public 
employment services was when they were unemployed. The training they 
received was matched to the available types of work that were 
commensurate with their low educational level. The intention of the public 
employment services was to get them back into employment swiftly. 
Moreover, the inculcation of self-reliance in the collective belief of 
"developmental workers" (Sung 2006, p. 76) also contributes to their 
willingness to accept low-wage jobs (as we have seen from the LWWs 
policies and their narratives). 
Finally, it is also apparent that low-wage security employees have 
very limited upward career mobility opportunities within the sector. Mr. N 
calls it a "dead end job but secure" because it would not be subjected to 
offshoring. The hierarchical structure of the employment means only a 
relatively small percentage of employees would ever get promoted to 
supervisor and operation executives. Hence, self-initiated participation in 
skills upgrading to higher skills does not make any economic sense. 
Collective belief of LVIII/Vs 
`Self-Reliance', 'Working Hard', and 'Stay Employed' are the three 
most prominent dispositions displayed by the five interviewees. They 
demonstrated a strong awareness of the importance of acquiring job-
related credentials and the need for upgrading their skills. From a 
perspective that takes into account the societal context, one can see that 
their dispositions are shaped by institutional affordances such as the 
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absence of unemployment benefits, the minimalist approach of social 
welfare, and the short-term transitional assistance provided by the multiple 
ministries (Mathi and Mohamed, 2011). Ultimately, the participants have 
been motivated to adopt the 'job first' perspective because only when they 
are employed could they receive income redistribution benefits such as 
public housing loans, additional education subsidies, or back-to-school 
vouchers for their children, as well as a workfare income supplement 
(MOE, 2009). 
Given these realities, low-wage work makes the most sense for 
these participants. Madam J, Madam H, and Mr. G have been moving 
from low-wage work to low-wage work for a long time; hence, lateral 
mobility into another low-wage sector is an acceptable move for them. For 
them, upward mobility is not a realistic expectation. Mr. N who 
experienced downward mobility at age 40 stated it aptly: 
This job is low pay, but at least, I can bring money home. 
No one can guarantee me a better-paid job. At my age and 
with my qualification, I cannot expect too much. I hope my 
son will be better than me. 
Based on Sung's (2006) concept of "developmental workers" (p. 
76), it would seem that the very existence of the developmental state 
institutions, their actions, and their interactions with the lowly-educated 
workers resulted in the creation of a pool of workers who were willing to 
take up low-wage jobs. 
CET — For Enterprises and for Jobs 
Within a meritocratic education system that privileges the 
cognitively able in support of a high-skills economic model, low-wage 
security officers such as the interviewees in my research study are often 
`sorted out' early from formal education. As a compensatory strategy, the 
national continuing education and training system (CET) was established 
with the promise to facilitate "an inclusive society where everyone has the 
equal opportunity for upward mobility" (excerpt from Deputy Prime Minister 
Shanmugaratnam's speech in January 2012b). 
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However, based on the following extract from the WDA Website, 
the current CET system appears to be skewed towards employers with its 
aim to "improve labour mobility by allowing companies in growing 
industries to easily recruit workers with the necessary skills, while 
improving opportunities for workers to enter these industries". The quoted 
passage clearly shows that the primary objective of CET is to supply 
sufficiently-skilled workers for the different sectors, hence leaving in-
employment skills upgrading to employers. 
Currently, the CET system operates upon the premise that a "job is 
the best social safety net" (quoted from a WDA representative during the 
interview) with the emphasis on preparing the unemployed for 
employment. However, once the LWWs are employed, there is no 
mechanism to purposefully facilitate their upward mobility. The severe lack 
of income and employment risk-mitigating mechanisms thus make CET 
inaccessible to the low-skilled/low-wage workers because of the presence 
of circumstantial factors in the security sector. 
Moreover, the current arrangement within the CET system is not 
systematically differentiated in accordance with the social-cultural capital 
of individuals so as to enable LWWs to overcome any inequalities that 
might exist, as in the case of the five interviewees working in the security 
sector. The higher course fee subsidy has proven to be ineffective in 
helping LWWs accessing skills upgrading because employers see no 
need to enhance the skills of their workers. Left to their own devices, the 
LWWs have no means nor economic interest to go for skills upgrading. 
The various studies on social class and intergenerational income 
mobility have proven that the social and economic placements of 
individuals do affect their mobility (Tan, 2004; Ng, 2007; Yip, 2012). That 
is, the lowest strata of the workforce have limited chances of moving 
upward without special assistance tailored for them. Hence, situational, 
dispositional, institutional, and informational barriers still persist, despite 
the endeavour to create equal opportunity through funding and 
programme interventions, as reported in the MCLWW report (MOE, 2009 
pp.15-17). 
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Limited Upward Mobility Opportunity in Security Sector 
Based on the findings, circumstantial factors in the security sector, 
such as extremely long working hours, a long work week, and limited 
upward mobility opportunities, have created high barriers for low-wage 
security employees, which prevent them from upgrading skills. Moreover, 
the outsourced nature of the security sector that plays a determining role 
in shaping employment relationships between security employees and 
employers also undermines the upward mobility of LWWs. 
The concept of 'strive and succeed' does not apply in this sector, as 
reported by Mr. G and Mr. L, who were frustrated in their attempts to move 
up the career ladder. In fact, the traditional firm-based career pathway has 
been eroded away in many outsourced low-wage sectors (see, inter alia, 
Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, and Scott, 2001; Osterman, Kochan, Locke, 
and Piore, 2001). The low-wage and low-skilled phenomenon has also 
perpetuated the security sector's journey down the low-skills route. The 
details of the low-skills route will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
This exploration of the LWWs' skills strategies also refutes the "it's 
their own fault" view held by many. The remark by one of the interviewees 
from the PLRD reflects the labelling mindset of those who are ignorant of 
the low-wage situation: 
Currently, training is quite well-subsidised. So, it is a matter 
of will, whether they want to make personal sacrifices to 
attend training. I think security officers must also take care 
of themselves. 
What we saw from the five interviewees was that they were aware and 
wanted to go for upgrading — the will is present, but the way is obstructed. 
The aforementioned view thus fails to account for the presence of 
attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors that place the LWWs in 
a disadvantaged position. Their upward mobility thus requires deliberate 
efforts from all stakeholders. However, in order to rise above the 
convenient judgment of laying blame on firms and institutions, I will 
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analyse the low-wage phenomenon from the perspectives of security firms 
and institutions in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE CHALLENGES OF COORDINATING WITH 
STAKEHOLDERS: STRATEGIES OF SECURITY FIRMS 
5.1 	 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we examined how security employees 
interpret and facilitate their own mobility. For this chapter, we will shift our 
attention to the firms in the low-wage sector — the unarmed private 
security agencies. The aim of the chapter is to focus on the perspectives 
of security firms in order to understand their behaviours in response to the 
Singapore government's call for productivity enhancement and 
corresponding wage increase in the security sector. 
In Chapter 3, I had set forth the argument that the disposition of 
security firms towards high-road strategies is shaped by their ability to 
coordinate with key stakeholders — clients, employees, regulators, and 
various socio-economic institutions. This chapter will thus examine the 
evidence that sheds light on this hypothesis. More specifically, it will 
attempt to illuminate the security firms' interactions with key stakeholders, 
which result in their decisions and actions that, in turn, affect the upward 
mobility of LWWs. 
In order to examine the complex coordination between firms and 
stakeholders, I drew upon Gadrey's (2000) societal effect model (as 
explained in Chapter 2) by choosing three types of business strategies, 
namely: 1) business/market strategies; 2) the organisation of work; and 3) 
skills strategies. The literature suggests that these three strategies are 
critical to the understanding of the pre-existing conditions of the sector 
(see inter alia, Baret et al., 2000; Keep et al., 2006; Gautie and Schmitt, 
2010). Moreover, the firms' responses through these strategies reflect the 
underpinning societal values and attitudes of the developmental state. 
To provide the background context for this discussion, the next 
section will offer an overview of the security sector in Singapore. Next, it 
will examine each of the three strategies as interpreted and applied by the 
interviewees. Finally, the attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors 
that shape the strategies of the interviewees, as well as the productivity 
enhancement initiative of the sector, will be evaluated. 
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5.2 	 Profile of Private Security Services Sector 
The Triumvirate of the Security Forces 
In Singapore, security duties are distributed among three key 
players: 1) the Singapore Police Force (SPF), 2) the Auxiliary Police Force 
(APF), and 3) the unarmed private security services (UPS). Put simply, the 
SPF is the state's law enforcement unit whose role is augmented by the 
APF and UPS. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the complementary roles 
of the triumvirate. 
Table 5.1 Singapore Police Force, Auxiliary Police Force, and the 
Unarmed Private Security Providers 
Ownership Estimated 
workforce 
No. of 
establish- 
ments 
Key roles Act 
Singapore State- 14,269 full- 1 i. Maintain Criminal 
Police 
Force 
owned; 
funded by 
general 
time officers, 
of whom 
8,661 are 
law and 
order; 
ii. Take 
Procedure 
Code, 
Police 
taxation regular 
police 
officers; the 
others are 
civilian 
officers, 
national 
servicemen, 
and 
volunteers 
crime- 
preventive 
actions; 
and 
iii. Investigate 
crime. 
Force Act, 
and 
Public 
Order Act 
(2011a)* 
Auxiliary 100%- 6,204 3 i. Crowd Police 
Police owned by (2010a)* control; Force Act 
Force government- ii. Guard key and 
(armed) linked 
corporation; 
operate for 
profit 
buildings; 
iii. Protect 
valuables; 
and 
iv. Check 
property of 
person 
entering a 
restricted 
area. 
Public 
Order Act 
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Unarmed Private 44,560 282 i. Guard; Private 
Private ownership; licensed (2011b) ii. Patrol; Security 
Security operate for Security iii. Access Industry 
Agencies profit Officers 
(2010a)*: 
75%, or 
control; and 
iv. Report 
incidents. 
Act (PSIA) 
33,577, are 
active 
*Compiled by author from various sources: 2011a Singapore Police Force Annual Report 2010a 
Security Sector Productivity Roadmap, 2011b Police Licensing and Regulatory Department 
The APF performs security protection functions at restricted and strategic 
locations for a profit. The UPS, also for profit, provides general protection 
to security services buyers. 
From the perspective of SPF, the triumvirate makes up the total 
security protection forces in Singapore. The current ratio of UPS forces to 
the SPF is 4:1 (with 33,577 unarmed guards versus 8,661 career police). 
The high ratio of UPS forces to SPF is a common phenomenon in 
developed market economies (Lim and Nalla, 2011). According to one of 
the interviewees from the PLRD, the unarmed guards are an extension of 
the national security forces, as he said: 
They form the network of eyes and ears on the ground 
that not only perform detect and report functions, but 
also act as critical deterrents in ensuring the national 
security of Singapore. 
Increasing Demand for Unarmed Security Services 
Due to the strong economic growth in Singapore over the last 10 
years and increased security concerns following the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States, the demand for private security services has grown 
exponentially. Table 5.2 shows the increase in the number of licensed 
unarmed security officers from 2006 to 2011. 
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Table 5.2 Number of Unarmed Licensed Security Officers, 2006-2011 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Licensed 
Security 
Officers* 
21,757 22,995 26,441 29,524 35,929 40,374 
Annual 
percentage 
increase in 
demand for 
guards 
- 5.7% 15% 11.6% 21.7% 12.4% 
Source: *Police Licensing & Regulatory Department 
The PLRD forecasted an annual growth rate of 5% in the UPS 
sector over the next few years, whereas the respondents (security firms) 
of the SSMDS (2010b) reported a higher expected annual growth rate of 
10%. Amidst the high growth, due to the tightening labour market, the 
traditional high labour intensive business model is being challenged. 
As the sector is characterised by high labour intensity and high 
incidence of low wages, it was identified as a key target by the 
government for the path of productivity enhancement, in order to reduce 
the sector's dependency on manpower and improve wages. The 
assumption was that, through productivity enhancement, the real wage of 
the sector would increase by 3% per year over the next 10 years. 
Specifically, the bipartite security sector productivity workgroup set 
out four key initiatives under the security sector productivity roadmap: 
1) Promote skills upgrading and manpower development of security 
officers; 
2) Enhance buyer awareness and education; 
3) Promote the use of technology by security agencies; and 
4) Improve employment and working conditions of security officers. 
A brief description of the initiatives is shown in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Security Sector's Productivity Enhancement Initiatives 
Strategies Intervention measures 
Promote skills upgrading and 
manpower development of 
Security Officers (SOs) 
• Incentivise firms to adopt holistic 
and comprehensive 
development plans for 
employees at all levels; 
• Develop career ladders with 
requisite skills for security 
officers to upgrade; 
• Mandate specific training for 
officers performing specialised 
functions; and 
• Mandate training for firms' 
management. 
Enhance buyer awareness and 
education 
• Create differentiated security 
services according to site 
requirement; 
• Incentivise buyers to adopt 
quality-based procurement 
practices; 
• Incentivise buyers to adopt 
security technology, instead of 
security manpower; 
• Encourage public sector to take 
the lead in introducing Best 
Sourcing initiatives; and 
• Implement buyer awareness 
education programmes. 
Promote use of technology by 
security agencies 
• Encourage firms to leverage on 
technology, 	 so 	 that 	 security 
officers can be more effective at 
work. 
Improve employment/working 
conditions of SOs 
• Reduce officers' working hours; 
• Increase wages of officers; and 
• Improve the image of the 
profession. 
Source: Extracted from Security Sector Productivity Roadmap 
The four initiatives sought to: 1) improve the overall skills level of 
the management and staff in the sector; 2) improve working conditions of 
SOs; 3) reduce employers' reliance on manual labour; and 4) convert 
cheap-sourcing to best-sourcing of security services. Such a skills initiative 
is premised on the human capitalist's assumption that skills upgrading is 
the foundation of economic development, productivity growth, and 
innovation (Becker, 1964). Put in another way, a skilled workforce will 
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propel the productivity agenda, which will lead to wage increases. Hence, 
wage increases should thus lag behind productivity growth. 
The initiative on improving working conditions, coupled with the 
skills initiative, resembles a job quality agenda — career progression, 
appropriate level of job intensity, and fair wage. However, my 
conversations with the representatives from PLRD, WDA, and the Work 
Group for Security Sector Productivity suggest that they have adopted a 
narrow perspective of the initiatives for attracting and retaining security 
workforce. The potential to move the sector away from a low-skills 
equilibrium through job re-designing and parallel enhancements of job 
quality was left untapped (see Finland's workplace development initiatives, 
Alasoini et al., 2005). 
Moreover, productivity enhancement through technology adoption 
simplistically assumes that technology can reduce the firms' reliance on 
manpower and improve the work efficiency of the SOs. This initiative is 
also based on the erroneous conception that security firms have 
discretionary power over the design of their services rendered to clients. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the 'Inclusive Growth Programme' (IGP), 
launched by the labour union in 2010 to encourage the adoption of 
security technologies to improve productivity and the sharing of gains with 
employees (e2i, 2012) has had modest success. Only about 10% of the 
security agencies have participated in the programme (as reported by the 
IGP officer in charge during the interview). 
The entrenched practice of cheap-sourcing in which security 
services buyers award contracts based on the cheapest quote and specify 
security service requirements in terms of headcount has been 
acknowledged as an issue of concern. The part of the initiative that 
addresses buyer education seeks to change this trend. Thus, the relevant 
authorities have issued a tripartite advisory on best sourcing practices11 to 
11  The Ministry of Manpower, together with the National Trade Union Congress and the 
Singapore National Employers Federation, produced a best-sourcing guidebook that 
provides step-by-step guidance on best-sourcing practices. 
http://mom.gov.sq/Documents/employment-
practices/Tripartite/020Advisory%20on`Y020Best%20Sourcing`Y020PracticescY020(2703201  
2).pdf 
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encourage buyers to change their buying habits. However, when I spoke 
to the five security firms, none was aware of such schemes. Moreover, 
they were not hopeful about its prospects. 
Essentially, the responsibilities of increasing productivity through 
adopting technology, upgrading the skills of employees, and improving 
employment conditions fall squarely onto the lap of security agencies. The 
narratives of the five security firms in the following sections will challenge 
all the aforementioned assumptions. 
Characteristics of the Sector 
The unarmed security sector is dominated by a large number of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Among the 282 security firms, 70% 
(191) are considered small with less than 100 security officers (SOs), 
while the remaining 30% (82) employ at least 100 SOs each. Close to 
80% of the SOs (about 29,000) are employed by larger firms (WGSSP, 
2011). The breakdown of the deployment locations of SOs is shown in 
Table 5.4. The top three sites fall under the commercial, industrial, and 
residential categories. 
Table 5.4 Deployment Locations of Unarmed Security Officers 
Deployment location Percentage 
Office complex/Factory/Shipyard/Farm 39.27% 
Residential building/Condominium 21.04% 
Shopping mall/Centre 7.93% 
Protected Areas and Places (e.g. Airport, Power 
Stations, Waterworks, and Telecommunication 
facilities) 
7.89% 
School, Polytechnic, Institute of Technical Education, 
Institute of higher learning, Private school 7.30% 
Government/Statutory board building 5.02% 
Construction firm/site 4.54% 
Hotel/Country club/Entertainment outlet/Resort 3.67% 
Checkpoint 1.64% 
Foreign diplomatic mission, or foreign consulate, in 
Singapore 0.70% 
Hospital 0.66% 
Place of worship 0.34% 
Source: Security Sector Productivity Roadmap 
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This sector traditionally attracts retired uniformed personnel from 
the SPF and the Military Service. About 58% of the managers and 
entrepreneurs in the sector are 50 years old and above. The educational 
level of many of them (58%) is below the tertiary level (SSMDC, 2010b). 
Regulatory Frameworks of Unarmed Private Security Services Sector 
Prior to 2005, the unarmed security sector had been lightly 
regulated under the Private Security Industry Act 1973 (PSIA). It 
mandated the licensing of companies and personnel involved in the 
provision of security and investigation services. 
However, with the formation of the Security Industry Regulatory 
Department12 (SIRD) in 2004, a greater emphasis was placed on raising 
the standard of the sector and the skill level of the SOs. In 2007, an 
individualised vocational licence was mandated for individuals seeking to 
be SOs and security supervisors. SIRD worked with the Singapore 
Workforce Development Agency (WDA) to develop mandatory training 
programmes for the SOs, which trained them to handle security incidents, 
as well as provide guard and patrol services. Security Supervisors were 
required to take an additional module on supervising SOs. 
Furthermore, during the same year, the government rolled out a 
more stringent set of criteria for the application of the operating licences of 
unarmed security firms and personnel, as part of the revision of the PSIA 
(PLRD, 2012b). The new criteria for firms included: 
• Higher minimal paid-up capital (S$50,000, instead of S$25,000); 
• Higher level of general education attainment (at least 3 GCE '0' 
level passes, or equivalent) and relevant Workforce Skills 
Qualifications (WSQ)13; and 
• At least two years of managerial experience. 
12 SIRD was subsequently renamed Police Licensing and Regulatory Department (PLRD) 
in April 2012. 
13 Workforce Skills Qualifications (WSQ) is the national skills qualification issued by the 
Singapore Workforce Development Agency (WDA). 
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Moreover, licensed security firms were required to participate in 
mandatory annual graded audits as part of the licence renewal process. 
The grades were then published online. 
Table 5.5 shows the grading attainments of the security firms from 
2008 to 2011. The objectives of the grading exercise constituted a part of 
PLRD's efforts to professionalise the sector: 
The grading aims to provide an assessment of the 
performance of the SAs, help service buyers to discern 
service quality, motivate Security Agencies to improve 
operation capability, and to strategically elevate 
standards of private security industry in Singapore. 
(Chee, 2011, p. 1) 
Table 5.5 Grading of Unarmed Security Firms, 2008-2011 
Grades 
No. of 
firms 
A 
Excellent 
B 
Good 
C 
Satisfactory 
D 
Unsatisfactory 
2011 282 56 (21%) 77 (29%) 85 (32%) 45 (17%) 
2010 274 64 (25%) 72 (28%) 64 (25%) 54 (21%) 
2009 275 57 (23%) 91 (36%) 65 (26%) 38 (15%) 
200814 263 27 (19%) 58 (41%) 47 (33%) 9 (6%) 
Data compiled by author from Security Agencies Grading published online by PLRD. 
The grading criteria focused on Operations, Training for Operation, 
and Support for Operation. On the SIRD website, the declared benefits of 
the regulatory framework, which included licensing and auditing, were 
stated as follows: "Increase in the value of security contract for security 
agencies" and "generous increase in individual guard wages" (SIRD, 
2011). 
Besides dealing with the PLRD for their operating licensing and 
annual audits, security firms also have to interact with the Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM) with regards to the application for exemption from the 
overtime limit under the Employment Act that stipulates daily and monthly 
overtime limits. Due to historical practices and market demand, more than 
80% of the guards are deployed on a 6-day/12-hour shift arrangement. 
14 As the 2008 audit was not mandatory, 122 SAs (46.4%) did not participate. Newly-
licensed agencies are exempted during the year of registration. 
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Hence, firms are required to apply for site-specific exemption on a case-
by-case basis. During the interview with PLRD, I learnt that PLRD have 
plans in the near future to reduce the long working hours of the SOs, as 
they are concerned that overworking is affecting the vigilance of SOs. The 
Security Productivity Roadmap has also identified the reduction of working 
hours as a strategy to enhance the working conditions of guards (see 
Table 5.3). 
The Interviewees 
Five unarmed security agencies participated in my study. Table 5.6 
provides a brief overview of the five agencies, highlighting their years of 
operation, size, types of services offered, and PLRD's grades. 
Table 5.6 Five ParticipatingUnarmed Security Agencies 
Code Yrs in 
Ops 
Guard Services Participate 
in IGP* 
PLRD's grades 
2011 2010 2009 2008 
SAM1 4 100+ Manpower No B A A B 
SAM2 3 50 Remote 
monitoring 
system, 
manpower 
Yes A A B 
SAM3 31 50-60 Manpower, dog 
kennel 
Yes C D C Not 
graded 
A SAM4 27 680 Technology 
and manpower 
Yes A A A 
SAM5 30 100 Manpower No B B B Not 
graded 
Notes: *Inclusive Growth Programme 
5.3 	 Product/Market Strategies: Ultimately, it is about Price! 
This section presents the interviewees' responses on their 
product/market strategies as big/medium/small agencies. Regardless of 
their sizes and the types of services offered, each agency has devised a 
set of strategies that suit their niche within the unarmed security services 
market. 
As shown in Table 5.4, buyers of security services range widely 
from the public to the private sector. The security and service 
requirements of the various locations are also vastly different: 
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For residential, it is all about customer service, unlike 
industrial which is mostly theft prevention. Construction 
site is a mix of access control and theft prevention. 
Commercial building is access control and customer 
service. No one site is the same; it all depends on the 
buyers' needs. (SAM5) 
The majority of the security services buyers adopt a 12-month term 
contract, although there are some that award 24-month contracts 
(SSMDS, 2010c): 
12-month is just right. Too long contract term is not 
beneficial (to us) because there is no room for contract 
sum to move up. (SAM4) 
However, the contract could be prematurely terminated, if the relationship 
did not work out. The following comments from the interviewees reflect the 
unequal power relationship between the buyers and security service 
providers, which is characterised by transience and distrust: 
Every new client is a risk. I had a real bad experience with 
this client where he imposed unreasonable liquidated 
damages in the first month of operation. Ended up I have 
to pay them amount more than the contract sum. We can't 
work like this, so I said sorry, let's part ways. (SAM1) 
The tender specifications dictate the number of security 
officers and supervisors needed per shift. We just quote 
based on the specification. Sometimes they (buyers) may 
not require supervisor on site. Sometimes, they may ask 
us to quote for walkie-talkies and clocking equipment. 
(SAM5) 
The quotation by headcount is an entrenched practice among the 
buyers. Data from SSMDS show that the per headcount pricing paid by 
the buyers ranges from S$1,200 to S$2,999 (the median range: S$2,000—
S$2,199) per SO and S$1,400 to S$3,000 (the median range: S$24,00—
S$2,900) per Supervisor. The difference between the per-headcount 
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pricing and the salary paid out to SO and supervisors on site is the margin 
that covers the firms' operation and administrative costs. 
According to the interviewees, the PLRD's grading process has not 
contributed to their business, as buyers tend to choose the cheapest 
quotes among the bidders: 
It is all up to the buyers. They can specify grade B and 
above in the tender, but they still pick the cheapest. 
Ultimately, it is about price! (SAM4) 
Based on past experiences, I think clients only differentiate 
between B and above versus C and below. There is no 
difference between A & B grade. You can see that in the 
tender bids. (SAM1) 
I think it is because of their limited budget. Most of them 
don't specify grade. Mostly bigger companies or more 
special locations would do so. Majority would pick the best 
price that comes with the best grade. (SAM5) 
However, not all five of them are passively going for low-price bidding to 
secure business, as some argued that the strategy of selecting the right 
buyers is essential: 
We choose clients carefully, especially those who are 
serious about security. We offer value-add services, stay 
and grow with them. (SAM1) 
Among the five, only SAM4, being the bigger player, claimed to be able to 
"charge a premium" for their services because of their Virtual Supervision 
System (VSS) and well-trained guards. The VSS allows the firm to track 
the movements of their employees on site through remote access. SAM4 
is the only one among the five that operates a commercial security-training 
academy. Without these advantages, the smaller firms resort to price-cost 
strategies to win contracts: 
I lower my price to get in, hoping that the client may 
consider me for other sites. But sometimes, it backfired 
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because the low price also mean I cannot recruit SOs. 
(SAM5) 
Moreover, SAM2 that has ventured into remote monitoring services 
with the support of IGP commented that security technology has not 
translated into a premium position, as buyers pay by headcount. In other 
words, buyers do not pay for the deployment of technology in their 
contract: 
I put in a bid for a government tender. With the remote 
monitoring, I managed to reduce the number of guards 
from 16 to 5. So they pay me 5 headcounts based on 
market rate. I saved cost for them. 
Therefore, in this case, while SAM2 might have enhanced its productivity 
by reducing the number of SOs, it did not increase the per headcount 
pricing and the SOs deployed remained on low pay. SAM2's experience 
suggests that the deployment of security technology only achieves the aim 
of reducing manpower at the site. However, the buyer did not recognise 
the need to pay for operational efficiency (presumably less downtime and 
instantaneous reporting of incidents). The increase in operation efficiency 
did not translate into a corresponding increase in revenue. Therefore, the 
SOs' wages remained low. 
The general sentiment among the five interviewees is that most 
security buyers do not perceive security to be a priority, since Singapore 
has a low crime rate. Moreover, a terrorist attack is deemed an unlikely 
event: 
Except for the few genuine buyers who know what they 
really want for security, the vast majority is buying for 
various reasons other than security. (SAM4) 
The buyers have their limited budget: they know roughly 
how much they want to pay for the service. They think this is 
what it is worth. (SAM2) 
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Their comments are supported by the SSMDS's (2010c) report: about 
67% of the buyers stated that their security budget would remain 
unchanged for the next two years; only 33% had factored in a 10-15% 
increase in their budget to cater for inflation. 
Based on the experiences of the five interviewees, buyers do not 
usually bundle security manpower requests with security technology in the 
tender specification because these aspects constitute different 
considerations. SAM4 who markets a wide range of security systems 
explained: 
Not everyone can and wants to install security systems 
because of costs. Those who want would prefer to own it 
than to combine the system procurement as part of 
manpower contract. They can't be changing the system 
every now and then when they change the security vendor. 
According to the SSMDS (2010c) survey, a high percentage of buyers are 
already deploying various security systems at their sites: 92% have 
electronic surveillance systems and 87% have 24-hour central monitoring 
systems, while 83% deploy guard tour central systems. 
Mindful of the price-sensitive market, the five agencies have 
adopted a common strategy: the "promise of value-for-money" (SAM1) in 
their quotation. Because job contents are pre-determined, there is little 
room for a product differentiation strategy: "Clients only want warm bodies 
to stand around" (SAM3). Another interviewee also noted that the clients 
are not open to the security agency's suggestions: 
If only the customer would listen to us, we are not here to 
sell them many guards. We are here to tell them the bare 
minimum they can get away with, but they said 'just follow 
the spec'; so we just quote accordingly. (SAM5) 
SAM1 and SAM4 whose companies are in a relatively stronger 
position in the industry (as compared to the firms of the other 
interviewees) strive to select clients with desirable profiles, i.e. the 
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'genuine buyers' who see security as a critical operation. According to 
SAM1 and SAM4, these genuine buyers include large manufacturing 
plants with 24/7 operations; embassies and government buildings; high-
end commercial buildings in central business districts, and high-end retail 
stores, where security is deemed as essential to their operations. 
Some of the interviewees also cited the utilisation of market 
segment strategies. For example, the commercial segment commands a 
higher pricing than most residential and industrial segments; however, 
balancing a portfolio of desired market segment is not an easy task. 
Business opportunities derive primarily from referrals and the firms' 
network. A bigger firm like SAM4 with sizeable resources (such as a 
corporate website and a sales team) is at a greater advantage than 
smaller firms. The management team of SAM1, formerly from another 
large security firm, also possesses significant market knowledge. In 
contrast, the smaller players (SAM2, SAM3, and SAM5) tend to resort to 
price-cutting to stay afloat. Even SAM2 who has diversified into remote 
monitoring as a niche market has not been able to circumvent the 
disadvantages of the per headcount pricing. 
5.4 Productivity and Work Organisation: Minimising Liquidated 
Damages 
The unarmed security service is considered to be an outsourced 
service whereby security agencies supply manpower to the buyers' 
premises to perform security protection functions. Like any outsourced 
business, the recruitment of workers begins after a contract is secured: 
Once the contract is secured, we will recce the site and start 
recruitment. You need to choose the right type of SO for the 
site. (SAM1) 
The hierarchy of command includes an on-site Security Supervisor 
who leads a team of SOs. The Supervisor in turn reports to an Operations 
Executive who manages multiple sites. For the purpose of operational 
needs, the deployed team reports directly to a buyers' representative who 
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is usually part of the facility management team. Hence, contact between 
the agency and the site team is minimal, except when manpower issues 
arise. The Operations Executives from the agencies are expected to liaise 
with site supervisors regularly. 
For security agencies, manpower poses the greatest challenge, as 
shown by the interviewees' comments below: 
I am not afraid of recruitment. It is retention that is the 
biggest headache. (SAM1) 
They (SO) are mercenaries. They would leave for the extra 
dollars. It is very frustrating! It does not help when PLRD 
allows the licensed guards to work for two employers; it 
should be one! Some work for one agency in the day shift, 
change uniform, and work for another agency in the night. 
Next day, too tired, did not report for duty. (SAM4) 
At the moment, the guards are getting away with murder. 
PLRD should hold them individually accountable. Agencies 
like us are toothless. I told the guard: You sleep on duty, I 
sack you! Sack lor! He goes to the next employer. Then, we 
are penalised by our customers! (SAM4). 
`Liquidated damage' (LD) is a term that evokes tremendous fear in 
the five interviewees. LD is a list of deductibles that buyers impose on 
security agencies for their failure to comply with contract terms. SAM4 
commented that LD stems from the "human mistrust philosophy". SAM5 
offered a more detailed explanation of his concern: 
In principle, we always tell our customer: we have no 
problems with LDs. Because I do understand that you 
need to use that as an instrument to manage your 
vendors, but it is how you use it. 
According to the five interviewees, LD is a monthly occurrence for 
all their clients. A sampling of the LD deductibles is presented in Table 5.7. 
As SAM1 said: 
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The list of deductibles increases over the years. Buyers 
learn from experience of dealing with contract agencies. 
Some contracts have as many as 40 items. 
Table 5.7 Samolina of Deductibles in a Security Service Contract 
Shortcoming Amount to be 
deducted 
1 Unmanned Security/Fire Command Centre $500 per occasion 
2 Frequent change of security personnel, 
exceeding limit of the number of times in the 
contract year 
$500 per occasion 
per supervisor/guard 
3 Patrol vehicles fail to reach site within 30 
minutes 
$500 per occasion 
4 Contractor fails to comply with any reasonable 
instructions 
$500 per occasion 
5 Failure to provide training to Supervisors and 
Guards, 	 or 	 deployment 	 of 	 Supervisors 	 or 
Guards without consent of ABC Ltd* 
$200 per occasion 
6 Failure to keep proper records $100 	 per 	 item 	 per 
day 
7 Failure to submit/update (but not limited to), 
within the specific timeframe, the following 
data/records to ABC Ltd*, as requested or 
required by this contract: 
• Bio-data 
• CID screening reports 
• Daily reports 
• Investigation reports 
• Others as required by this contract 
$100 	 per 	 item 	 per 
day 
8 Failure to provide (but not limited to), within 
the specified timeframe, the following items to 
ABC Ltd*, as requested or required by this 
contract: 
• Clocking gun/Printer 
• Stationery items/Torch lights 
• Electronic Attendance System 
• Mobile phone/phone device 
• Others as required by this contract 
$100 	 per 	 item 	 per 
day 
9 Failure to rectify/replace any faulty 
equipment provided by the contractor 
$100 per item per 
day 
10 Security Supervisor stands in for more than 1 
hour (up to 2' 	 hour from starting of shift) 
$100 per hour 
11 Ditto for Guard $50 per hour 
12 Security Supervisor reporting for work later 
than the time specified (after 15 minutes), but 
within the first hour 
$50 per occasion 
per Security 
Supervisor 
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13 Ditto for Guard $30 per occasion 
per Guard 
14 Security Supervisor found absent after the 
first hour (he is deemed to be absent for the 
whole shift) 
$400 per occasion 
per Supervisor 
15 Ditto for Guard $300 per occasion 
per Guard 
16 Security Supervisor fails to perform his 
duties as stated in the Contract Specification 
$200 per occasion 
17 Ditto for Guard $100 per occasion 
18 Failure to carry out patrolling/clocking 
(include 15 minutes late or early clocking 
below 5 points) 
$20 per round 
19 Incomplete clocking (missed points, 
irregularity between points) 
$10 per point 
20 Absent Supervisor $400 per occasion 
21 Ditto for Guard $300 per occasion 
22 Supervisor leaves workplace without approval $400 per occasion 
23 Ditto for Guard $300 per occasion 
24 Abandon Post $100 per occasion 
Source: Permission granted by SAM2 to reproduce the table. *ABC Ltd is a pseudonym. 
As a result, minimising LD deductibles is one of the core 
management functions of the interviewees, which involves investigations 
and negotiations with buyers. Hence, maintaining a good rapport with 
buyers' representatives is a key part of the operation. SAM1 and SAM5 
shared their experiences: 
I give my Operations Executives the leeway to deliver what 
the customer wants. Comes to the crunch, it is the trust and 
relationship between clients and us that work. (SAM1) 
They will definitely issue LD, but some are negotiable. It 
takes time to investigate every LD item, then we use 
relationship to negotiate. Of course, there are those who 
would go by the book. (SAM5) 
Among them, SAM4 deploys a combination of bio-metric thumb and 
attendance systems, a real-time clocking system, and remote cameras to 
improve the supervision and management of sites: 
Essentially, this Virtual Supervision System (VSS) was to 
help us, firstly, to encourage punctuality, good attendance, 
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and discourage people from leaving the site without proper 
authority. And at the same time to make sure that whatever 
we promised the clients in terms of security patrols are 
carried out diligently. Lastly, it enables us to observe what's 
going on at the site without us having to be there. Hence, 
my Operations Executives and Managers can control 
multiple sites real-time, via iPhones. So that's very 
productive. 
SAM2 and SAM3 also install CCTV at all the guard posts to monitor the 
behaviour of SOs on duty. All of them have taken advantage of the IGP 
grants for such installations. 
Ultimately, the interviewees' chief concern is the protection of their 
profit margin that comes from the monthly service fees charged to the 
buyers. Their notion of productivity is simple: they deploy technologies to 
minimise potential LD incurred by their staff. After all, the organisation of 
work at the client's site is beyond the control of the security agencies. 
Moreover, providing better security services does not translate into higher 
service fees. In pleasing their clients, the interviewees' main concerns are 
"contract renewal and negotiation for lower reduction in LD items" (SAM4). 
This perception is also echoed by SAM5's reflection of an episode: 
Once, for one whole week, I have to deploy SOs to 
manually operate the carpark gantry that was out-of-order. 
Frankly, it is not our job, but it is all for goodwill. 
According to the interviewees, the most desired productivity 
enhancement in the area of organisation of work takes place at the head 
office: 
I got to chase business to ensure viability. The fixed cost is 
here (pointing to his office of staff). It is about reaching the 
efficient point. The formula is quite simple, for every 
Operations Executive whom I employed, he needs to have 
a minimum of 50 guard posts and the optimum may be 
around 100 guard posts. You need to reach the efficient 
point. (SAM 1) 
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The concept of 'reaching the efficient point' was also reiterated by SAM4 
when he shared his thoughts about using VSS to improve the productivity 
of his team of six Operation Executives so that they can manage more 
sites efficiently. 
For the security firms, productivity is solely about "minimising LD" 
and "reaching the efficient point". Essentially, the deployment of security 
technologies at the site is helpful for controlling and managing the pool of 
"unreliable" transient staff at the outposts (SAM4). The security agencies 
are able to enhance their productivity when the head office staff members 
are able to manage more sites with less manpower input. 
However, this conception of productivity contradicts the general 
belief of productivity, as described in the security sector's productivity 
roadmap in Table 5.3. For the policymakers, the deployment of security 
technologies should improve the work efficiency of SOs deployed, thus 
reducing the reliance on manpower at clients' sites. SAM3 disagreed with 
the technology replacement concept of productivity: 
There is a limit to how security technology can improve the 
work of SO. Honestly, how much can you improve their 
work? I don't get paid more if they work harder or faster. 
5.5 	 Skills Strategies of Security Firms 
In this section, the skills strategies of the interviewees, which 
include recruitment, retention, and skills development, will be examined. 
The examination of their strategies in recruitment-retention-skills 
development should illuminate the interviewees' conceptions of the skills, 
skills development choices, and skills utilisation, which are most relevant 
to their operations. 
Recruitment Strategies 
All five interviewees agreed that the tight labour market has made it 
difficult to recruit SOs and Supervisors. They use multiple channels for 
recruitment: 
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We advertise in newspapers, participate in career reviews 
at SII (Security Industry Institute) and e2i (Employment 
and Employability Institute), and through word-of-mouth to 
recruit (staff), but it is not easy. (SAM4) 
My scanning15 of classified job advertisements on security positions in The 
Straits Times'', from July 9 to 15 last year, revealed that, on average, 
there were about 44-64 advertisements related to security recruitment per 
day. It is interesting to note that, among the advertisements, only a small 
percentage (about 17%) revealed the agency name, with the vast majority 
remaining anonymous (see Diagram 5.1). The advertisements with agency 
names appeared to come from the bigger agencies. The primary 
information in all the advertisements concerned pay, location, and shift. I 
noticed that SAM4 advertised thrice in that week, while SAM1 advertised 
once to recruit security officers for a specific event. As for the other 
interviewees, it was unclear whether they had put up advertisements, 
since most advertising agencies were anonymous. 
It is interesting to note that the tight labour market has forced 
agencies to push up wages in order to attract SOs: 
We are seeing the market offering higher salary to attract 
people. It used to be one-two (S$1,200), then, one-five 
(S$1,500); it is going to be one-seven, one-eight pretty 
soon (S$1,700, $1,800). (SAM4) 
The gross salary advertised for a SO ranged from S$1,500 to S$2,000 and 
S$1,900 to S$2,500 for a supervisor. The bigger agencies also added an 
incentive of a "joining bonus" of S$3,000 to lure potential candidates (also 
see Diagram 5.1). Among the advertisements, those for recruiting 
supervisors were far fewer than those for SOs. 
15 I analysed classified security job advertisements in The Straits Times from July 9-15, 
2012. 
16 Straits Times is a 160-year old local paper with the highest local circulation of 1.35 
million readers: http://www.sph.com.sq/ourproducts newspaper st.shtml  
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Diagram 5.1 Sample of Security Employment Job Advertisement 
Source: Straits Times Classified Jobs, July 9, 2012. 
Most of the advertisements did not state any skills requirements. 
For the exceptions, a minimum education level (lower secondary) and 
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THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS 
OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
English literacy were the top two criteria. Some included attributes such as 
"positive attitude", "pleasant personality", and "must be physically fit". 
Surprisingly, the attainment of a security vocational licence was not widely 
stated as part of the requirement. 
However, at the SII security mass recruitment session, I observed 
that the recruiters preferred applicants who already had a licence. The 
recruiters assessed the English literacy level of the applicants through the 
form filling and interview process and sized up the suitability of applicants 
for various sites. Each interview lasted no more than 15 minutes. It is 
apparent that the current skills requirement for the entry-level job is 
relatively low: basic level of English literacy and the two modules of 
mandatory security training for the vocational licence. 
Skills Development 
The ongoing development of the rank-and-file staff is not a common 
practice among the interviewees: 
They have to prove their worth, loyalty to company, have 
the potential to lead, then I may consider sending them for 
supervisory training. Or, when buyers insist on specific 
training, such as first-aid. (SAM1) 
In general, the interviewees are reluctant to send SOs for more training 
unless their clients make specific requests. For the interviewees, sending 
their SOs for training specified by the clients is more about fulfilling 
contractual obligations than staff development: 
Some high-end condo or high security plants may stipulate 
additional training for guards deployed to their sites. The 
management would demand to see proof of training within 
first month of contract. Usually, we submit training 
certificates as proof. (SAM4) 
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Besides the mandatory training required by the regulator and 
clients, the five informants do not see the need for the training of rank-
and-file staff. SAM3 used the term "undeserving" to support his decision 
for not sending SOs for training, whereas SAM1 cited the high turnover 
rate as the main deterrent. However, the five informants stated their 
willingness to send high-potential workers for supervisory training. It would 
seem that few SOs are perceived by their employers to deserve the 
privilege, based on the low take-up rate of the supervisory training 
modules. 
Retention Strategies 
The retention of staff is also a challenging issue for the 
interviewees. Security agencies surveyed in the SSMDS (2010b) reported 
that, on average, 15% of the new recruits left the job within six months. 
According to the interviewees, the four reasons for high staff turnover are: 
a) Unattractive pay; 
b) Unfavourable working conditions; 
c) Poor job fit; and 
d) Lack of career progression. 
When asked to comment on the rank-and-file retention issue, the 
interviewees insisted that some of these factors are beyond their control: 
Buyers dictate the price... unless they are willing to pay 
more, there is no way for me to pay my guards more. 
Maybe the government should top up the workers' salary. 
As for the working hours, it has always been 12-hour shift 
since the day I joined the industry some 25 years ago. 
Again, it is the buyers who state it in the tender. (SAM3) 
Nonetheless, interviewees have implemented various strategies to 
retain the rank-and-file staff including: taking care of hygiene factors such 
as paying salaries on time and making sure that guards deployed are a 
good match for the deployment site: 
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Most of them are hand-to-mouth, so they expect prompt 
payment of wages on fortnightly basis. For some, we 
even allow them to advance their pay. (SAM3) 
It is interesting to note that almost all of the interviewees indicated 
that the on-site supervisor plays a critical role in staff retention: 
Site supervisor is the most important man. He needs to be 
able to command and galvanise the ground. When he 
talks, people must listen. Having a good man there would 
ensure a stable team. (SAM1) 
Supervisory skills such as interpersonal leadership, problem solving, and 
decision-making skills were identified as the top four desired skills of site 
supervisors in the SSMDS report. The interviewees also confirmed that 
site supervisors with the desired skills set can reduce SO turnover and 
minimise the chances of LD deductions. 
Among the interviewees, only two (SAM1 and SAM4) use career 
progression pathway as retention strategies. They also claimed that they 
paid better wages to their staff to prevent their staff from being poached by 
competitors. Although they recognise that retaining "good people" is 
critical in rendering quality security services, SAM1 and SAM4 also stated 
that it is a daunting task to recruit and retain staff due to low pay and 
unattractive working conditions. Of the five interviewees, SAM4 is best-
placed to manage the manpower situation because the firm has a sizeable 
professional team of Operations Executives who can leverage on their 
VSS and put specific work processes in place. 
5.6 	 Conclusion 
The evidence above revealed that the five security agencies are 
constantly engaged in endeavours to coordinate demands from buyers, 
workers, and regulators. On top of this activity, they are also expected by 
the other stakeholders to shoulder the productivity enhancement 
responsibilities. In this section, I seek to address one of my key research 
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questions: How do firms' responses to exogenous forces shape their 
product/market strategies, organisation of work, and skills strategies? 
As for-profit organisations, the five security agencies in this study 
employ strategies that are driven by their desire to increase profits and 
minimise losses. Ideally, these objectives could be achieved through a 
mutually beneficial arrangement between the buyers, security agencies, 
and workers. However, the historic cheap-sourcing practices (lowest bid 
wins the contract), coupled with the low-skills equilibrium (low-wage and 
low-skilled production) and poor job quality (high job intensity, no job 
autonomy, lack of career progression, low wages, and low skills) have 
perpetuated the vicious cycle of the perceived low value of security 
services. 
Drawing upon the responses of the interviewees and other sources 
described above, I now present an analysis of the factors that have 
influenced security agencies' decisions and behaviours pertaining to their 
low-wage employees: 
1) Due to cheap-sourcing practices, firms have responded with 
price/cost strategies to win bids, thus further depressing wage 
costs. 
2) Unlike other businesses where firms have discretionary power 
over product and process design, the outsourced nature of 
security services has taken the job design discretion away from 
firms. Hence, firms have no influence on employees' productivity 
at the deployed sites. 
3) Yet security firms are penalised by service buyers for the 
"misbehaviour of security employees" and the "non-fulfilment of 
duties". As a result, firms have to commit substantial resources 
to managing liquidated damages imposed by buyers. 
4) Due to the price/cost strategies, the skills strategies of the firms 
are reduced to recruitment and retention. Firms also make do 
with the minimal skills available; in short, they have settled for 
low-skills equilibrium. 
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5) The minimal skills training mandated by PLRD for SOs keep 
entry-level skills low. The SSMDS report showed that the desired 
skills of security employers and buyers — customer service 
skills, communication skills, and problem-solving skills — have 
not been met. The mandatory training only address the PLRD's 
security skills need. 
The firms' perceived powerlessness in the price-cutting game and 
fixation on a low-skills equilibrium deserves a more in-depth analysis. One 
contributing factor is an environment that promotes a continuous supply of 
low-skilled workers who are willing to take up better-paid, low-wage 
employment in the security sector, which is further bolstered by the official 
permission granting the extension of the overtime work arrangement. The 
evidence in Chapter 4 support this claim. 
A second factor is the inability of security firms and security 
employees to work as one collective force to change the rules of the 
game. Studies by Bosch et al. (2010) showed that in sectors where the 
industry bodies and the labour unions are able to achieve mutually 
beneficial collective bargaining, sectors are likely to adopt a high-skills 
equilibrium with a correspondingly lower incidence rate of low wages. In 
these sectors, collective bargaining achieves the desired outcome of 
producing higher productivity and higher job quality than other sectors with 
no collective bargaining. Clearly, such a scenario is absent in the security 
sector in Singapore. According to developmental state literature, the 
centralised coordination by state institutions diminishes the social partners' 
power, specifically by co-opting social partners in the fulfilment of national 
interest (see, inter alia, Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). In the next chapter, I 
will evaluate the phenomenon of the weak social partners. 
These two reasons highlight the need for an evaluation of the 
current institutional arrangements of the developmental state, which 
contribute to the perpetuation of the aforementioned behaviours of the 
security firms. The developmental state literature explains that economic 
primacy is the national interest because the state believes that the 
creation of economic wealth and employment is dependent on the success 
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of businesses (Sung, 2006). The government's pro-business stance with 
regards to the security sector is evident in the following areas: 
a) The authorities permit security employers to schedule extended 
overtime work arrangements. 
b) Flexible labour market practices allow employers to hire and fire at 
ease. 
c) They believe that the market itself is effective in setting prices and 
wages. 
d) They presume that a sustainable wage increase must lag behind 
productivity growth. 
e) Finally, they consider employers to be apt judges of employees' 
in-employment skills upgrading needs, who would then furnish the 
necessary training as needed. 
I argue that these entrenched beliefs and practices have contributed to 
security firms' failure to seek out alternative business models to replace 
the cheap-sourcing market arrangement and led them to conveniently 
settle upon the low-skills equilibrium. The institutional arrangements have 
thus facilitated economic growth on the one hand and produce the 
unintended consequence of low-skills equilibrium for the security sector. 
The developmental state's institutional arrangements will be investigated 
in the next chapter. 
In sum, the circumstantial factors identified in this chapter have 
clearly demonstrated the security firms' limited capacity and willingness to 
facilitate the upward mobility of their low-wage employees. The security 
sector productivity roadmap had sought to change the behaviour of 
security sector through high-skill strategies, improved work conditions, 
increased wages, and the introduction of best-sourcing guidelines. A key 
question is whether the well-intended and ambitious plan could take effect 
when the developmental state institutions continue to cling to their 
predisposition of economic primacy. I will discuss this question in Chapter 
7 after studying the current institutional arrangement in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6: BEHAVIOURS OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
6.1 	 Introduction 
The examination of the skills strategies of low-wage security 
employees in Chapter 4 indicates that their chances of upward mobility are 
slim. Chapter 5 highlighted the challenges security firms face in 
coordinating with the different stakeholders. While firms feel powerless in 
the cheap-sourcing environment, they also have no motivation or incentive 
to move away from the low-skills equilibrium. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the state-imposed productivity agenda has exerted little effect on their 
business practices. 
In this chapter, we will look at the macro-level institutions in 
Singapore to shed light on their perspective, roles, and mindset in 
facilitating the upward mobility of LWWs. The decisions and actions of 
these institutions that embody the cultural-historical values of Singapore 
play an important role in shaping the affordances available to security 
firms and low-wage security employees. More specifically, this chapter 
seeks to answer the question: To what extent does the developmental 
state mindset shape the institutional behaviour towards LWWs' upward 
mobility? This discussion constitutes the final stage of the three-level 
analysis that completes the exploration of the effectiveness of the 
"productivity-driven growth and skills upgrading for better life in creating an 
inclusive society" (MTI, 2010, p. i). 
More specifically, I will analyse the policies and practices of three 
institutions: the Workforce Development Agency (WDA), the Union of 
Security Employees (USE), and the Work Group of Security Sector 
Productivity (WGSSP). As mentioned in Chapter 3, these three institutions 
have had a direct impact on the upward mobility of low-wage security 
employees. 
To provide some background information, I will provide a concise 
overview of the three institutions and their roles. The WDA is mandated to 
design policies and programmes pertaining to the skills needs of the entire 
workforce in Singapore. The upgrading of LWWs is one among many in its 
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portfolios. The USE is the industry union that formally represents the 
security sector's employees. As part of Singapore's tripartite practices, 
USE purportedly represents its members at various platforms such as the 
Security Industry Skills and Training Council and the WGSSP. The 
WGSSP is a bi-partite platform that constructed the productivity road map 
to boost the productivity and wages of the security sector. 
Drawing upon the developmental state literature, this chapter will 
set forth the narratives of the interviewees from the aforementioned 
respective organisations. The discussion should offer insights into the 
macro-meso and macro-micro interactions between the diverse 
stakeholders in the security sector. The details of the informants 
interviewed for this stage of the thesis are presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Informants from WDA, USE, and the WGSSP 
Organisation Representative Code Relationship with 
security sector 
WDA Government 
agency 
GEA1 
GEA2 
Has managed a 
team of three 
officers serving 
the security 
sector for four 
years 
Manages five 
career centres 
that serve the 
unemployed 
USE Part of National 
Trade Union 
Congress 
UEM1 Managed the 
USE from 2004 
to 2011 
WGSSP Multiple 
stakeholders 
from government 
and unions: 
members 
include 
individuals from 
MHA, MOM, 
WDA, e2i, and 
USE 
MCP1 Senior member 
of the work 
group 
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The following section will first explain the unique roles of each 
institution before examining how their mindset and actions have affected 
the security firms and security employees, in terms of supply of and 
demand for low-wage work in the sector. The chapter will end by 
evaluating the success of the policy rhetoric on productivity and skills with 
regards to the security sector. 
6.2 A Competitive Workforce, Learning for Life, and Advancing 
with Skills — The Workforce Development Agency 
Mission and Roles of WDA 
Established in 2003, the WDA has been tasked with the mission of 
"enhancing the employability and competitiveness of the workforce" in 
order to support the free market economic system and outward-oriented 
economic policies (MTI, 2012). The WDA's website states: 
For Singapore's workforce to remain competitive and 
employable in today's fast-changing workplace, they must 
have both knowledge and skills that are relevant, current and 
sought after by employers. In turn, this will also help 
companies strengthen their capabilities, remain competitive, 
and contribute to stronger economic growth for Singapore. 
The Singapore Workforce Development Agency aims to help 
workers advance in their careers and lives by developing and 
strengthening skills-based training for adults. We work with 
various partners — including employers, industry associations, 
the union and training organisations — to develop relevant 
skills-based training that is accessible to all in the workforce, 
whether young or old, from rank-and-file to professionals and 
executives. 
(excerpt from WDA website, 
http://www.wda.gov.sg/content/wdawebsite/L209-001About-
Us.html)  
In short, workforce development is a means to bolster businesses and 
sustain economic growth. Workers bear the onus of having the relevant 
skills to meet employers' needs. It is assumed that, for the workers, career 
advancement and good lives would ensue from being skilled. 
The WDA's roles include the following: 
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• Supporting sectoral skills needs"; 
• Enhancing the quality of continuing education and training18; 
• Providing funding subsidies to incentivise training participation19; 
and 
• Offering employment facilitation services to jobseekers. 
To encourage more LWWs to participate in training, WDA offers 
additional funding assistance to LWWs under Workfare Training Support 
(WDA, 2012b) by providing a higher course fee subsidy (95%, instead of 
50%-90%) for the general workforce and monetary rewards for LWWs up 
to S$400 per year for the successful completion of selected training 
programmes. Those who complete the first upgrading full qualification are 
rewarded with another S$400–S$1000. The assumption underpinning 
such a scheme is that the monetary incentives would motivate employers 
and LWWs to participate in skills upgrading. 
In parallel with worker assistance, a suite of productivity-related 
training programmes has been made available to enterprises across 
various sectors (WDA, 2012c). Annually, WDA trains about 300,000 
workers (15% of the resident workforce) and support nearly 750,000 
training places. 
Continuing Education and Training, Wages, and Worker Progression 
From the outset, the WDA has adopted a sectoral approach in 
ensuring that the skills supply matches the skills needs of the security 
industry, which is done through the deliberative platform of the Industry 
Skills and Training Council (ISTC) — a tripartite formation. The ISTC 
articulates the competencies of the security employees in the Security 
Workforce Skills Qualification (WSQ). The Security WSQ has had a list of 
17 WDA helps sectors to identify skills shortages and skills gaps before inviting training 
providers to provide training. 
18 WDA accredits training programmes that meet quality standards. 
19 The funding includes: course fee subsidies to defray course fees; absentee payroll to 
compensate employers for productivity lost when employees attend training and training 
allowances to the unemployed, while they attend pre-employment training. 
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training programmes since 2007. As we saw in Diagram 4.1, the 
framework is designed with qualifications pegged to respective job roles. 
GEA1 explained the purpose of such an approach: 
We want to ensure that there is occupational progression 
within the sector. The qualification is designed so that 
workers can move up through the ranks after acquiring the 
necessary skills. All the necessary skills for the job roles are 
incorporated into the corresponding qualifications. 
Thus far, only the mandatory training programmes as stipulated by 
the PLRD, which is required for new workers entering the sector, have the 
greatest rate of participation. In contrast, the participation rate of training 
programmes for in-employment upgrading is very low: only 5% of the 
security workforce participates in further training: 
We were puzzled too. Our commissioned study (referring to 
SSMDS) shows that buyers and employers valued trained 
staff, but that did not translate into action. (GEA1) 
Due to the perceived strategic role of the private security sector in 
national security, the regulator PLRD plays the primary role of directing the 
sector's skills strategies as part of its efforts to professionalise the sector. 
During my interview with security firms, I learnt that they considered the 
skills agenda to be overly skewed towards security technical skills, with 
inadequate attention paid to the soft skills that are desired by service 
buyers. SSMDS (2010c) reported that two-thirds of the buyers who 
participated in the study expressed dissatisfaction with the current quality 
of security officers. They stated their willingness to pay 5-20% more for 
better-trained officers. 
Similarly, 75% of the security firm representatives who participated 
in the study agreed that more training is needed for the workforce. 
Moreover, buyers highlighted the gaps in the skills of the security 
workforce: specifically, 98% of the buyers deemed generic skills such as 
(a) interpersonal/communication skills, (b) customer service skills, and (c) 
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problem-solving and decision-making skills as more important than 
technical security skills (79%). Buyers expect SOs to perform more 
customer service functions, instead of just protecting the premises. 
With regards to this discrepancy, GEA1 sought to provide a 
rationale: 
WDA's role is to understand skills needs before designing 
programmes and schemes that are relevant to the sector. 
This includes understanding the number of workers needed 
and the skills they need. So we work closely with PLRD and 
the industry as well. Our role is to help the sector to have a 
pipeline of a skilled workforce. We need to know what 
PLRD's plans and aspirations are for the sector. PLRD is the 
lead agency; therefore, we need to support their plan. On our 
own, we have limited influence on training participation. 
We do listen to the security firms. For example, they said 
generic skills are important, so we have included customer 
service, communication skills, and problem solving as 
elective modules. But the core competencies on security 
technical skills must first be fulfilled. The employers can 
always send their staff for additional training if necessary. 
That is what PLRD wanted. I guess Singapore is such a 
peaceful place and crime rate is low. Hence, the trained 
security officers have practically no chance to apply their 
security technical skills. That does not mean that technical 
skills are unimportant. 
However, I pointed out that soft skills were considered to be critical by 
security services buyers and security firms in the SSMDS; yet, in the 
current design, soft skills are not mandatory. GEA1 responded to my 
comments as follows: 
Anyway, security firms are generally only interested in fulfilling 
the mandatory training set by PLRD. They always say soft 
skills are important, but in reality, they don't send staff for 
training, citing manpower shortage as the reason. It is really 
up to the employers to send staff for more training if 
necessary. 
I think, at the moment, we have been setting standards based 
on PLRD's minimum requirements. The industry and the 
buyers are having a different set of expectations. Unless 
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PLRD recognises it, there is little we can do. We have done 
our best to make available all training and funding subsidies, 
but employers are not subscribing to them because they are 
not mandated by PLRD. 
The two mandatory training modules that form the basic requirement 
for the vocational license were implemented in 2007. During the initial 
implementation phase, the high failure rate was a major cause of concern 
because many low-skilled new entrants were not able to go into 
employment. Although the passing rate has improved over the years, the 
regulator has not raised the entry-level skills or the skills level of the 
incumbent workforce, fearing the potential negative impact on businesses. 
Moreover, the exponential growth in security service demand also means 
that security firms have difficulties releasing staff for more training. 
Loading more skills training for new entrants, which would lengthen the 
training period, would also not be a welcomed measure. 
The statistics provided by GEA1 on the training attainment of the 
security workforce showed that the actual number of SOs who progressed 
up the career ladder constituted approximately 5% of the 4,200 security 
officers trained during the Jan 2010—Dec 2011 period. Hence, despite 
creating four levels of qualifications to facilitate the upward mobility of 
security workforce, the take-up rate of the full qualification was relatively 
low (6%): 
We recognised that currently, there is a lack of linkage 
between the skills attainment and the wages of the security 
workers. From the employers' perspective, they have major 
challenges with buyers dictating the price. We even tried to 
influence the salary of new entrants by subsidising 50% of 
the first six months of salary, while the new entrants undergo 
a work-study programme. Honestly, we are not confident that 
it would change the landscape. Wages and career 
progression are really beyond our control. (GEA1) 
Our study (SSMDS, 2010a) on security employees reported 
that they perceived they could do a better job after training. 
This is an indication of progression, isn't it? After all, the 
poaching of trained security employees is quite pervasive. 
Now, if they are poached because they are trained, and are 
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able to secure higher pay by moving to another employers. I 
should think that they are actually progressing, in a way. 
(GEA1) 
Hence, it would seem that the Security WSQ that is supposedly 
designed to support the sector's manpower needs has not succeeded in 
motivating employers and workers to move beyond the two mandatory 
training modules prescribed by PLRD. One may speculate that the 
minimal skills requirements, coupled with the cheap-sourcing market 
environment, have pushed the sector towards a low-skills route. 
GEA1 highlighted the issue of the lack of linkage between skills and 
wage compensation as another possible cause for the preference for low-
skills. Progression, in terms of wages (as per GEA1), has been left to 
market forces, with salaries going up in tandem with labour shortages. Yet 
the basic wage has fallen over the last few years, which sadly has not 
triggered any alarm among the regulators and the social partners. The 
noticeable poor job quality — low wages, long working hours, as well as 
the lack of career progression, skills upgrading opportunities, and work 
autonomy — are similarly neglected. Studies have shown that such 
inaction on poor job quality has perpetuated the low-skills equilibrium of 
many service sectors (see, inter alia, Gautie and Schmitt, 2010). 
Job first: Recycling LWWs 
The acute shortage of security manpower has translated into a high 
number of job vacancies in the low-wage sector. The five WDA-operated 
career centres referred 40% of the 9,300 job seekers to security training 
and jobs during the May 2011–May 2012 period (statistics provided by 
GEA2). These job seekers are predominantly mature (aged 40 & above) 
low-skilled workers (education level of secondary school and below). 
When I inquired about the reason underlying the high number of referrals 
to security jobs, GEA2 offered the following explanation: 
Due to their age, qualification, and work experience, the best 
job available is security. They get into employment quickly 
after five days of intensive training. Being a Security Officer 
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is far better than being a cleaner or healthcare support 
assistant. At least, the nature of the job is less laborious. The 
pay is also better than the other low-paid jobs. 
MOM's Report on Wages in Singapore 2011 confirmed that the wages of 
SOs ranked high among the bottom 10% of the occupational group (p. 61). 
With regards to the skills upgrading of job seekers, GEA2 explained that 
job seekers were provided with pre-employment preparatory training 
before they made their employment choices: 
We will try to give them as much preparatory training as 
possible. This includes motivational workshop, job search 
skills, grooming, basic literacy skills, and soft skills such as 
personal effectiveness and communication skills. We hope to 
give them as much confidence as possible. We also arrange 
work trials for them to try out some jobs. Once they decided 
on the employment, we would send them for vocational 
training. For security, it would be the mandatory licensing 
training. 
Skirting around the question of the party that is responsible for 
helping LWWs progress to better job, GEA2 highlighted his agency's 
primary focus on getting the unemployed into jobs: 
Our job is to help the unemployed get into a job as soon as 
possible. In a sense, employment facilitation is an important 
social safety net for the lowest 10% of the workforce. With a 
job, they would get many other benefits, like Workfare 
Income Supplement. Without a job, they have nothing. 
Currently, we are focusing on placing the unemployed into 
jobs. Moving LWWs into better jobs is not our mandate. 
Championing better jobs and better wages is the job of the 
union, isn't it? 
In an endeavour to enhance the accessibility of skills upgrading for 
LWWs, Workfare Training Support initiatives were launched in 2010 to 
help LWWs upgrade to better jobs and hence increase their wages (WDA, 
2012b): 
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We target to get 30,000 LWWs annually to participate in the 
scheme, but we have not met the target yet. Those who 
participated were primarily sent by employers; individual-
initiated training is still very low, about 10%. We went on 
roadshows, knocked on the doors of poor housing estates, 
but the people just don't sign up for training. Our objective is 
also to get the economically inactive low-skilled to return to 
the workforce. With the tight labour market, we need a 
greater resident workforce. (GEA2) 
Having a job is seen as the main social safety net for the LWWs, or 
as Esping-Anderson and Myles (2009) explained, "... market is expected to 
provide main part of the welfare." (p. 645). At the very minimum, the 
market provides income to the workers. The CET system that includes 
skills training and employment facilitation thus helps the unemployed get 
into entry-level jobs in the security sector. The current system, based on 
the active labour market concept, is designed to place low-skilled 
unemployed people into jobs as soon as possible, even if the job is low-
skilled/low-waged and lacks career progression opportunities. In-
employment upgrading is very much left to employers: "Because 
employers should know best" (GEA1). 
The need to serve the security sector's manpower demand also led 
to the launching of a new scheme by WDA and PLRD in August 2012. 
Under this scheme, a 'restricted' vocational licence was offered to entice at 
least 500 housewives and retirees to work as security officers at 
condominiums and schools (Toh, 2012). This scheme stems partly from 
the pressure of security firms who lack sufficient manpower and the need 
to increase the resident workforce's participation rate in order to ease the 
overall tight labour market situation. 
The relentless efforts to supply low-skilled workers and the creation 
of mini-jobs in the security sector suggest that meeting the sector's 
manpower needs and a `job-first' approach are the main foci of the WDA. 
The upward mobility of security employees is "not their mandate" (GEA2) 
and "beyond their control" (GEA1). 
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The effort of WDA in facilitating LWWs' upward mobility may be 
interpreted as enabling LWWs to remain employed. Thus, CET is made 
available to facilitate their return to the workforce for the next available 
jobs when they are unemployed. Though in-employment upgrading 
courses and funding are made available, it is up to the individual LWWs 
and employers to access them. 
6.3 Collaboration, Not Confrontation — The Union of Security 
Employees 
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and Its Socio-
economic Roles 
According to labour analysts (see, inter alia, Chew, 1991; Trocki, 
2001), labour unions in Singapore have been embroiled in politics since 
their establishment. In their separate studies, Chew (1991) and Trocki 
(2001) suggested that the labour unions in Singapore have an 
exceptionally close relationship with the developmental state that they are 
perceived as part of the institutions. 
The NTUC was officially set up in 1961 when the ruling party came 
into power. The year 1968 marked a significant change in labour history: 
the introduction of new labour laws emphasising the promotion of 
industrial expansion and economic prosperity essentially transformed the 
traditionally militant union movement into a cooperative one (Lim-Ng, 
1986; Rodan, 1989). 
In 1969, at the Modernisation Seminar, the NTUC announced, 
"Collective bargaining became collaborative and not confrontational; and 
workers were helped to achieve better quality of life through better 
education and training" (Ee, 2011, p. 15). In 1972, the establishment of the 
tripartite National Wage Council to regulate wage increases further 
curtailed the collective bargaining role of NTUC (Chew, 1991). In his 
studies of the trend of trade union movements worldwide, Baccaro (2008) 
argued that the roles of unions have diminished over the years due to the 
rise of neo-liberalism: 
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In the era of globalisation and neo-liberalism, the institution 
that once improved earnings and income distribution have 
become much less apt at doing so. (p. 1) 
In fact, since its inception, the NTUC has been closely associated with the 
ruling party. Many NTUC leaders are also members of parliament under 
the ruling party (Chew, 1991). 
In the area of helping the workforce in training and employment, the 
NTUC has been participating in the direct delivery of training programmes, 
taking up the role of employment facilitation, and championing best-
sourcing initiatives and Inclusive Growth Programmes through its 
cooperatives — the Employment and Employability Institute and the NTUC 
Learning Hub. 
As of 2011, the union density in the workforce is about 19% 
(MRSD, 2011a). In his study, Chew (1991) concluded that workers who 
join unions in Singapore enjoy only limited benefits — mainly social 
benefits. The NTUC has been introducing a slew of social benefits in a bid 
to push up membership, such as discounts at its co-operative 
supermarket, its leisure social and sports clubs, its childcare services, and 
its cooperative insurance services. The perceived image of the NTUC is of 
a body that runs many cooperatives. In the attempt to rectify their brand 
image, NTUC put up a full-page advertisement in The Straits Times (May 
2, 2012; see Diagram 6.1). 
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Diagram 6.1 Full-page Advertisements by NTUC in The Straits Times, 
May 2, 2012 
Ironically, in the advertisement, NTUC concedes that "everyone 
think that we are just a supermarket", because its supermarkets are the 
most prominent aspect of its operation, compared to its other roles. Its 
claim that it represents 690,000 members (including students and 
membership for social enterprises) does not resonate with the majority in 
the workforce, as we have read from the narratives of the five cases of 
security employees in Chapter 4. 
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THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS 
OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Since its establishment, the NTUC has subscribed to the view that 
the interests of the nations are prioritised over those of the workers: "Full 
employment before pay, national competitiveness above wages" (Chew, 
1991, p. 97). Chew's (1991) observation is echoed in the numerous 
statements made by the current Secretary General of the NTUC, Lim 
Swee Say, who has been toeing the line on the establishment of a flexible 
labour market policy and the non-intervention of wages. For example, he 
rejected the proposition of minimum wage in Singapore in a speech that 
was reported in Loh (2011): 
Mr. Lim said the government is determined to increase 
wages and improve worker skills through training. This 
approach will allow workers to remain employable. He also 
gave an example of a security guard who used to earn $850 
a month. While training will take 3 to 5 years, it will pave the 
way for a pay increase of $600 or more. In the meantime, his 
salary can be complemented through workfare supplements, 
in some cases, up to 25% of his salary. He said although 
90% of the countries worldwide have adopted the minimum 
wage, Singapore's model is different from other countries 
that does not mean what Singapore has done is the wrong 
thing (p. A5). 
The Secretary General of NTUC who is also a minister at the Prime 
Minister's Office has also clung to the collaborative approach as the 
primary strategy for helping workers and businesses in the low-wage 
sector through the Best-Sourcing Initiative and the Inclusive Growth 
Programme (IGP) — both of which are administered by the NTUC: 
Best-sourcing initiative and Inclusive Growth Programmes 
are the only way to bring up wages of the LWWs. It may take 
many years, but it is the best for all (quoted in Toh and Heng, 
2012, p. B8) 
The Union of Security Employees (USE) that was formed in 1978 is 
a part of NTUC. USE represents about 22% of the security workforce. 
Since 2009, USE has assumed the role of processing the vocational 
licences of SOs. Its mission is: 
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To provide our members with good welfare, benefits and 
services, so as to give them a better life. To improve the 
image and professionalism of the security workforce through 
strong leadership and partnership with our key stakeholders. 
(excerpt from USE website http://unions.ntuc.org.sg/USE) 
 
Exactly how USE has performed its mission will be revealed by a USE 
representative in the following section. 
USE'S Industry-wide, Worker-Centric Approach 
The outsourced nature of private security services means that 
security employees are deployed to clients' sites throughout their period of 
employment. This sort of work arrangement challenges the traditional 
labour union arrangement where the house union within a firm could 
recruit its members from among the employees. UEM1 lamented about 
the challenge of membership recruitment: 
We realised that to organise the people in the sector is 
difficult. Here is one company with 100 employees, all at 
different locations: one condo here, one factory there. There 
is no way we can represent our members. Every two we 
recruit, one will drop out, because they can't pay their dues 
and stuff like that. So, we decided that we needed to work 
with employers. We go for industry-wide worker-centric 
approach, so that employers can see the value of the union. 
That I am paid better contracts, that MOM is not hitting at me 
anymore. 
USE's industry-wide worker-centric approach entails participating in 
national level initiatives and reaching out to employers, in lieu of the 
collective bargaining approach, to improve work and pay. UEM1 
elaborated: 
We were the ones who initiated the tripartite partnership for 
the security sector. We have achieved a lot since. To ensure 
that security employers are aware of their employment 
obligations, we worked with MOM to publish an employment 
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guide for the security agencies and officers. Pushing for 
responsible sourcing, we organised best-sourcing awareness 
education forums for buyers to know the consequences of 
their action. We even play the whistle-blower role by 
watching over government's procurement practices on 
security contracts. I think the employers really appreciate our 
efforts. 
If we go to every employer and start saying I want collective 
bargaining, give you a form B and serve this section, the war 
is over! Instead, this industry's upgrading approach has been 
so successful. Now companies come to us and want that. 
Today, I have about 80 security firms (30%) as unionised 
companies. 
For the security employees, we were also the ones who 
insisted on changing the name from guard to officer; the 
standardisation of uniforms; and the licensing and all that. 
Today, they are more professional than before. Our efforts in 
industry redevelopment have resulted in better skills, better 
pay, and better jobs for everyone. Better pay in the sense 
that because of all this mandatory training that we introduced 
in phases, educating buyers, educating employers, educating 
workers, code of conducts, new laws, grading of agencies, 
everybody is upgraded and performing better. 
When I showed him the wage reports that contradicted his claim of 
better pay, UEM1 responded as follows: 
Gross pay has certainly increased from a low of $1,000 to 
today's $1,500. The fluctuation in basic pay may be a 
general trend, but I think MOM is looking into it. I am sure 
that the introduction of the Workfare Income Supplement will 
surely help the security employees too since they are all low-
waged. 
My analysis of the trending of basic wage of the SOs from 2004 to 
2009 shows that their basic wage declined from $1,018 in 2004 to $837 in 
2009 (data from annual wage report published by MOM). This fact 
suggests that the high demand for SO and tight labour market, the security 
firms might have creatively manage the wage costs by attributing the 
increase to other portion of compensation package instead of wages. 
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As for my queries on the employers' reluctance to send employees 
for skills upgrading, as well as poor working conditions such as extended 
working hours and low-pay, UEM1 pinpointed causes that were beyond 
USE's control: 
PLRD should mandate skills upgrading, set aside protected 
time for upgrading, just like doctors, lawyers. They are the 
regulators — they should do something! Until that point of 
time, currently with the manpower shortage, employers are 
already facing so much flak. We tried with e2i to give half-
hour trainings at workplaces — just half an hour before they 
start work. It didn't work because the security officers, they 
spend one hour commuting to workplace, another hour 
commuting back, 12 hours at work. They are so tired. 
Tough! Tough! 
The overtime exemption is historical. The pay is low, so 
overtime gives workers the extra bucks. With the labour 
shortage, we cannot abruptly stop the exemption; 
otherwise, the employers would suffer. The drastic move 
may force many SMEs to go out of business. What 
happens next, employees would be out of jobs. I think it is 
also a lack of political will from the government. It is all their 
doing. Actually, with one stroke, the government can revert 
many things, the overtime and the wages. It is a lack of 
political will! 
It is evident that these comments reflect a developmental state 
mindset, the adherence to the pro-business national agenda, and the 
conformance to the job-first philosophy. The unions' peripheral 
participation in the security sector and their refusal to take a leading role in 
addressing job quality issues clearly capture the behaviour of unions in the 
developmental state. Trocki (2001) offered an apt description: 
Within the tripartite framework of labour, capital and 
government, labour almost always found itself subordinated 
by the partnership of the government and business (p. 129). 
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6.4 Productivity has No Strong Correlation with Wages — Work 
Group of Security Sector Productivity (WGSSP) 
Role Of WGSSP — Turning Vicious Cycle Into Virtuous Cycle 
The establishment of the National Productivity and Continuing 
Education Council (NPCEC) in April 2010 resulted in the adoption of 
productivity as a national agenda, which permeated throughout all sectors. 
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) was tasked by NPCEC to raise the 
productivity of the private security sector. The WGSSP chaired by MHA 
was formed in January 2011, consisting of a multi-agency team 
(comprising PLRD, MOM, and WDA) and union representatives from USE 
and e2i. Departing from the typical tripartite arrangement in Singapore, 
whereby the government, employer group, and unions are represented, 
this work group however, did not have employer representation. MCP1 
explained: 
Based on PLRD's experience, the two industry associations 
do not represent the majority of the security employers; so 
they don't fully represent the industry. Moreover, the office 
holders also run security companies: they so-called 
represent their own interest. So we decided to engage them 
outside of the workgroup when the road map is approved. 
The work group identified the problem in the security sector as 
being a "vicious cycle" that is related to the outsourced nature of the 
security service in which buyers dictate the price and other pre-existing 
conditions, which combine to contribute to the low-wage phenomenon. 
The approved road map was supposed to convert the "vicious cycle" into a 
virtuous cycle" for the sector with a targeted goal of increasing real wages 
by 3% annually over next five years" (MCP1). 
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A Tough Mission — We Are Not Confident! 
The outsourced nature of private security services has given the 
productivity-and-wage agenda a complicated starting point. The work 
group admitted that it would be a tough mission, but they had to figure out 
how to achieve the national level directive of productivity-led-wage-
increase: 
The mandate from NPCEC is really to improve the 
productivity of this security sector so that the real wages of 
the workers could be increased 3% annually over the next 
five years. But as we worked on it, we realised that, as with 
other low-wage sectors in which buyers adopt an outsourced 
approach, the overall dynamics are different. Even if you 
improve productivity, you have no way of directly influencing 
the wages of the workers, because the security agencies are 
just contractors. This is unlike the manufacturing sector 
where the value per worker can be enhanced through 
process improvement. The value-added per worker formula 
does not apply here. 
Actually, the NPCEC realised it too. A study by MTI and 
MOM shows that in outsourced sectors, the correlation 
between productivity and wage is not strong. We find our 
mission very tough. Because when we looked at the last 10 
years, the real wage didn't really increase at all in these 
sectors (security & cleaning); some years, it actually dipped. 
But we just have to do it and hope that it happens eventually. 
We have no assurance that it will happen. We are not that 
confident! (MCP1) 
The ambitious four-pronged approach of the security productivity 
roadmap includes: 1) promoting manpower development; 2) shaping buyer 
behaviour; 3) reducing reliance on manpower with technology; and 4) 
improving wages and working conditions of security officers. The first three 
are based on existing initiatives such as the expansion of mandatory 
modules, the provision of best-sourcing initiatives, and the implementation 
of the Inclusive Growth Programme. The component that stands out from 
the rest is (4): improving wages and working conditions of security officers: 
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In the end, we realised that we may need to implement a 
minimum wage; otherwise, the goal of an annual 3% wage 
increase will never happen. But we are concerned about the 
possible negative impact on the sector and the ripple effects 
onto other low-wage sectors. Although we have put it down 
on the roadmap, we need to study this option very carefully. 
We also found out that the overtime exemption enjoyed by 
security employers have, to a certain degree, suppressed 
wages. We want to do away with the overtime; so we worked 
it into the plan and asked MOM to champion it. They said it's 
very difficult. They are afraid that if they tighten the 
exemption, many security companies will collapse. (MCP1) 
It is also significant to note that the work group would no longer be 
convening any more meetings since each member organisation would 
implement the part of the strategy under its care (MCP1). They all hoped 
that the sum of their efforts would somehow produce the desired 
outcomes. The cautionary tone in the actual implementation of (4) was 
evident in the following excerpt from the productivity roadmap: 
MHA will work with MOM for security officers deployed at key 
government premises and selected sensitive locations to 
comply with the legal working hours requirements in the 
Employment Act. Further study will be done as reduction in 
overtime may decrease the gross wages of security officers, 
and security firms will need time to adjust their contracts, 
cost structures and recruitment. 
To encourage SAs to pay better wages to security officers, 
the basic wage criterion has been incorporated into the 
grading system for firms in 2011. The work group will work 
with MOM to further enhance the criterion for the grading 
system for 2012. Given the potential implications of setting a 
basic wage level and its possible negative impact on the 
sector, this option will need to be studied carefully. To further 
motivate firms to pay better remuneration to security officers, 
the work group will also look into the incorporation of a 
requirement for firms to pay officers better as qualifications 
for the various incentive schemes under the road map. (p. 
F7) 
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While the WGSSP has recognised that it is not appropriate to apply 
the generic productivity model to the security sector and the need to 
manage wages and skills head-on, it has elected to conform to the 
practices of the establishment. This stance is demonstrated in the 
following comments of a senior official of PLRD: 
Some security firms requested us to mandate a minimum 
price. But we cannot control prices; it has to be by market 
forces. Hopefully, with MOM coming in with more regulations 
on working hours and determining appropriate wages, 
maybe the situation will improve. (SPOF1) 
The government has always maintained the position that wages 
could be adjusted upward once productivity is enhanced: 
I am confident that employers and workers will be able to 
achieve the government's target of 2 to 3 per cent 
productivity growth each year, and by so doing, wages would 
take care of themselves. (Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 
Speech in 2012) 
While ensuring that we remain a society, where at the core, 
people do have a sense of responsibility for their families, 
they do want to work hard to improve themselves and do 
take pride in being part of a society where everyone moves 
up. Government intervenes through education, workplace, 
housing, and healthcare, while keeping taxes low. This can 
only be achieved by being a 'market fundamentalist' — one 
that believes only in letting market forces go to work. (Deputy 
Prime Minister, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, speech in 
2012b) 
The aforementioned quotes from Prime Minister Lee and Deputy 
Prime Minister Shanmugaratnam affirmed the neo-liberal mindset of 
policymaking in Singapore. The political economic philosophy extols the 
virtues of a free market economic system with minimal intervention (see 
Milton Friedman's Power of Market20 ) and that wage increase must lag 
20 Free to Choose: "Part I Power of the Market" — a TV series that distils the basic 
arguments of the neo-liberalism and the necessity for the market to reign supreme. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1  Fi5tzuYBE  
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behind productivity growth. It is, therefore, not surprising to understand the 
concern and the reservation held by the WGSSP since their 
recommendation is seen as going against the belief of the free market 
economy. 
6.5 	 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided significant evidence to address the 
research question: To what extent has the developmental state mindset 
shaped the institutional behaviour towards LWWs' upward mobility? 
Through the analysis of the attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial 
factors, I will discuss the cascading impact of the macro-level behaviours 
on the firms' behaviours at the meso level and LWWs' behaviours at the 
micro level. 
The responses of the three institutions discussed in this chapter, as 
well as the stance of the top government leaders, display a consistent 
belief of the "market fundamentalist" (Shanmugaratnam, 2012b) —
economic primacy and a pro-business mentality with strong adherence to 
a flexible labour market, which is based on the mantra that a "job is the 
best social safety net" (GEA2). This mental model has translated into the 
institutional behaviours that promotes active labour market policies of job-
first' (any job is better than no job, even if it is low-pay) and the creation of 
an 'enterprise-focused' (employers know best) CET system. 
However, newly emerging circumstances on both the social and 
economic fronts have chipped away at the validity of this developmental 
state's mental model and the accompanying institutional arrangements. 
The pressure points are twofold: the need to reduce dependency on 
labour for sustainable economic growth and the increasing pressure from 
citizens to improve bread and butter issues for the vulnerable workers. 
Singapore has embraced the market economy since day one of 
nation building. The government has identified the free market economy 
and outward-oriented economic policies as the sole paths for sustained 
survival and success for a micro-island state with scare resources (Han et 
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al., 2011). It is important to note that such a mindset is the norm of neo-
liberalism, as Bourdieu (2005) aptly stated: 
Economic globalization is not a mechanical effect of the laws 
of technology or the economy, but the product of policy 
implemented by a set of agents and institutions (World Trade 
Organisation, International Monetary Fund, World Bank), and 
the result of the application of rules deliberately created for 
specific ends, namely, trade liberation (that is, the elimination 
of all national regulations restricting companies and their 
investments). (p. 225) 
The developmental state may be perceived as a member of the 
liberal economy, practising the universal rules of free trade, the free 
movement of capital, and flexible labour markets, where the development 
state is expected to keep itself relevant to the world economy. Thus, it 
plays accordingly to such neo-liberal rules. The developmental state's 
concept of 'inclusiveness' could thus be considered to stem from its 
strategies to galvanise its workers towards the nation's goal of economic 
prosperity. It would appear that exogenous forces have shaped the 
development of specific policies that have, in turn, led to the low-skilled 
workers' willingness to take up low-wage jobs, and the low-wage sector's 
reluctance to participate in the productivity drive. 
I posit that the developmental state is a compliant member of the 
neo-liberal game. In fact, it would seem that Singapore has performed 
better than other countries on many fronts; thus, it has been hailed as the 
poster-boy of neo-liberalism: 
• Ranked /best business environment in the world' by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in December 2011; 
• Ranked top 5 in the world for the 'most business-conducive labour 
regulations' by the World Economic Forum, 2011-2012; 
• Top of the Business Environment Risk Intelligence's (BERT) labour 
force evaluation measures, 2011; and 
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• Top 3 in the world for foreign trade and investment by The 
Globalisation Index 2010, among others'. 
The responses of the developmental state are translated into the 
application of the "universal rules" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 224). Bourdieu 
(2005) accused this phenomenon of being an economic policy that is 
aimed at unifying the 'economic field' (across the world) with a set of 
juridical-political measures that are designed to remove all limits and 
obstacles linked to free trade and the nation-state. A chief characteristic of 
the developmental state is the strong belief in economic primacy —
economic growth is the only guarantee for jobs and better life. Hence, a 
pro-business environment is needed to nurture and attract enterprises, 
which will, in turn, create jobs and allow the government to continue 
facilitating the market mechanism to work effectively. 
Essentially, for a developmental state such as Singapore, the 
adoption of flexible labour market policies is, therefore, deemed the most 
appropriate for supporting an open market economy because of the speed 
needed for the labour market to adapt to the fluctuations and changes of 
the economy. A flexible labour market thus leads to flexibility of wages and 
employment. The moderation of wage costs to ensure that they lagged 
behind productivity to support the competitiveness of the economy is thus 
required. As such, skills upgrading and flexibility in switching employment 
are economically driven. In other words, CET is primarily designed to 
ensure a pipeline of skilled workers for businesses. Such a pro-business 
philosophy has thus become an entrenched part of the mindset of the 
decision-makers of the diverse institutions, which has permeated all key 
socio-economic decisions of the nation-state. 
The successful cultivation of institutions that have been single-
minded in their pursuit of Singapore's national agenda can be attributed to 
the government's effectiveness in performing three key functions (Low, 
2001; Yeung, 2005; Sung, 2006; Pereira, 2007): 
21 Details of all Singapore's world rankings are available on the website of Singapore's 
Economic Development Board: http://www.edb.cov.sq/content/edb/en/why-
singapore/about-singapore/facts-and-rankinqs/rankinqs.html accessed on 11 October 
2012 
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• Securing economic growth and ensuring the sharing (or 
reinvestment) of the growth through education, housing, healthcare 
and infrastructure; 
• Building a highly-efficient, disciplined, and elite-oriented 
bureaucracy to deliver all national priorities; and 
• Creating engagement platforms with private sectors and workers for 
communication and coordination purposes that include the effective 
management of non-state economic interests — a critical part of the 
developmental state's economic model. 
The underpinning mindset of the developmental state is prevalent in 
the three institutions discussed earlier in this chapter. For instance, it is 
evident that the CET supporting the security sector is primarily regulator-
directed and employer-initiated; hence, it is not designed for the purpose 
of facilitating the upward mobility of LWWs. In fact, the current system 
limits LWWs' opportunities for upward mobility. The active labour market 
policies that support the `job-first' approach has essentially created a 
conducive environment for providing a steady supply of workers who are 
ready to step into low-wage jobs in sectors such as security. As there is a 
readily available pool of LWWs, the security sector has no impetus to 
reach for a high-skills equilibrium. 
The weakness of the representation offered by security employer 
groups and the sectoral union (USE) means that the two social partners 
have not been able to leverage on high-skills strategies and improve the 
job quality of the security jobs. For instance, the USE did not address the 
lack of linkages between skills and wages during the design of the 
productivity roadmap, as NTUC has long subscribed to the belief that 
collective bargaining is confrontational. From their perspectives, 
undermining businesses will result in losses of potential employment 
would be lost. Hence, security service buyers have become a convenient 
target for finger-pointing: "Buyers are our common enemy" (UEM1). 
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The policy rhetoric of productivity-driven growth and skills upgrading 
for a better life stems from the developmental state's continuous 
endeavour to secure its legitimacy amidst diminishing economic growth 
and the widening of the income gap between the haves and the have-nots. 
The tenacity of the ideology — productivity-driven growth is the only way 
to achieve an inclusive society — means that the outsourced services 
sector such as Private Security Services cannot be exempted from the 
national interest. However, to push for security firms to enhance the 
productivity of the sector, the low-skilled, low-wage situation must be 
reversed. The inability of the USE and the employer groups to take on the 
negotiation of sectoral level collective bargaining that links skills to wages, 
as well as the unwillingness of the PLRD or MOM to assume the 
unwanted role, means that the upward mobility of LWWs in the security 
sector has remained unachievable. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 	 Introduction 
In the previous three chapters, I have presented a variety of 
evidence at the micro, meso, and macro levels to illuminate the attitudinal, 
institutional, and circumstantial factors that impede the upward mobility of 
low-wage security employees. In this concluding chapter, I bring together 
the different elements of my thesis. This chapter will show how my study 
has offered an original contribution to the: 
• Understanding the low-wage phenomenon in the unarmed private 
security sector of Singapore; 
• Formulation of a new methodological approach to the study of the 
low-wage phenomenon; and 
• Identification of policy implications for workforce development in 
Singapore. 
Just as significantly, the chapter also explores the implications for 
future research. Though the study was conducted on a small scale, it 
constituted the first attempt in Singapore to provide a robust platform for 
the development of a comprehensive picture of the visible and invisible 
forces shaping the opportunities of career advancement for LWWs. The 
issues that emerged from the study offer vital input for implementing the 
national agenda of building an inclusive society, meeting the needs of 
small-medium enterprises, and enhancing people's life chances. 
In Chapter 3, I presented an integrated micro-meso-macro-level 
conceptual and analytical lens to guide my study, which comprises: the 
inter-related concepts of economic sociology (e.g. Smelster and 
Swedberg, 2005); Praxeological analysis (Bourdieu, 2005); the societal 
effect approach (Maurice, Sellier and Silvestro, 1986; Gadrey, 2000); and 
the developmental state theory (see Johnson, 1982; Sung, 2006). I argued 
that the understanding of low-wage mobility must combine the analyses of 
economic interests and social relations. Essentially, the interrogation of 
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actors (state institutions, firms, and workers) and their actions requires 
delving deeply into their relational interplays and the underpinning 
dispositions of Singapore's society. Thus, unveiling the inter-related 
attitudinal, institutional, and circumstantial factors at three levels was a 
logical approach for this research study. 
In order to flesh out the influence of the political economy, I have 
drawn upon the developmental state theory to support the explanation of 
the externally-shaped and historically-constructed attitudinal factors that 
shape the behaviours of institutions and workers. Traditionally, the 
developmental state theory offers an analysis of institutional behaviours 
(Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). Sung (2006) expanded upon the theory by 
shifting the spotlight onto the workers. Therefore, prior research had not 
attempted to address the role of the firms within a developmental state. In 
endeavouring to fill the gap of the meso-level firms analysis, I adapted the 
concept of the societal effect approach that was originated by Maurice, 
Sellier, and Silvestre (1986), which was further advanced by Gadrey 
(2000), to illuminate the complexity of the factors that influence firms' 
interactions with other major stakeholders. 
The investigation of the interactions of multiple actors within a social 
phenomenon has been adopted in many studies of various disciplines 
including: Iverson and Armstrong's (2006) study of the working poor in the 
USA; Ritzer's (1995) analysis of the credit card debt phenomenon in the 
USA; and Bourdieu's (2005) analysis of the Paris housing market. What 
these researchers share in common is their adoption of a relational and 
contextual approach to construct a more accurate understanding of social 
phenomena (Bourdieu and & Wacquant, 1992). Felstead et al. (2009) 
offered a concise explanation of the importance of creating a 
comprehensive picture that encompasses diverse perspectives: 
If certain phenomena are studied in isolation and/or extracted 
from their context, they will burn as individual candles, while 
the rest of the world remains in darkness. Moreover, by 
privileging certain phenomena, we begin to formulate 
incomplete and potentially misleading accounts of the world 
to which they belong. (p. 190) 
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I now revisit the research results before proceeding to discuss the 
Praxeological analysis employed in this thesis. 
7.2 	 Explaining the Upward Mobility of the LWWs in Security Sector 
It is important to point out that the low-wage phenomenon is not 
peculiar to Singapore; in fact, it is common in most advanced economies 
(Gautie and Schmitt, 2010). This study joins the others in identifying neo-
liberalism as the root cause of economic inequality because not everyone 
can benefit from a high-growth and knowledge-based economic model 
(Bourdieu, 2005; Sweet and Melsins, 2008). Essentially, the free market is 
not as effective as Milton Friedman had proposed in catering to the 
welfare of all stakeholders within a society. Acknowledging the failure of 
the market mechanism, the International Labour Organisation (2011b) 
initiated a call for a movement — "Making Markets Work for Jobs". 
Specifically, the market failure may be attributed to the neo-liberalists' 
`unification of rules' that favour free trade and a flexible labour market, with 
the state stepping in to take on re-distributive roles in areas where the 
market fails to deliver the desired welfare. 
Singapore's endeavour to build an inclusive society has been 
considered to be a model that should be emulated by many (The 
Economist, October 24,2012, pp. 3-10). While Koh (2012) acknowledged 
that more can be done by major stakeholders to address economic 
inequality, he also highlighted Singapore's achievements in this area: 
In defence of Singapore, I would say that Singapore's gini 
coefficient does not tell the full story. There is almost full 
employment, as unemployment rate is only 2%. Housing is 
heavily subsidised and there are no homeless people in 
Singapore. Public housing and private housing often exist 
side by side. There are no gated communities in Singapore. 
Education is also heavily subsidised, and while there are 
elite schools, there are no bad schools in Singapore. 
Healthcare and transportation are good and accessible to the 
poor and rich alike. The rule of law is strong and the 
government is non-corrupt. Most important of all is equality of 
opportunity and social mobility. It is probably better to be 
poor in Singapore than anywhere else in Asia. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, Singapore places a great emphasis on 
equality of opportunity (in contrast to Nordic countries that focus on 
equality of income). Equality of opportunity is supported through the pre-
employment education system and the continuing education and training 
system (CET). In fact, developmental state theorists have praised both 
systems as the major pillars of Singapore's economic success (Ashton et 
al., 1999; Sung, 2006). Nonetheless, while the education and training 
systems have supported the market economy thus far, they do not seem 
to have rendered similar support to the workers, especially the low-
skilled/low-wage individuals. If the CET system is the only path for upward 
mobility, it needs to help LWWs make progress in their career. Therefore, 
it is evident that the current systems contain blind spots that should be 
identified and addressed. 
Therefore, it is the intention of this thesis to provide a critical and 
unbiased evaluation of the current circumstantial factors, influenced by 
hidden predispositions and institutional arrangements, which are 
undermining the mobility of LWWs. From the findings, I have pinpointed 
the levers of change that could overcome critical gaps in the field of CET 
with regards to the plight of LWWs. 
First, the findings on the Unarmed Private Security Services sector 
provide supportive evidence that the presence of institutional conditions 
has promoted the supply and demand of low-wage jobs (see, inter alia, 
Gautie and Schmitt, 2010). In Singapore, the supply of low-wage labour is 
facilitated by the following societal systems: 1) the 'sorter-based' 
education system that categorises individuals by ability; 2) the availability 
of wage and non-wage benefits; as well as 3) the active labour market 
programmes that aim to "maximise individuals' contributions to the 
economy as developmental workers" (Sung, 2006, p. 93). The demand for 
LWWs, on the other hand, is driven by the easy supply of low-skilled 
cheap labour, the persistence of poor-quality jobs, and the cheap-sourcing 
nature of the sector. Against this backdrop, there are entrenched 
culturally- and historically-constructed attitudinal factors, stemming 
uniquely from the developmental state, which continue to pervade the 
thinking underlying social and economic policies in the country. They are: 
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economic primacy, the pro-business mentality, self-reliance, the `job-first' 
philosophy, and the focus on the next generation. 
The unintended consequences of such attitudinal and institutional 
actions are twofold. First, firms in the security sector persist in taking the 
low-skills route that deprives the low-wage employees of the opportunities 
for upward mobility. Second, the low-skilled workers are willing to accept 
low-wage employment and recycle within a low-wage universe that offers 
limited upward mobility opportunities. 
Based on the evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the 
government's stance on productivity-driven growth (technological 
replacements of manpower) is unlikely to produce the desired results 
under the current conditions in the security sector. Apart from the readily-
available supply of LWWs, the reluctance of any stakeholder in the sector 
to intervene in the pricing and hence the wages of security services has 
also helped to put buyers in an enviable bargaining position. 
The skills upgrading strategies, as envisaged in the security sector 
productivity roadmap, were designed to equip workers with site- and 
mission-specific skills. They were based on the human capital logic that 
when workers are better-skilled, they should attract higher pay (Becker, 
1964) because employers would automatically pay more for the skilled-
workers. However, the statistics on wages in security sector over the past 
ten years indicate that the imposition of the mandatory skills certification of 
security officers as of 2006 has not increased their wages; in fact, basic 
wages have even fallen during some years (WGSSP, 2011). 
Even though policymakers and their subordinates have 
acknowledged the traditionally outsourced nature of the sector, they still 
pin their hope largely on the best-sourcing initiative (as opposed to cheap-
sourcing) by appealing to buyers to act in a socially responsible manner 
through monetary incentives in their productivity-led wage enhancement 
plan. However, such an approach runs counter to the rent-maximising and 
cost-minimising rationale thinking of corporations. The indifference of the 
buyers implies that the chances of success of the best-sourcing initiative 
are slim to none. If the current situation is not corrected soon, the national 
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goal of building an inclusive society through productivity enhancement and 
skill upgrading in the security sector will not be realised. 
7.3 Investigating Upward Mobility of LWWs: A Methodological 
Contribution to Real-World Research 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study aims to contribute to real-
world research. My prime interests were twofold: 
1. Understanding the causal mechanisms and the hidden reasons 
underlying the actions and rationale of key stakeholders who 
influence the upward mobility of LWWs in the security sector; and 
2. Identifying levers of change to improve the CET system in 
Singapore to better support the national agenda of building an 
inclusive society. 
Throughout the process, I was guided by the need to present the 
complexity of social facts, as advised by Bourdieu (quoted in Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992): 
Social science must construct total social facts that preserve 
the fundamental unity of human practice across the 
mutilating scissures of disciplines, empirical domains, and 
techniques of observation and analysis. (p. 26) 
To attain Praxeological knowledge, one must weave together structuralist 
and constructivist approaches to analyse the modus operandi — the 
principles of the production of the regularities inherent in social practice. 
To put it simply, one must uncover the systems of dispositions (Bourdieu, 
1973). The thesis, therefore, adopted the inquiry lens of economic 
sociology to examine the social relationships among major actors. 
Within the context of this study, the state institutions, the firms, and 
the LWWs were viewed as actors in their own right — agents interacting 
with pre-existing structures and with one another. The three 
developmental state institutions encapsulate the neo-liberal disposition of 
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the developmental state, whose policies and systems have inadvertently 
undermined the mobility of LWWs. The Security firms operate in a free-
market outsourcing sector within constraints perpetuate the vicious cycle 
of low-skills equilibrium. The low-wage security employees are even more 
powerless as the "developmental workers" (Sung, 2006, p. 76) who are 
expected to carve out "their own stake-holding within the development 
state" (Sung, 2006, p. 97). Within such a system, the dice of life is cast 
against them because they had failed to excel in the formal school 
education system. The Praxeological analysis that focuses on the 
dialectical interplay among the actors has served to address the primary 
concerns of the study. The strengths of the micro-meso-macro analysis in 
examining the low-wage phenomenon will be deliberated below. 
Micro-Meso-Macro Approach Sharpens Praxeological Analysis 
Some Bourdieusians have claimed that the practice of 
Praxeological analysis is premised on the primacy of the field theory (e.g. 
Grenfell, 2008a; Everett, 2002). In my view, this perspective is too narrow 
because Bourdieu's "logic of practice" (1977, p. 16) — mechanisms and 
pre-dispositions that underpin societal practice — has always been 
premised on the 'relational' positioning of actors and the need to unveil 
systems of dispositions. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Bourdieu developed the field 
theory later to propose a possible way of analysing the logic of practice 
through analytical tools such as habitus, capitals, and field. Thomson 
(2008) sought to enhance the understanding of Bourdieu's concept of field 
theory by analogising it to the game of football. Thus, the "social field is 
likened a football field" (field as boundaried site) (p. 68). There are written 
and unwritten rules (habitus) on how the games are played. Depending on 
the positions they hold (e.g. goalkeeper versus striker), the players have 
specific roles to play; concomitantly, they are expected to have specific 
skills (capitals). Thomson (2008) further elaborated upon Bourdieu's 
concept of field theory: 
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The game that occurs in a social field is competitive, with 
various social agents using different strategies to maintain or 
improve their position. At stake in the field is the 
accumulation of capitals: they are both the process within, 
and the product of, a field. (p. 69) 
In adopting a multi-disciplinary approach and integrating macro, 
meso, and micro perspectives in this thesis, I have sought to demonstrate 
that the Praxeological methodology can be applied without employing field 
theory. The micro-meso-macro level analysis has the potential to 
overcome a number of limitations of field theory. One such limitation is the 
difficulty of defining the scope of the field (Couldry, 2003). Bourdieu 
attempted to shed light on this issue, as quoted in Wacquant (1989): 
The limits of the field are always at stake in the field. Thus 
the boundaries of the field can only be determined by an 
empirical investigation. The limits of the field are situated at 
the point where the effect of the field ceases. (p. 39) 
This explanation has not helped social researchers, as it is evident 
that the 'field' remains a slippery concept. Many who have adopted field 
theory do so by restricting the field of their research. For instance, Ladwig 
(1994) claimed that he was informed by field theory in his study of the US 
education policy with this argument, "The study of policy is best 
understood strictly with respect to its role in the field of educational policy" 
(p. 342). Essentially, he treated education policy as a social field and 
refuted the need to study the relationship between educational policies 
and the shifts in socio-political and economic conditions. He argued in his 
conclusion that "the perspective developed here suggests that in the 
1980s, US educational policy reforms reveal the historical maturation of a 
social field, which has developed its own autonomy and its own rewards" 
(p. 359). 
However, limiting the scope of the field, or choosing to study what 
one wishes to see, places limits on a more in-depth account of the social 
fact (Naidoo, 2004). In Ladwig's case, not only did he present a distorted 
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understanding of the US' educational policy changes, he also undermined 
the principles underpinning Bourdieusian research — the critical need to 
conduct relational thinking. Now, if I were to restrict the analysis to the 
security sector as a field, I would be truncating social facts, which could 
lead to my simplistic classification of the various agents as victims and 
culprits. 
Therefore, in opting for micro-, meso-, and macro-level analyses, I 
am able to take into account the overlapping and relational socioeconomic 
spheres. Each sphere has a different set of rules and considerations, even 
though they are interwoven with the others. 
Some may suggest that the developmental state constitutes a field 
in this study. I refute this argument on two accounts: 
First, by taking the concept of the developmental state as one field, 
one risks taking things at face value without acknowledging the fact that 
Singapore as a development state is just one actor in the neo-liberal game 
and that its behaviour illuminates the neo-liberal system of dispositions. 
Second, the developmental state theory is not adequate for it does 
not account for the behaviours of security firms at the meso level and the 
interplay between firms and security employees. Drawing upon the 
development state theory in this instance facilitates the understanding of 
the political economy model of Singapore. In so doing, as recommended 
by Bosch et al. (2009) and Appelbaum et al. (2010) on the proper 
treatment of each unique political economy and its national institutions, I 
was able to present the potential volatility of national economic and social 
performance due to externality and circumstantial factors confronting 
Singapore. 
Ultimately, researchers' insistence on the use of field theory as the 
only social theory to complement Praxeological analysis can be attributed 
to an inadequate understanding of Bourdieu's ideology "against 
theoreticism and methodologism" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 26). 
To Bourdieu, theory and methods are toolkits designed to help solve 
problems; thus, he warned against the use of theory and methodology as 
censorship that prevents researchers from grasping the truth. Bourdieu 
stood against the institution of theory as a self-referential realm of 
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discourse. My interpretation is that Bourdieu never exhibited an "obsessive 
preoccupation" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 35) with his conception 
of field theory since his ultimate goal is to achieve Praxeological 
knowledge. Hence, Bourdieu (1972) insisted on the need to move "from 
the mechanics of the model to the dialectic of strategies" (p. 3). In fact, it is 
the primacy of relation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 15), not the 
primacy of field theory, for which Bourdieu advocated. 
Hence, in my view, the micro-meso-macro-level analysis has 
sharpened the concept of Praxeological analysis without operating under 
the socio-political paradigm of control imposed by the dominant onto the 
subordinate. The only way to present a balanced evaluation of the upward 
mobility of LWWs is to move way from the labelling of victims and culprits 
so as to offer a comprehensive relational analysis. Thus, the thesis was 
able to offer an in-depth understanding of the logic of practice in the 
development state of Singapore, without the tinted lens of class struggle. 
Although class struggle is a concept that is strongly embedded in 
Bourdieu's field theory, it should be considered as a reflection of his 
personal cultural-historical upbringing in France: throughout his life, he 
struggled with the class divisions22 (also see, inter alia, Grenfell, 2008b; 
Robbins, 2008). 
From my perspective, class struggle is not a relevant issue in 
Singapore. While there may be class divisions based on income 
groupings, there are a number of unique Singapore practices that have 
eroded away class divisions. In the country's education system, rich and 
poor kids attend public schools (only with special approved reasons could 
kids attend private schools). Another phenomenon is the proliferation of 
good-quality and highly affordable local cuisine in every community at the 
local coffee-shops or hawker centres where more than two-thirds of 
residents lunch and dine everyday. One final example of an absence of a 
class divide is the compulsory conscription of the male Singapore citizens. 
22 As a public intellectual, Bourdieu never managed to shake off the dark shadow of his 
family origin. In the documentary film, Sociology as Martial Art, Bourdieu openly 
expressed his struggles due to his background from Denguin in the Beam region of 
French Pyrenees-Atlantiques: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Csbu08SqAuc 
  
accessed on 6 October 2012. 
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The two years of conscription service bring together boys from all walks of 
life to serve the nation. These three distinctive phenomena of Singapore 
offer evidence to counter the existence of class divisions in the country. 
The concept of 'capitals' within the field theory (human, social, and 
cultural) implies that one's capital is entrenched within one's social origin 
and that the dominant class uses its capital to strengthen its position and 
legitimacy. This concept runs counter to that of 'upward mobility' as 
promised by equal opportunity for all. 'Capitals' in field theory suggest 
intentional class oppression. The concept of upward mobility is premised 
on the assumption that one could achieve absolute mobility from one's 
original status. Therefore, under this assumption, capitals can be altered 
for the better. 
Therefore, the macro-meso-micro approach affords an objective 
lens for understanding the actions, rationale, and the interplay amongst 
the actors. In the case of this research study, it was able to clearly identify 
the relational positions of the three actors and their competition for 
legitimacy in fulfilling their respective roles, as state institutions, firms, and 
workers. The ultimate outcome that has contributed to the current situation 
in the security sector effectively stems from the complex interactions 
between the three actors who occupy unique positions in the 
developmental state. 
In sum, the multi-disciplinary macro-meso-micro integrated 
approach has enhanced the Praxeological methodological approach in the 
following ways: 
• Allows for the appropriate engagement of multi-disciplinary theories 
in presenting a more accurate presentation and exploration of 
social facts; 
• Circumvents the 'field bias' of relying on one dominant theoretical 
lens that could distort the social reality (e.g. social oppression); 
• Manages relational thinking effectively without falling prey to the 
risk of narrowly scoping the 'field'; and lastly, 
• Helps in identifying truly actionable levers of change. 
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As the aforementioned discussion on Bourdieu's corpus has already 
addressed the first three points, I will be examining the last point in greater 
detail below. 
Identification of Actionable Factors 
For a piece of social science research to be useful, it should strive 
to offer ideas to solve socioeconomic problems through the identification 
of actionable factors or areas where changes are feasible (Robson, 2011). 
Sadly, not all studies have succeeded in achieving this ideal outcome. 
I would like to use the low-wage studies commissioned by Russell 
Sage (Gautie and Schmitt, 2010) as an example to elucidate this point. As 
I had pointed out in Chapter 2, one main problem with Gautie et al.'s 
(2010) comparative studies of LWWs is their inability to clearly identify the 
reasons underlying the disparities in the practices of the five industries in 
the six countries. 
To be fair, they did attempt to identify the causal mechanism 
between labour market institutions and the incidence of low-wage 
employment. Their analysis led them to conclude that the behaviour of 
these labour market institutions could be construed as "inclusive" or 
"exclusive" in the respective countries (Bosch et al., 2010, p. 134). 
Inclusive labour market institutions in certain countries behave in a way 
that helps to limit low-wage incidence to a relatively low level. Conversely, 
their counterparts that exhibit exclusive behaviour promote conducive 
environments for the supply and demand of low-wage employment. 
As a consequence, Gautie et al. (2010) concluded that, ultimately, 
firms possess the discretionary power to adopt high-road strategies, which 
places the responsibilities of change squarely on firms. This conclusion is 
problematic for several reasons: 
First, the studies failed to account for the origins of the behaviours 
of the labour market institutions. Their attempts to make sense of the 
reasons by drawing from the concepts of "production regime" (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p. 8) and "employment regime" (Gallie, 2007, p. 16) have 
limited applicable value to policymakers. The deliberation at the 
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institutional level offers no practical solutions to policymakers on potential 
areas of change to alter the LW situation — what needs to be done to alter 
the institutional setting. 
Second, the researchers' conclusion that the behaviours of firms 
constitute the main factor of change in incidents of LW is overly simplistic. 
Previous studies (see Sung, Loke, and Ramos, 2011) and my thesis have 
shown that not all firms have the discretionary power to adopt high-road 
strategies. 
In my view, the research of Gautie et al. (2010) fell short because it 
did not endeavour to uncover the systems of dispositions within the six 
advanced economies. The researchers have thus made a mistake of 
taking things at face value without going beyond pre-constructed facts. In 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I clearly showed how LWWs, security firms, and the 
three development state institutions have interpreted their logic of practice 
by taking actions that reflect the modus operandi of developmental state. 
Their interactions with each other provide insight into the low-wage 
phenomenon, which extend beyond the "phenomenological knowledge" 
(Bourdieu, 1973, p. 53) of the three actors. 
By using an integrated approach that encompasses micro-, meso-, 
and macro-perspectives, under the guidance of the Praxeological analysis, 
this thesis has gone beyond the identification of causal mechanisms to 
reveal the reasons underlying the phenomena being studied, hence 
helping to pinpoint actionable factors. Moreover, this thesis has shown that 
leveraging on a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach, coupled with 
Praxeological analysis, could produce an accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of the social facts. Accordingly, the understanding of causal 
mechanisms and the systems of dispositions offers a foundation for the 
identification of actionable factors for the resolution of socioeconomic 
problems. 
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7.4 	 Implications for Policy and Research 
Throughout the research process, I have shared emerging findings 
with colleagues and associates who are also involved in research and 
initiatives related to LWWs to solicit feedback that has proven to be 
thought provoking. My personal learning from the process is that research-
informed policy and practice must go beyond the publication and 
dissemination of completed findings. It also entails sharing one's research 
findings in a non-threatening manner, i.e., by seizing upon the right 
moment and communicating in a genre that is most palatable to the 
audience. As an insider-researcher, I have been able to bridge the divide 
between research and practice, which should not be separated into two 
worlds, in my view. Through the dialectical exchanges with my colleagues, 
I could definitely see opportunities for change in the current CET system 
and its accompanying policies. 
I remain hopeful that the skills strategies, under the tripartite 
partnership in Singapore, if managed appropriately, would lead to an 
inclusive society. The strong developmental state practice implies that the 
state has to take the lead in facilitating the adoption of a high-skills route in 
the domestic services sector and ensuring that increased skills will lead to 
higher pay. The security sector productivity roadmap to steer the sector 
towards a high-skills route should be better implemented (discussed in 
greater detail in the next section). Besides pushing for sectoral skills 
strategies, the state also has to take the lead in reviewing LWWs' access 
to skills upgrading. Skills strategies targeted at LWWs should not stop at a 
job-first' approach; they need to move beyond this approach in order to 
fulfil the promise of equal opportunity. 
In the next section, I will discuss how the CET policy could better 
support the security sector's skills restructuring and improve access to 
education and training for LWWs. The last part of this section will discuss 
future research implications. 
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Sectoral Skills Approach to Achieve High-Route Agenda 
A brief summary of the four strategies set out in the security sector 
productivity roadmap would help in this discussion: 
a) Promote the skills upgrading and manpower development of 
security workforce (led by PLRD, supported by WDA); 
b) Enhance buyer awareness and education (led by union, supported 
by PLRD); 
c) Promote the use of technology by security agencies (led by union, 
supported by PLRD); and 
d) Enhance the employment/working conditions of security officers 
(led by MOM, supported by PLRD). 
According to the interviewee from the WGSSP, these strategies are 
expected to be independently executed by the assigned partner, with the 
others playing a supporting role. Moreover, the WGSSP would not 
oversee the implementation of these strategies. 
However, treating the strategies as disparate initiatives has 
inadvertently undermined the desired outcome of the plan. The chance to 
create a better architecture to enable the sector to move towards a high-
skill route is missed. In my view, integrated implementation is required: 
putting skills acquisition at the centre of the equation will pave the way 
towards enhancing productivity and raising wages in a sustainable 
manner. Moreover, the re-enactment of a tripartite platform (involving the 
government, the employers, and the labour union) to oversee the 
implementation will be critical to the success of the endeavour. In my view, 
the coordinated implementation of the roadmap by the tripartite partners is 
the only way to ensure that the whole is larger than the sum of the parts so 
that productivity-skills-wage could be effectively implemented. 
Experience has shown that security firms, if left on their own 
devices, have no impetus to pursue a high-skills route because the cheap-
sourcing market condition does not reward high skills strategies. In light of 
these challenges, the security sector requires a coordinated effort from the 
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tripartite partners to achieve the ultimate goal of shifting the sector towards 
the high-skills route. Based on the evidence gathered in this thesis, I 
recommend the following steps: 
First, a high-level, centrally coordinated sectoral skills approach 
should be implemented. The existing tripartite Industry Skills and Training 
Council (ISTC), under the purview of WDA, could take charge of driving 
the high-skills route. The desired skills profile of the workforce over the 
next five years has to be mapped out (beyond the current minimum skills 
for entry-level jobs). It should include the entry-level training and 
continuous skills upgrading plans for every level of the security workforce. 
The productivity roadmap has already spelled out PLRD's desire to 
establish career pathways to facilitate progression for the incumbent 
workforce. The site-specific skills training must incorporate security-related 
technical skills and critical generic skills (such as customer service, 
communication skills, and functional literacy skills). 
Second, the tripartite partners have to link skills to pay by 
establishing wage compensation that is commensurate with skills levels —
or, as I call it, the "skilled-wage". Setting wages in accordance with skills 
levels should shift the balance of power from buyers to firms and workers. 
For instance, Carre et al. (2010) described how France, through the 
coordinated efforts of social partners, succeeded in raising the skills level 
and the corresponding wages of the retail workers. The retail firms had 
only one choice — adopt high-route strategies of producing high-value 
merchandise and offering innovative services in order to charge high 
prices. Similarly, by paying skilled-wages, the security services would no 
longer be cheaply available. 
There is little doubt that instituting such a wage mechanism would 
be a tough goal as it violates the fundamental belief of a flexible labour 
market. Essentially, the developmental state would have to acknowledge 
market failure in addressing the issue of productivity and wage increases 
in the cheap-sourcing domestic service sectors. Various studies have 
shown that an effective wage policy can work in pushing firms towards a 
high-skills route, contrary to the general belief that wage moderation is the 
only way to push down unemployment (Charpe and Tobin, 2011; 
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Grimshaw, 2011). Therefore, institutional forces (including the wage-
setting institution on skilled-wages and labour market regulations on job 
quality) are needed to shape firms' product/market strategies. 
Raising the skills level of the workforce and linking skills to pay will 
also gradually eradicate the cheap-sourcing practice. However, to 
maintain its pursuit of the high-skills path, security firms will need to review 
their product/market strategies and related organisation of work. Security 
firms should be encouraged to devise strategies that differentiate their 
services from their counterparts so that they can command premium fees. 
Relevant support must thus be made available to the security firms, which 
will require a review of the existing suite of disparate funding schemes 
under the NPCEC's (2012) promotional website, "Way to go, Singapore" 
(the umbrella term for the productivity drive). Currently, the schemes are 
simply too complicated for enterprises to understand and adopt. 
It is likely that the sector's transition towards a high-skills route may 
result in the elimination of smaller or weaker firms. However, some form of 
consolidation will need to occur in order for the security services sector to 
be strengthened. 
Moreover, such an approach means that the tripartite partners 
would have to re-conceptualise the meaning of skills strategies in 
supporting the varied, yet inter-related, goals of the three stakeholders —
the government, enterprises, and labour union: 
• The Union for Security Employees must step up in its role of 
helping firms pursue the high-skills route and ensuring that the 
outcome is translated into an enhancement of job quality (fair wage, 
career progression, job discretion, skills upgrading, and job 
intensity) in the security sector. A collective agreement must take 
place, at the sectoral level, to institute productivity-skills-quality job 
as a common goal. 
• The government institutions that include the MOM, WDA, and the 
regulator (PLRD) must not be contented with a weak security 
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industry association. Helping to build a strong industry association 
is key to the successful implementation of sectoral-level 
coordinated skill strategies. 
PLRD as the sector regulator could play the role of coordinating 
productivity-skills-quality job of the security sector. Currently, the 
annual audit on security firms is based on a compliance model that 
does not produce the desired outcome for a professional industry, 
as evidenced in Chapter 5. Ultimately, strengthening the sector will 
contribute to national security. Thus, moving beyond the minimal 
skillset, as spelled out in the productivity roadmap, is a critical first 
step towards the genuine professionalisation of the sector. 
WDA, on the other hand, should review its intended CET outcomes. 
According to its mission statement, the WDA is supposed to serve 
the national interests of creating a competitive workforce and 
ensuring full employment. However, it is equally important to 
ascertain that CET efforts are translated into well-being for the 
workers. That is, CET must fulfil the promise of equal opportunity 
for all, especially vis-a-vis the vulnerable segments of the 
workforce; all workers should be given equal chances of working 
toward upward mobility. 
Of course, for any of these institutional changes to take place, there 
must be an attitudinal shift away from a mindset that the market 
mechanism is efficient, such as leaving wages to market forces and fears 
of a potential negative impact on businesses during the transitional period. 
The wage-led industrial revolution in the 1980s that shifted manufacturing 
sectors towards a high-skills route should be the benchmark of success 
(See Lim, 2012 in Straits Times). Re-designing as many low-wage jobs as 
possible into good jobs should be the desired outcome of national skills 
strategies. While the contributions of domestic service sectors like the 
security sector to the GDP may be insignificant, they do have the potential 
to offer quality jobs. With a strong economic foundation and a proven track 
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record of implementation capabilities, Singapore is in a better position than 
most other countries to succeed in the endeavour. This is the only way 
that skills strategies can effectively support the productivity agenda and 
build an inclusive society. 
Enhancing Upward Mobility through a Parallel Worker-Centric CET 
Approach 
In Singapore, the meritocratic education system means that the 
academically able benefit the most from the system; conversely, the less 
able are 'sorted out' of the education system early in life, thus increasing 
the likelihood of their landing in low-skilled/low-wage jobs. The five cases 
of LWWs in Chapter 4 show that most have been recycled in LW jobs 
since they joined the workforce. Under the rhetoric of equal opportunity, 
CET should be offering these low-skilled workers a second chance for 
upward mobility. 
The case study of the security sector suggests that skills upgrading 
opportunities for LWWs are extremely limited, if left in the hands of 
employers. LWWs themselves lack the capacity to access skills upgrading 
because of situational barriers such as high opportunity costs and 
uncertainties of better-paid jobs after training. Moreover, with a focus on 
keeping the unemployment rate low, the public employment service has 
contributed to the recycling of LWWs in low-wage jobs. The current 
operating model is targeted at placing the unemployed into any available 
job. Thus far, there has been no formal effort to distinguish between 'good' 
and 'bad' jobs. This approach is premised on the shared belief: as long as 
the lowly-skilled are gainfully employed, they would be entitled to a slew of 
social re-distribution benefits (see Table 4.2). In sum, the `job-first' mindset 
has caused the CET system, of which the public employment service is a 
critical component, to overlook the opportunity to facilitate the upward 
mobility of the low-skilled/low-waged workers. 
The current CET system targeted at the lowly-skilled requires a 
serious review: 
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First, there is no concerted effort for helping LWWs to get good-
quality jobs. This outcome is partly due to the lack of understanding of 
good jobs. As GEA2 explained, "We are not sure what is good job? Is it 
determined by pay or employment security?" A more significant cause is 
the lack of ownership of the issue of 'upward mobility of LWWs', based on 
the various comments from WDA and USE representatives: 
Wages and career progression are really beyond our control. 
(GEA1) 
Moving LWWs into better jobs is not our mandate. 
Championing better jobs and better wages is the job of the 
union, isn't it? (GEA2) 
If we go to every employer and start saying I want collective 
bargaining, give you a form B and serve this section, the war 
is over! (UEM1) 
PLRD should mandate skills upgrading, set aside protected 
time for upgrading, just like doctors, lawyers. They are the 
regulators — they should do something! (UEM1) 
Actually, with one stroke, the government can revert many 
things, the overtime and the wages. It is a lack of political 
will! (UEM1) 
It is evident that there is a lack of collective belief that upward mobility of 
LWWs is a shared responsibility, which could be attributed to the 
overriding belief that the free market mechanism works for all — nation, 
enterprises, and workers. 
Second, the limited financial assistance for off-the-job training is 
premised on the assumption that overly generous financial assistance 
would inculcate a negative work ethic and discourage the LWWs from 
getting into jobs quickly. The result of such an approach is that the 
opportunity cost of leaving employment for training is too high for most 
LWWs. 
Third, the high institutional barrier of getting into training 
programmes that lead to good jobs (e.g. healthcare, aerospace, and early 
childhood education) is a critical issue that needs to be resolved. The 
publicly funded CET institutions are reluctant to provide bridging 
171 
programmes for those who need the extra help in literacy, numeracy, and 
sciences. As one of the heads of a CET centre insisted: 
The programme requires applicants to have '0' level English 
and Mathematics. If they don't have it, they could go 
somewhere to study and pass the subjects before joining us. 
To enhance the upward mobility of LWWs, we need to put in place 
a worker-centric system (WCS) that places an emphasis on capability 
development. The WCS would begin by defining 'good-quality jobs' and 
establish an up-to-date and robust job intelligence database on the 
availability of good-quality jobs. Moreover, it would be represented by a 
dynamic line-up of related CET programmes that are accompanied with 
bridging support and full wrap-around financial assistance. By providing 
comprehensive financial support that covers living costs, transport costs, 
and the necessary costs to take care of family needs, LWWs would be 
better able to navigate the career transition. 
A good case in point is the Project-QUEST in San Antonio Texas 
(Rademacher, Bear, and Conway, 2001). The success of Project-QUEST 
is attributed to its clear focus on: 1) improving the lives of low-income 
families; 2) reducing their dependence on social assistance; and 3) turning 
them into tax-paying citizens. 
Project-QUEST first identifies jobs that pay family wages (high 
enough to cover the costs of raising family) and offer career progression 
prospects. They work with employers who have vacancies of such jobs 
and then partner with community colleges to design programmes that 
would help LWWs to get into these jobs. Special efforts are invested into 
helping potential employers to re-design jobs and turn them into good-
quality ones. The community colleges then offer three-month bridging 
programmes to prepare the LWWs with the adequate level of academic 
competencies, prior to their enrolment into vocational programmes. Once 
they have been selected for the programme, LWWs would be offered a 
comprehensive financial assistance package (Project-QUEST works as an 
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integrator of various financial schemes from different government 
departments). 
Comparing Project-Quest and Singapore's CET programmes 
highlights a fundamental difference underlying the two philosophies. In the 
case of Singapore that adopts a developmental state mindset, people are 
considered as human resources to support economic growth — "workers 
are expected to maximise their contribution in terms of their capability" 
(Sung, 2006, p. 93), In contrast, the San Antonio project recognises 
"human development as the end, economic development a means" 
(UNDP, 1996, p. 3). 
Hence, the CET model that is based on meritocracy and personal 
responsibility must be revamped to achieve the "responsibility for the 
persons" (Iverson and Armstrong, 2006, p. 211) through the provision of 
additional effective assistance to underprivileged workers. The low-waged 
individuals currently constitute the bottom 25% of Singapore's local 
workforce (estimated to be 450,000 individuals). Sennett (2006), in 
analysing the order of new capitalism, argued that empowering individuals 
in this era is the only salvation: 
The positives invoked by institutional changes are qualities of 
self, which might allow individuals to flourish as institutional 
life becomes more shallow. These qualities are the 
repudiation of dependence, development of one's potential 
ability, the capacity to transcend possessiveness. These 
qualities take us outside the realm of production, into the 
institutions of the welfare state, education and consumption. 
The positives invoked by the new order promise to 
consummate the project of meritocracy and to provide the 
model for progressive reform. (p. 182) 
Essentially, the inclusive society should invest in the future potential of the 
LWWs by getting them ready for the next move into good jobs so that they 
can recraft their life narratives. 
The key challenge, I foresee, is the mindset of a developmental 
state institutions — the tendency to wait for instruction rather than take the 
lead to make a change where deemed fit and inadequate deliberation on 
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the underpinning assumptions of the CET system. Keep et al. (2006) have 
aptly critiqued the public policy-making process: 
The public policy debate concerns itself with the means and 
manner by which a suite of policies might best be designed 
and delivered. Comparatively little discussion is devoted to 
the accuracy of the fundamental diagnosis of the 'problems' 
policy is meant to be tackling, or to the appropriateness or 
otherwise of the general lines that policy is taking to deal with 
them. To put it another way, much of the debate is about 
matters of details, not about the substance of underlying 
assumptions. (p. 540) 
It will take perseverance and tenacity to advocate for the required change, 
which should begin with questioning the fundamental beliefs of the 
developmental state. 
In conclusion, I posit that a genuinely inclusive society can be 
achieved in Singapore, through: 
a) Tripartite collaborative efforts in shifting the services sector towards 
the high-skills route with the ultimate aim of improving job quality. 
Institutional influences should be adjusted in order to shape 
sectoral business strategies. The interventions should result in 
improved business outcomes and better job quality for workers. 
b) Develop a parallel worker-centric CET approach that truly 
empowers LWWs for upward mobility, not simply leave the skills 
upgrading decision in the hand of employers. This entails re-
designing CET outcomes targeting at helping every individual 
workers to realise their potential. Equally important is the efforts in 
mitigating employment and income risks throughout the life-course 
of work. 
Singapore could and should leverage upon the tripartite network to 
achieve win-win outcomes for the worker, the business, and the state. 
Ultimately, this is the only way to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
developmental state. 
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Future Research on Upward Mobility of LWWs 
This security case study and the Russell Sage series have 
demonstrated the benefits of a sectoral approach in studying low-wage 
issues. Sectoral studies can provide contextualised knowledge on the 
demand for LWWs in relation to firms' responses to market conditions and 
institutional settings. In this research study, the investigation into security 
firms' product/market strategies, organisation of work, and skills strategies 
revealed the sector's predisposition towards the low-skills route and the 
corresponding demand for LWWs. Thus, it may be worthwhile to replicate 
similar studies for other outsourced domestic services sectors such as 
Cleaning and Landscape in which more than 80% of the workforce are in 
low-wage jobs. More generally, sectoral case studies should be conducted 
as part of the processes to support the development of sectoral skills 
strategies, with the aim of shifting such sectors towards the high-skilled 
route and improving job quality. 
In order to enhance the robustness of the sectoral study, I would 
recommend assembling a cross-disciplinary research team to conduct the 
studies. My case study has demonstrated the importance of integrating 
disciplines such as political economy, economics, sociology, and 
education to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the unique low-
wage phenomenon in the security sector. The macro-meso-micro 
integrated approach adopted in this thesis could be further fine-tuned 
through its applications to other sectoral studies. 
One key lesson of this thesis is that it is important to involve 
practitioners in the research project. They could then utilise real-time 
learning to effect change, without having to wait for the full completion of 
the research project, which usually requires a long gestation period. 
Cross-country studies of the low-wage phenomena could also be 
explored for the purposes of deepening one's understanding and learning 
with regards to the responses of the same or different sectors to 
exogenous forces (e.g. Gautie and Schmitt, 2010; Bosch and Lehndorff, 
2005; Baret et al., 2000). In particular, comparative studies among 
advanced Asian economies could be of interest to policymakers. For 
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instance, Ho (2012) pointed out that Hong Kong has a lower incidence of 
low-waged workers in the construction and healthcare sector and more 
compressed wage differentiations in the healthcare sector (between 
doctors and nurses). The identification of the factors that produced such 
positive outcomes could be important for Singapore's endeavour to 
address these issues within our societal contexts. 
This revealing research study, with a focus on the security sector, 
has illuminated the complexity of low-waged issues. If Singapore is 
genuine about building an inclusive society, more resources and attention 
should be invested in the research of the multifaceted low-wage issues. 
Specifically, research projects that promote debates on the underlying 
assumptions of the many interrelated socioeconomic policies would be 
most practical. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Preliminary Mapping of Relational Network of 
Stakeholders, Policies and Programmes 
Stakeholders Sub-unit Remarks 
Ministry of Home Affair 
(MHA) 
Police Licensing & 
Regulatory Department 
Work Group for 
Security Sector 
Productivity 
Security sector 
regulator 
Security sector 
productivity initiatives 
Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM) 
Income Security Policy 
Division 
Workplace Policy and 
Strategy Division 
Workforce 
Development Agency 
Income security of low-
wage 
Employment protection 
(e.g. working hours) 
Statutory board in 
charge of skills 
upgrading 
National Trade Union 
Congress (NTUC) 
Union for Security 
Employees 
Employment and 
Employability Institute 
Security sector workers 
representative 
In charge of 
employment 
facilitation, training 
referral and schemes 
such as Inclusive 
Growth Programme 
Singapore Security 
Association 
Security industry body 
representing security 
firms 
Security Firms Employers in security 
sector 
Security Employees Employees in security 
sector 
Singapore Security 
Institute 
Industry training centre 
Policies/Programmes Sources Remarks 
Low-wage policies Inter-Ministerial 
Committee for LWWs 
Encapsulate all social 
and economic policies 
designed for LWWs 
Continuing Education 
and Training 
programmes for low-
wage 
WDA's Employment 
Facilitation Division 
Workfare Training 
Public Employment 
Services 
Funding and 
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Scheme/ Workfare 
Skills-Up/ Training 
Completion Award 
Security Conversion 
Programme 
programmes for LWWs 
Career conversion and 
upgrading programme 
for workers entry/in-
employment in security 
Inclusive Growth (NTUC) Employment Funding programme 
Programme and Employability that encourages 
Institute security firms to adopt 
technologies in order to 
boost productivity and 
reduce dependency on 
labour 
Security Sector (MHA) Work Group for Details on 
Productivity Roadmap Security Sector stakeholders' 
Productivity responsibilities in 
boosting productivity in 
order to improve 
wages 
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Appendix B-1 
	
Sample Interview Questions for the Security 
Employees 
1. Please share with me your employment history. 
2. Why did you decide to join security industry? 
3. How long have you been working in the security industry? 
4. Is your current employer your first employer in security industry? 
5. Why do you change job within the industry? 
6. How do you describe your job as security officer? 
7. How tough is your current job comparing to previous job? 
8. Have your participated in any form of training since you joined the 
sector? 
9. What kind of training do you receive from your company? 
10. Do you think training is important? Did you take up training on your 
own? Why (yes/no)? 
11. How much are you paid as security officer? 
12.Are you satisfied with the pay? 
13. Do you see yourself getting promotion soon? Why? 
14. How do you describe career prospect within the sector? 
15. How long would you stay in this job? Why? 
16.Would you consider going for training and get a better job in other 
sector? 
17. Are you a member of Union of Security Employees? Why? 
18.Are you married? Any children? Do you stay in HDB 
(rent/mortgage/owned)? 
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Appendix B-2 Sample of Interview Questions for Security Firms 
1. Please share with me your company profile. (Years of operation, 
staff size, range of services) 
2. How would you describe your market share/market segment? 
3. In your opinion, are there ways to change the price-cutting 
competition in this industry? 
4. How do you differentiate your services from your competitors? 
5. Can you share the business/market strategies of your company? 
6. What are top three challenges facing your business? How do you 
overcome it? 
7. Your company is participating/not participating in e2i's Inclusive 
Growth Programme (IGP). Why the decision? 
8. (If participating) Please share the details of your IGP project. How 
do you see it benefiting your operation? 
9. Is the productivity enhancement concept relevant to this industry? 
Do you apply the concept in your operation? 
10. Have you heard of the Best-Sourcing Initiatives? Does the initiative 
have any positive impact to your business? Why? 
11. Does the PLRD's annual audit and grading system have any 
positive impact to your business? Why? 
12. How important is staff competence to business growth? How do 
you build staff competencies? Do you provide training to them? 
13. In each site-contract, how much discretion do you have in designing 
the site deployment of staff and job design? 
14. Is it true that clients charge liquidated damage to security firms 
frequently? Why such practices? How do you manage this? 
15. Shortage of manpower is a major concern for this sector. How can 
this problem be overcome? 
16.Would improvement in working condition and adjustment in wages 
overcome manpower shortage issue? Why? How? 
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Appendix B-3 Sample interview questions for WDA Representative 1 
1. How long have you been looking after this portfolio of the security 
industry? 
2. Please describe your team's roles and responsibilities for the 
sector. 
3. What are the expected outcomes you wish to achieve for the 
sector? What do you mean by impact for the workforce? 
4. How do you rate the success of your team after all these years of 
hard work? 
5. Do you agree that security employment is low-pay and dead-end 
job? Why? How do you intent to improve the situation? 
6. Why is it that the in-employment training has such a low take up 
rate? 
7. The underlying assumption of WSQ is that if worker goes for skills 
upgrading (including getting a full qualification), he/she is better 
skilled and therefore should get better job and better pay. Do you 
think this is happening in security sector? Why? 
8. Since its launch in 2007, WSQ training has been marginally 
adopted for mandatory entry training. It has not been embraced as 
part of sectoral skills strategies. Why is it so? 
9. Please describe the security sector productivity road map. 
10. How can this plan improve productivity and wages for the sector? 
11. How do you see the proposed skills strategies making a different to 
the sector's productivity and wage? 
12.What are the major challenges in the implementation of the sectoral 
productivity initiatives? 
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Appendix B-4 Sample Interview Questions for WDA Representative 2 
1. Please describe the roles and responsibilities of Employment 
Facilitation Division (EFD). 
2. What are the measures of your team's success? What are some of 
the key performance indicators? 
3. If EFD's main role is to help job seekers get into job, who is 
responsible to help low-wage workers in getting jobs with better 
wage and better prospect? 
4. What are the procedures of helping low-skilled workers into job? 
What kind of assistances are rendered to low-skilled/low-wage 
workers? 
5. From statistics, almost all low-skilled workers are placed into low-
wage jobs. Why so? 
6. Are there efforts in helping low-skilled into non low-skilled jobs? 
7. Please share your efforts in Workfare Training Scheme. Is it 
successful? 
8. Why are low-skilled not coming forth to take up the scheme? 
9. What are some challenges of low-skilled/low-wage workers in 
seeking employment and accessing training? 
10. Security employment appears to be the most favourable jobs 
referral by your career centres? Why? 
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Appendix B-5 Sample Interview Questions for USE Representative 
1. Please describe your role in USE. How long have you been 
involving in USE? 
2. What are the major challenges of security sector that USE has 
been tackling? 
3. What have USE been doing in the recent years in tackling 
members' employment related issues? 
4. Are you happy with the current work situation and wages of the 
sector? 
5. Do you think the excessive overtime work arrangement create 
negative impact on wages (suppressed wages) and on training 
access? 
6. How do you think these situations can be overcome? 
7. The in-employment skills upgrading is relatively low, only about 5% 
of the security workforce access training. What do you think should 
be done to improve the situation? 
8. What are your plan in improving the career progression and wages 
of the sector? 
9. What are the reasons for the drop in basic wages of the security 
employees over the past five years? Do you intervene? 
10.Why are you not implementing collective bargaining in your sector? 
Why, instead you prefer to champion for best-sourcing initiative and 
inclusive growth programme? 
11. Are you confident that the security productivity initiatives will 
improve the life of your member? How? Why? 
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Appendix B-6 Sample Interview Questions for WGSSP 
Representative 
1. Please share with me the aim of the workgroup. What are the terms 
of reference of the workgroup? 
2. The work group has recommended a suite of very ambitious 
strategies. How confident are you in achieving the intended 
outcome of 15% increase in wages over the next 5 year? 
3. How will these strategies be implemented? Who is overseeing the 
implementation? 
4. Is productivity enhancement is workable concept in outsourced 
services sector like security? What are the major challenges? 
5. How does the workgroup intend to measure the success of the 
plan? 
6. Strategy one attempts to create career progression for the security 
sector. How will this be done? Do you see the need to pack this 
with corresponding wage-level? How can this be done? 
7. Strategy four mentions the need to reduce overtimes arrangement 
and increase wages. But there is not concrete implementation plan. 
What are the concerns? 
8. Strategy two is a continuation of existing best-sourcing initiative 
(BSI). BSI has not been successful in the past. Why does the work 
group continue to pin hope on such approach? 
9. Strategy three on security technology deployment is based on the 
assumption that by using technology, security employers would be 
more productive. However, WDA's sectoral study shows that firms 
and buyers are adverse to such approach. Why the persistent in 
security technologies as the solution to productivity? 
10.What are the necessary conditions to ensure the success of the 
productivity initiatives? 
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Appendix C-1 Participant Information Sheet 
MM DD YYYY 
Dear 
I would like to invite you to participate in the case study of 
education and mobility of workers in Singapore Security Sector. The 
project aims to gain an in-depth understanding of how workers engage 
with stakeholders in the continuing education and training (CET) system 
that facilitate their entry into security jobs and their skills upgrading within 
the sector. And, how security firms' coordination activities with 
stakeholders influence the education and mobility of their employees. The 
intended benefit of the study is to shed light on what are the factors within 
the CET system that facilitate or impede the mobility of the workers within 
security sector. 
What is involved if I take part in the study? 
With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded and 
transcribed. Upon request, a transcription of the interview can be sent to 
you for verification. A copy of the interview questions will be included for 
your information close to the date of interview. 
What will happen to what I say in the interview? 
Neither you nor your organization would be named in the research 
reports. Your personal details will be removed from the research data 
before it is stored securely for the duration of the project. It will then be 
destroyed upon completion of the study. 
The study is the doctorate thesis of Ms Gog Soon Joo, who is being 
supervised by Professor Lorna Unwin of Institute of Education and 
Associate Professor Lee Yew Jin of National Institute of Education. Soon 
Joo is contactable at soonjoogog@gmail.com or 94350819 
Yours sincerely, 
Gog Soon Joo 
Principal Investigator 
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Appendix C-2 Interview Consent Form 
Project title: Education and Economic Mobility of Low-Wage Workers: 
The Case of The Security Sector In Singapore 
Principal Investigator: Ms Gog Soon Joo 
Mobile: 94350819, 
Email: soonjoogog@gmail.com 
 
• I have read the Participation Information Sheet and the purpose of 
the research project has been explained to me. I understand and 
agree to take part. 
• I understand the purpose of the research project and my 
involvement in it. 
• I understand that my involvement is voluntary, and that I may 
withdraw from the research project at any stage. 
• I understand that while information gained during the study may be 
published, I will not be identified and what I say will remain 
confidential. 
• I understand that the interview will be audio-taped. 
• I understand that the tape will be used to create written version of 
the interview and then erased. I understand that once the transcript 
has been prepared, I will be offered an opportunity to review it. 
• I understand that any publications (report, journal articles, seminar, 
etc.) will neither name nor identify my affiliated organization and 
me. 
Full name of interviewees 
Contact details (phone or email) 
Signature 
Date 
I would like a copy of my consent form Yes/No 
I would like a copy of my transcript Yes/No 
I would like a summary of the research report Yes/No 
I have provided information about the research to the research 
participant and believe that he/she understands what is involved. 
Researcher's signature: 	 Date: 
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